Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence

Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence

by Roger D. Congleton
     
 

Leading scholars in rational choice analysis present the public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives on the political and economic effects of constitutional design and review the accumulating empirical evidence.See more details below

Overview

Leading scholars in rational choice analysis present the public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives on the political and economic effects of constitutional design and review the accumulating empirical evidence.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262033497
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
06/01/2006
Pages:
408
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.75(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

1Introduction : rational choice politics and institutions1
2Direct democracy : designing a living constitution39
3Constitutions and economic policy81
4Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system111
5The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies133
6On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovermmental bargaining and policy stability163
7Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy189
8Federalism : a constitutional perspective205
9Common tax pool problems in federal systems229
10Judicial independence and economic development251
11Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations289
12Amendment procedures and constitutional stability319
13Designing constitutional stability343

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