Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications / Edition 1by Ahmet Alkan
Pub. Date: 03/19/1999
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
The twenty-nine papers selected for this volume cover topics in cooperative and noncooperative games, social choice and welfare, bargaining, matchings, auctions, mechanism design, general equilibrium, general equilibrium with finance, industrial organization, macroeconomics, and experimental economics. They reflect the diversity and depth of thought and method in
The twenty-nine papers selected for this volume cover topics in cooperative and noncooperative games, social choice and welfare, bargaining, matchings, auctions, mechanism design, general equilibrium, general equilibrium with finance, industrial organization, macroeconomics, and experimental economics. They reflect the diversity and depth of thought and method in economic theory and applications, as shown in the meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET).
Table of Contents
E. Agliardi: Pseudo-supermodular games: theory and an application.- F. Aleskerov, E. Kurbanov: Degree of manipulability of social choice procedures.- A. Alkan: On the properties of stable many-to-many matchings under responsive preferences.- S. Altug, F. Demers, M. Demers: Cost uncertainty, taxation, and irreversible investment.- S. Athanasoulis, R. Shiller: The significance of the market portfolio: theory and evidence.- E. Basci, I. Saglam: Does money matter? A deterministic model with cash-in-advance constraints in factor markets.- S. Bose, G. Deltas: Welcoming the middlemen: restricting competition in auctions by excluding the consumers.- M. Dasgupta, R. Deb: Acyclicity of fuzzy preferences.- J. Davila: On the connection between correlated equilibria and sunspot equilibria.- F. Forges: Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms.- H. Gersbach, H. Haller: Allocation among multi-member households: issues, cores, and equilibria.- P. Hammond, A. Villar: Valuation equilibrium revisited.- C. Herrero, A. Villar: The equal-distance rule in allocation problems with single-peaked preferences.- A. Idzik: The existence of the satisfactory point.- K. Kawamata: Optimal entry and the marginal contribution of a player.- L. Koutsougeras: On an Edgeworth characterization of rational expectations equilibria in atomless asset market economies.- S. Lahiri: A characterization of the equal income market equilibrium choice correspondence based on average envy freeness.- B. Lucke: Non-keynesian effects of fiscal contractions: theory and applications for Germany.- M. Magill, M. Quinzii: Incentives and risk sharing in a sk market equilibrium.- M.-A. Oliva, L. A. Rivera-Batiz: Mergers and acquisations, bargaining, and synergy traps.- B. Z. Orbay: Protectionism versus non-protectionism under cost uncertainty in Cournot and Stackelberg markets.- B. Peleg, J. Rosenmüller, P. Sudhölter: The canonical extensive form of a game form: symmetries.- C. Ponsati, J. Sakovics: Bargaining in a changing environment.- D. Ramachandran, L. Rüschendorf: An extension of the nonatomic assignment model.- C. Seidl, S. Traub: Testing decision rules for multiattribute decision making.- K. Serfes, N. C. Yannelis: Collusion and distribution of profits under differential information.- A. Stefanescu: Predicting proposal configurations in cooperative games and exchange economies.- B. Taub: International financial equilibrium with risk sharing and private information.- R. Tourky: Remark on extended price equilibria.
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