Designing the New European Union / Edition 1

Designing the New European Union / Edition 1

by Helge Berger

ISBN-10: 0444529683

ISBN-13: 9780444529688

Pub. Date: 01/01/2007

Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing

This volume is based on papers delivered at the second CESifo-Delphi Conferences (Munich, November 2003, and Delphi, June 2004), which are jointly organized by CESifo and the Department of International and European Economic Studies of the Athens University of Economics and Business. The CESifo-Delphi Conferences are organized every two years and involve a two-stage…  See more details below


This volume is based on papers delivered at the second CESifo-Delphi Conferences (Munich, November 2003, and Delphi, June 2004), which are jointly organized by CESifo and the Department of International and European Economic Studies of the Athens University of Economics and Business. The CESifo-Delphi Conferences are organized every two years and involve a two-stage process. Following an initial call for abstracts, a number of authors were selected and invited to present their papers at a workshop meeting in Munich. After further refereeing, some of the authors were invited to present (possibly revised) versions of their papers at the final conference meeting in Delphi.

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Emerald Group Publishing
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Contributions to Economic Analysis Series
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Table of Contents

Preface     xiii
List of Contributors     xv
Introduction     1
Designing Europe - A Survey of Tasks Ahead   Helge Berger   Thomas Moutos     3
Introduction     3
Europe's institutions: the constitution     5
Europe's institutions: other aspects of EU organization     8
Fiscal and financial policies     16
One money, one economy?     20
Concluding remarks     25
References     26
Europe's Institutions     31
In Praise of the European Constitution: A Political Economics Perspective   Gerard Roland     33
Introduction     33
A primer on the constitutional treaty     35
Evaluating the constitution     40
A cleaned up intergovernmental institution or a parliamentary confederation?     40
Which public goods will the EU deliver with the Constitution?     47
Conclusion     51
Acknowledgement     52
References     52
Comment: Lambros Pechlivanos     53
Institutional Aspects of EU Organization: An Economic Analysis   Massimo Bordignon     57
Introduction     57
On enhanced cooperation     59
The problem     59
What are ECAs?     61
ECAs: the debate     63
The analysis     65
Policy implications     72
The allocation of powers inside the EU and the "open coordination method"     75
The problem     75
The analysis     77
Results     78
Policy implications for the EU     80
Concluding remarks     80
Acknowledgement     81
References     82
Comment: Stefan Voigt     85
Welfare Policy Integration Inconsistencies   Giuseppe Bertola     91
Introduction     91
Welfare policy in an integrating world     92
Choices and changes     93
Economic policy in the EU     96
Social policy and the EU     100
Principles and policies     101
Incoherence     104
Enlargement, delays, and reforms     105
Integration, delayed?     107
Redesigning and modernizing welfare delivery     110
Summary and prospects     114
Acknowledgments     117
References      117
Appendix     119
Comment: Laszlo Goerke     121
The EU Budget: How Much Scope for Institutional Reform?   Henrik Enderlein   Johannes Lindner   Oscar Calvo-Gonzales   Raymond Ritter     129
Introduction     129
Some theoretical considerations     131
The EU's institutional framework between supranational and intergovernmental decision modes     131
Budgetary procedures - a balance between efficiency and legitimacy     134
The EU budgetary procedure under the constraint of limited political integration     135
Reforming the EU budgetary procedure: an assessment     137
Proposals for reform at the general level     140
Proposals for reform at the level of multi-annual planning     143
Proposals for reform at the level of the annual procedure     148
The state of play following the intergovernmental conference     153
Conclusion     156
Acknowledgement     157
References     157
Comment: Margarita Katsimi     161
Fiscal and Financial Policies     165
From the Stability and Growth Pact to a Sustainability Council for EMU   Jurgen von Hagen     167
Introduction: Europe's fiscal framework under stress     167
Fiscal discipline in the EMU     168
The Excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact     170
Proposals for SGP reform     172
Fiscal performance under the EDP and the SGP     173
Experiences in the 1990s     173
Fiscal policy stance 1998-2003     175
Patterns of fiscal adjustment in the EMU     177
A sustainability council for the EMU     182
Mandate     183
Method of operation     184
Enforcement     185
Independence, accountability, and transparency     186
Appointments, composition, and resources     187
Conclusions     188
References     188
Calculation of fiscal stance     189
Comment: Wolfgang Eggert     191
Super Vision of the European Banking Market   Martin Schuler     195
Introduction     195
The rationale for integration of banking supervision in Europe     197
Banking supervision in the EU     201
The national arrangements     201
The internationalization of banking supervision     202
Proposed reform of the supervisory arrangements in the EU      205
Evaluation of the supervisory arrangements     209
Open issues in crisis management     210
Lender of last resort and central bank involvement     210
The European situation - do we need a European LOLR?     212
A European observatory of systemic risk     214
Conclusions     215
References     216
Appendix     220
Comment: Tuomas Takalo     223
One Money, One Economy?     229
Reasons and Implications of Inflation Differentials Within the European Monetary Union   Ignazio Angeloni   Michael Ehrmann     231
Introduction     231
Stylised evidence and interpretations     233
A model of inflation differentials in EMU     241
The role of inflation persistence     244
Effect of changes in the monetary policy rule     245
Conclusions     251
Acknowledgement     252
References     252
Comment: Andrew Hughes Hallett     255
Black Tie Required? How to Enter a Currency Union?   Volker Nitsch     263
Introduction     263
Implementing a monetary union: two case studies     264
Greece      264
Ecuador     265
Background and literature     266
Data     267
Empirical results     269
Robustness     280
Conclusions     281
Acknowledgements     282
References     282
Comment: Sarantis Kalyvitis     285
Subject Index     289

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