Deontic Morality and Control

by Ishtiyaque Haji

Overview

This book addresses the following dilemma: if determinism is true, no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. Prof. Haji concludes by explaining that if no action is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, then our world would be morally impoverished.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521813877
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	07/18/2002
Series:	Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Pages:	304
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.67(d)
Lexile:	1460L (what's this?)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; Part I. Determinism and Deontic Morality: 2. Obligation and control; 3. Frankfurt-type cases and deontic control; 4. Control requirements of deontic anchors: some objections; 5. Determinism and deontic anchors; Part II. Indeterminism and Deontic Morality: 6. Transition: from determinism to indeterminism; 7. Robust modest R-libertarianism and luck; 8. Robust model R-libertarianism and deontic anchors; Part III. Consequences of Being Deprived of Deontic Anchors: 9. The significance of the possibility of being without deontic anchors; 10. Determinism, deontic anchors and appraisability; 11. Virtue ethics without metaphysical freedom; 12. On the connection between morality's dethronement and deontic anchors; 13. Concluding remarks; Notes; Glossary and list of principles; References; Index.

Editorial Reviews

Haji (philosophy, U. of Minnesota, Morris) sets forth a detailed presentation of a new dilemma about freedom and deontic morality which closely mirrors the long-existing dilemma of freedom and responsibility: If determinism and indeterminism are true, then no one has control over one's actions, but it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, to perform an action only if one has control over it, and therefore no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. Haji suggests a way that the dilemma can be evaded, arguing that moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not indeterminism, and that if determinism were true the result would be a morally-impoverished world. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Booknews

'Readers interested in recent debates not only in its main field but in virtue ethics, or on the relation of morality to practical reason, will find the work impressively up to date and incisively engaged.' Journal of Moral Philosophy

'rigorous and thought-provoking work, … Haji's arguments are meticulous and intriguing and I found much in the work in which I agreed. … Haji has addressed a problem that has not received sufficient attention. For whilst the literature on control and responsibility is huge, far less has been said about control and deontic morality.' Philosophical Writings

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