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"In the light of recent interest in both deliberation and privatization, McFarland's meticulous research on the attempts of environmentalists and business ...
"In the light of recent interest in both deliberation and privatization, McFarland's meticulous research on the attempts of environmentalists and business executives to negotiate their differences is sobering. He argues that deliberation among private parties has its limits because minority vetoes stymie negotiations and because active involvement of government officials is absolutely critical. This is an important contribution to literatures on interest groups, corporatism, environmental politics, and public policy."—John W. Kingdon, author of Congressmen's Voting Decisions
"Truly an original contribution to interest group theory. Although it ultimately failed to bring about binding agreements on the largest issues involved, the NCPP was surprisingly successful in getting as far as it did. For this approach to be improved so that it may succeed, political elites need a better understanding of the techniques that worked and those that didn't. McFarland's imaginative and well-grounded theorizing serves that purpose. A work of distinction."—Jeffrey M. Berry, author of The Interest Group Society
"This is an intrinsically interesting case, and even more so for what its apparent failures tell us about the dynamics embedded in the American system of governance. This book makes important theoretical statements about the evolution of interest group politics and public policymaking in the United States."—Christopher J. Bosso, author of Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle of a Public Issue
Author Biography: Andrew McFarland, professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Chicago, is author of Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest, Public Interest Lobbies: Decision Making on Energy, and Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems.
|1||An Experiment in Interest Group Theory||1|
|2||Coal, Strip-Mining, and Air Pollution: The Policy Context||12|
|3||An Organizing Principle: The Rule of Reason||30|
|4||Early History of the National Coal Policy Project||44|
|5||The Process of Consensus||68|
|7||The Failure of Lobbying||102|
|8||The NCPP and Regulatory Negotiation||131|
|Appendix A: Participants in the NCPP||169|
|Appendix B: Schedule of Meetings Held, Phase I||175|
|Appendix C: Contributors||179|