Contract Theory / Edition 1

Contract Theory / Edition 1

by Patrick Bolton, Mathias Dewatripont, Mathias Dewatripont
     
 

ISBN-10: 0262025760

ISBN-13: 9780262025768

Pub. Date: 01/01/2005

Publisher: MIT Press

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels.

It covers the areas of agency theory, information

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Overview

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels.

It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics,especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained,intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

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Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262025768
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
01/01/2005
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
744
Sales rank:
1,142,478
Product dimensions:
7.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.25(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Related Subjects

Table of Contents

1Introduction1
Pt. IStatic bilateral contracting45
2Hidden information, screening47
3Hidden information, signaling99
4Hidden action, moral hazard129
5Disclosure of private certifiable information171
6Multidimensional incentive problems199
Pt. IIStatic multilateral contracting237
7Multilateral asymmetric information : bilateral trading and auctions239
8Multiagent moral hazard and collusion297
Pt. IIIRepeated bilateral contracting365
9Dynamic adverse selection367
10Dynamic moral hazard419
Pt. IVIncomplete contracts487
11Incomplete contracts and institution design489
12Foundations of contracting with unverifiable information553
13Markets and contracts601
14Exercises647

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