Consciousness, Color, and Content / Edition 1

Consciousness, Color, and Content / Edition 1

by Michael Tye
     
 

A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.See more details below

Overview

A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262700887
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
02/07/2002
Series:
Representation and Mind series
Edition description:
Reprint
Pages:
212
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.50(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

Preface
I Challenges to Reductive Theories of
Consciousness
1 Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and
the Knowledge Argument
1.1 The Hypothesis Clarified
1.2 The Three L's (Levin, Lycan, and Loar): Some Unpersuasive
Objections to the Ability Hypothesis
1.3 The Problem as I See It
1.4 A Possible Revision to the Ability Hypothesis
1.5 More on Knowing What It Is Like and the Knowledge Argument
2 The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion
2.1 Perspectival Subjectivity
2.2 Phenomenal Concepts
2.3 The Gap Examined
2.4 Remaining Worries
II Representationalism
3 Representationalism: The Theory and Its
Motivations
3.1 Transparency
3.2 Introspective Awareness of Phenomenal Character
3.3 The Intensionality of Phenomenal Discourse
3.4 PANIC
3.5 The Nature of Phenomenal Content
4 Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New
Problems for Representationalism?
4.1 Levels of Content in Visual Experience
4.2 Replies to Counterexamples
4.3 Crossmodal Cases
5 On Moderation in Matters Phenomenal: Shoemaker and
Inverted Qualia
5.1 A Critique of Shoemaker's Theory
5.2 Inverted Spectrum Cases
6 Swampman Meets Inverted Earth
6.1 The Problem
6.2 Biting the Bullet on the Inverted Earth Objection: A Reply to
Block
6.3 The Real Trouble with Biting the Bullet
6.4 An Alternative Approach to Inverted Earth
III Color and Simple Minds
7 On Some Alleged Problems for Objectivism about
Color
7.1 The Commonsense View of Color
7.2 Three Theories of Color Consistent with Common Sense
7.3 A Physicalist Reply to Cosmides and Tooby
7.4 The Unitary/Binary Structure of theHues
7.5 Criticisms of Theories at Odds with Common Sense
8 The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is
Like to Be a Honey Bee?
8.1 The Phenomenal Consciousness of Simple Creatures
8.2 Some Disclaimers
References
Name Index
Subject Index

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