Differential Information Economies / Edition 1

Differential Information Economies / Edition 1

by Dionysius Glycopantis
     
 

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ISBN-10: 3642059775

ISBN-13: 9783642059773

Pub. Date: 12/15/2010

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume

Overview

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9783642059773
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date:
12/15/2010
Series:
Studies in Economic Theory Series, #19
Edition description:
Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005
Pages:
650
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.36(d)

Table of Contents

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies.- Core Notions, Existence Results.- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy.- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper.- The core of an economy with differential information.- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core.- On the continuity of expected utility.- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core.- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw.- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information.- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence.- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information.- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies.- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core.- Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility.- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information.- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies.- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core.- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm.- Optimal multilateral contracts.- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry.- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans.- Incentive compatible contractible information.- Continuity and Stability.- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete.- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms.- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection.- Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core.- Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET.- Cooperative games with incomplete information.- The value allocation of an economy with differential information.- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information.- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information.- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?.- Implementation.- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies.- An extensive form interpretation of the private core.- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies.

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