Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions

Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions

by Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova
     
 

ISBN-10: 0521816181

ISBN-13: 9780521816182

Pub. Date: 01/12/2004

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with

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Overview

The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521816182
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
01/12/2004
Pages:
396
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.18(d)

Table of Contents

List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
1Federations and the Theoretical Problem1
2Federal Bargaining42
3Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining76
4Representation111
5Incentives142
6Political Parties in a Federal State177
7Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I226
8Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II259
9Designing Federalism299
References337
Name Index367
Subject Index374

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