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Gang- and drug-related inner-city violence, with its attendant epidemic of incarceration, is the defining crime problem in our country. In some neighborhoods in America, one out of every two hundred young black men is shot to death every year, and few initiatives of government and law enforcement have made much difference. But when David Kennedy, a self-taught and then-unknown criminologist, engineered the "Boston Miracle" in the mid-1990s, he pointed the way toward what few had...
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Gang- and drug-related inner-city violence, with its attendant epidemic of incarceration, is the defining crime problem in our country. In some neighborhoods in America, one out of every two hundred young black men is shot to death every year, and few initiatives of government and law enforcement have made much difference. But when David Kennedy, a self-taught and then-unknown criminologist, engineered the "Boston Miracle" in the mid-1990s, he pointed the way toward what few had imagined: a solution.
Don't Shoot tells the story of Kennedy's long journey. Riding with beat cops, hanging with gang members, and stoop-sitting with grandmothers, Kennedy found that all parties misunderstood each other, caught in a spiral of racialized anger and distrust. He envisioned an approach in which everyone-gang members, cops, and community members-comes together in what is essentially a huge intervention. Offenders are told that the violence must stop, that even the cops want them to stay alive and out of prison, and that even their families support swift law enforcement if the violence continues. In city after city, the same miracle has followed: violence plummets, drug markets dry up, and the relationship between the police and the community is reset.
This is a landmark book, chronicling a paradigm shift in how we address one of America's most shameful social problems. A riveting, page-turning read, it combines the street vérité of The Wire, the social science of Gang Leader for a Day, and the moral urgency and personal journey of Fist Stick Knife Gun. But unlike anybody else, Kennedy shows that there could be an end in sight.
"Fascinating…Kennedy's argument is solid, and he shows again and again that many of our approaches to crime are done to make an electorate feel good, without changing basic dynamics that drive the drug trade…Understanding and knowledge, more than guns and handcuffs, are weapons in the war on crime that last for generations." – Seattle Times "For the last few years, from roughly the spot on the Venn diagram of intellectual culture where Malcolm Gladwell and David Simon overlap, some intriguing flares have been set off by a crime theorist named David M. Kennedy… Kennedy’s work suggested that optimism was possible…What is brilliant about [it] is its specificity, its insistence that street violence has its own special contours and patterns that can be understood, and manipulated, and that crime is only about crime…. that maybe crime itself [can] be bargained with." – New Republic
"Kennedy tells me that this work can cut the nation’s homicide rate in half. Read his important book - part jeremiad, part gripping crime thriller - and you will believe him…The approach is simple, but not easy... It takes tremendous, continuous cooperation - reaching across political, organizational, and cultural divides... This is how we, as a nation, can and must finally back out of the rolling destruction, by death and mass incarceration, of our cities, our society, and our moral character." – Boston Globe
“An unlikely criminal-justice pioneer revisits his innovative, immensely successful crusade against youth homicide in America's worst neighborhoods… A valuable text—not just for the solution, but also for the refreshing philosophy behind it.” —Kirkus Reviews “In a matter-of-fact, street-smart style... Kennedy explains his remarkably effective strategies for combating violent crime… This heartfelt book shows what can happen when police, gangs, and communities come together to address some of America's most intractable social problems.” —Publishers Weekly, starred review “The good news about the drug- and gang-related violence epidemic is that it can be controlled and substantially reduced. As proof, you only have to read David Kennedy’s wonderful new book Don’t Shoot… Now being tried in over 70 communities, David’s campaign is expanding to have the national and international impact it deserves.” —Bill Bratton, chairman of Kroll, former chief of police of the Los Angeles Police Department “Don't Shoot is a work of moral philosophy that reads like a crime novel—Immanuel Kant meets Joseph Wambaugh. It’s a fascinating, inspiring, and wonderfully well written story of one man's quest to solve a problem no one thought could be solved: the scourge of inner city gang violence… This is a vitally important work that has the potential to usher in a new era in policing.” —John Seabrook, author of Flash of Genius “Represents one of a small number of ‘big ideas’ revolutionizing crime control, especially policing and prosecution. Shame on any city, police department, or prosecutor’s office that isn’t learning from [Kennedy’s] experience. What Don’t Shoot documents really matters.” —George Kelling, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, professor of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, and fellow in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University “Kennedy’s ideas extend beyond community policing and serve to revolutionize the entire criminal justice system.” —Garry F. McCarthy, superintendant of Chicago police “Despite the recent and welcome decline in United States crime, gun crime remains a persistent concern in this country. Solutions to the ‘gun problem,’ fueled by ideological, constitutional, and moral debates, diverge considerably. In Don’t Shoot, David Kennedy elegantly and forcefully describes an approach to stopping gun violence that does not depend on policing gun crime with guns or solving crime’s root causes. Instead, his approach leans on the power of community trust in the law and officials – legitimacy. Offenders can and do voluntarily comply with the law. When they do, neighborhoods are safer, fewer people go to prison, and policing is turned on its head.” — Tracey L. Meares, deputy dean and Walton Hale Hamilton Professor, Yale Law School “David Kennedy’s work helped Cincinnati revolutionize the way that we think about policing our community. His passion for solving the never-ending cycle of violence is evident in every conversation with him. We have found that by engaging offenders with a strong, unified, community message telling them that the violence must stop and offering them an alternative life, we can have a meaningful and lasting impact in our community. David’s work is a must read for Mayors around the country confronted with the scourge of gun violence in their cities.” —Mark Mallory, mayor, Cincinnati, Ohio “The author brings more than two decades of practical, administrative, managerial, supervisory and academic experience to this work of art. A unique and comprehensive view of the toxic impact of mass incarceration on our most vulnerable neighborhoods as seen through the eyes of this criminal justice professional. A must read.” —Patrick R. Melvin, national president of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) “The book provides a raw and unadulterated look at gang violence as well as Mr. Kennedy’s approach to combating it on a national level… His commitment over the years has helped to save and change the lives of many youth… This is a must read for all!” —Tyrone C. Parker, executive director, Alliance of Concerned Men “The subheading for this book, ‘The End of Violence in Inner-City America’ would be pretentious if were it not for the indisputable evidence, compelling true stories, and common sense solutions detailed therein. Bottom line: this works.” —Reverend Kenneth Edward Copeland, New Zion Baptist Church, Rockford, Illinois
An unlikely criminal-justice pioneer revisits his innovative, immensely successful crusade against youth homicide in America's worst neighborhoods.
Kennedy (Criminal Justice/John Jay Coll.) didn't set out to dedicate his career to crime, much less the seemingly insurmountable problem of gang-and-drug related violence plaguing America's cities and stumping even the most seasoned law-enforcement units. Rather, as an aspiring writer straight out of college, he took a job constructing teaching cases for Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. An early assignment on problem-oriented policing sent him to Los Angeles' beleaguered Watts neighborhood, one of many hit hard by the 1980s crack epidemic. Kennedy was struck by the devastating violence he witnessed and, as he plunged further into researching the problem, the horrifying trends it represented. Quickly, a few things became clear. First, guns, drugs and gangs held the keys to the downward spiral. Second, in a shockingly optimistic and humane perspective, that the real problem was, in essence, a massive misunderstanding; that is, that cops and communities wanted, at the base level, the same things, and could be brought together to work toward them. Kennedy and a few key colleagues launched what became known as the Boston Miracle (a name not sanctioned by Kennedy, who emphasized that hard work, rather than divine intervention, created the results). With a massive communication effort, including an astonishing set of forum meetings which actually brought gang members and police officers together, Kennedy's team made clear to the community their goal of stopping violence and valuing the young lives that had previously gone unnoticed. Results were swift and unprecedented—youth homicide rates halved, then quartered, and broad changes were made to communities. More importantly, the solution was not specific to Boston. Over the years, Kennedy has cloned his experiment in cities across the country, from smaller communities like Stockton, Calif., to, with significantly more effort and issues, meccas of urban blight like Baltimore.The problem has in no way been eliminated—and Kennedy emphasizes the drastic consequences when the programs falter—but progress is undeniable.
A valuable text—not just for the solution, but also for the refreshing philosophy behind it.
In the mid-1990s, David M. Kennedy spearheaded Operation Ceasefire, a series of interventions aimed at bringing down the high youth homicide rate in Boston. The project worked so well that it became widely known by another name: the Boston Miracle. In this book, Kennedy, now a professor of criminal justice at John Jay College, writes, "I always hated that name, it wasn't a miracle, it was hard damned work."
Don't Shoot: One Man, a Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in Inner-City America is Kennedy's passionate account of that work, which has seen striking results not just in the roughest sections of Boston but in many of the bleakest neighborhoods of the United States. While his goals were lofty — healing toxic relationships between the police and blighted communities, rewriting the conventional wisdom on gangs, drugs, and violent crime — Kennedy proposed solutions so simple that cops often laughed him out of the room.
Years of research showed that a very small percentage of gang members was actually driving inner-city violence — and that most of the kids joining gangs felt trapped and scared. The program Kennedy created in response involved calling them into forums with police and a host of community workers and social service providers. Gang members were told that the community cared about them and would help them, but the violence had to stop. If it didn't, they were warned, heavy law enforcement would come down on them hard. The program left gangs intact but "surgically [excised] the violence from the mix." In most cases, violent crime plummeted almost immediately.
Kennedy's chronicle of his two and a half decades working on urban crime is highly readable, if occasionally repetitive. He is by turns hopeful and wry, though consistently generous to the many colleagues he's worked with in the field. He is also bracingly honest, about everything from poisoned race relations and vicious local politics to the zigzagging emotions he experiences as he immerses himself in this important work. He writes, "I have gone from feeling, at least from time to time, pretty damned smart, to feeling deeply, profoundly humble and not infrequently ashamed."
Barbara Spindel has covered books for Time Out New York, Newsweek.com, Details, and Spin. She holds a Ph.D. in American Studies.
Reviewer: Barbara Spindel
The first piece of the puzzle came in Boston. Like the pieces that would follow, it came as a revelation, the first in a series of revelations. I don't mean it in the biblical sense, though I work with people, people of faith, who are quite sure that Providence is at work. It's that big, that powerful. But I mean it in the more mundane, the more literal sense. I mean that the pieces have been revealed, disclosed, unveiled. Looking back, it's clear. This piece went with that piece, then those went with this piece. Sometimes it was hard to see the pieces, sometimes hard to see how they fit together. But the pieces are there, they fit, and when you see how they fit it all makes perfect sense.
The first piece was gangs.
Or, as we would come to see, not gangs, not exactly. But close enough.
It came one day in January 1995, in a battered muster room at the Boston Police Department's special-operation headquarters on Warren Street in Roxbury, from Paul Joyce.
I was on the ground in Boston because America's streets were burning.
Boston, just across the river from my Cambridge office, was one of the many city stories that together added up to the national homicide epidemic. It was far from the worst, but it was bad enough and ran appallingly to type. Crack hit Boston hard in 1988. In 1987, there were around twenty killed, age twenty-four and under; in 1990, there were over seventy. It came down from there, but not enough. It wasn't just the sheer volume of violence, it was the center-is-not-holding craziness of it all. In August of 1988, Tiffany Moore, a twelve-year-old black girl, was shot three times while sitting on a mailbox on Humboldt Avenue in Boston's largely black Roxbury neighborhood. A mistake, but she was dead anyway. The city hired outreach workers to try to pull the kids off the corners. In 1992, gang members with knives and guns invaded the Morning Star Baptist Church and attacked mourners at a memorial ser vice for a slain rival. Black ministers started walking the streets at night. None of it worked. In 1994, kids fleeing a shooting at a popular skating rink left so many guns behind the police had trouble figuring out which might be implicated in the shooting. It was chaos. Bernie Fitzgerald, chief probation officer in Boston's Dorchester neighborhood, was sitting in his office one morning, looking out the window, and saw two kids on opposite sides of Washington Street shooting at each other. A judge called for the National Guard to be deployed against the gang problem in the court houses. "I think there was a real question in people's minds about whether Boston would remain a viable city," said BPD commissioner Paul Evans. The same story was being played out all across the country.
Boston sergeant detective Paul Joyce: strong, silent, shaved head, marathon runner, to this day I think probably the best street cop I've ever met. In another life Paul would have been the sheriff who rides alone into the mountains while the bankers and farmers cower and brings back the entire band of outlaws that has been terrorizing the town, or a Shaolin monk, meditating all day save for bursts of acrobatic, devastating, morally impeccable violence. In this life, he was the de facto and spiritual leader of the Boston Police Department's Youth Violence Strike Force: a gang unit, by any other name. We sat there that day in 1995, he with his people and I with mine, and he said, We know what's going on out there, we know what's getting them killed, and told us a story we'd never heard before. The rest of the world saw chaos, pathology, irrationality, sociopathy. Paul Joyce saw gangs.
Our team from the Kennedy School had set up in Boston to try to do something about the killing. We'd ended up with Paul Joyce on Warren Street against our better judgment; we didn't think a gang unit was the right place to start. We were wrong. Paul Joyce knew what was going on on the streets. He knew, in ways we had never heard before, who was doing the killing and who the dying. He knew what was behind the killing and the dying. He understood the unwritten rules, the community, of the streets. He knew what didn't work with that community. He had brought together around him a network from law enforcement, the neighborhoods, the streets, that collectively knew even more. He, and they, even knew—and told us that first day—what worked to stop the killing. It was a story dramatically unlike all the other public and political and academic stories about what was going on, and even more dramatically unlike all the stories about what to do about it. We didn't understand it, any of it, at first, and wouldn't for some time to come.
But we would come to understand it. And it would change everything.
We'd gone to Boston, to the Boston Police Department, had ended up with Paul Joyce, to try to map the new policing ideas onto the youth violence epidemic. When I had started to think, several years earlier, about leaving my spectator's seat and trying to do some real work, it was the killing I had fastened on. It was the biggest crime issue in the country; nothing else even came close. Nothing anybody was doing was working. From my vantage at the Kennedy School, my work with the Executive Session, getting to know the nation's best police chiefs, plugged into the policy conversations, on the ground in the hot neighborhoods all across the country, I'd had a very good view of the policy conversation in law enforcement, government, scholarly circles. I'd read the journal articles, followed the debates, watched the Washington action, saw what police departments and prosecutors and cities were doing, spent more time in the cities, at Justice. It was all nonsense. If you'd seen the streets up close, the debate, the plans, the actions were transparently ridiculous. Mandatory minimums. The federal death penalty for drug kingpins. Buy-busts. Just say no. Source-country interdiction. The Brady Bill. Reform the juvenile justice system. Waive juvenile killers to adult court. You've got to be kidding. None of it was making any difference on the ground, none of it was going to make any difference. Man with an Uzi. I wasn't trained—not a cop, not an academic, not anything—but I didn't have to be. See somebody step in front of a freight train and hold up their hand Stop you don't have to be a physicist or a doctor to know what's coming.
I had started to think. What might work, for real, on the streets, in the neighborhoods?
Looking at the carnage, I had been seized by one idea in particular. The kids were killing each other with guns, overwhelmingly handguns. Kids were not legally permitted to buy guns; they seemed to be having little problem doing so; all of this was illegal already; could anything be done about this illicit market? Would cutting off their access stop the killing? There was parallel work and thinking to draw on. A lot of the policing research I'd been doing for the last ten years had been on a portfolio of innovative, clever, and very effective efforts to shut down illicit drug markets. J. W. Collins, a powerful, plainspoken career Houston cop, had closed the Link Valley drug market literally overnight. Years of arrests hadn't made a dent, so Collins, armed with George Kelling's "broken windows" ideas, organized a big neighborhood coalition to clean the place up. As part of it, they published a notice in the paper that streets would be sealed off and checkpoints set up. They'd planned a huge law enforcement sweep, but the dealers read the paper; when the sweep rolled in there was nobody there. (It would take years to see how simple and central, how profound, that was.) Collins and his partners cleaned up, building managers reasserted themselves, problem gone; it didn't seem to reappear anywhere else. In Tampa, working with "market disruption" ideas developed by drug policy expert Mark Kleiman, police chief Bob Smith essentially ended street drug dealing, not by eliminating supply and demand but by driving the message home that selling on corners would simply not be tolerated. Police cultivated neighborhood informants who peered out their windows and phoned in details of the street action, like where stashes were hidden; officers would roll up, saunter to a tree, and dramatically ask, Does this bag of crack belong to anyone? No? Guess I'll keep it ... Officers couldn't arrest a recalcitrant group of dealers who had the brass to set up lawn chairs and coolers on their spot; the cops showed up one day, pulled their own lawn chairs out of the trunk, and sat down with them until they just gave up. Six months of this and the streets returned to normal.
I wondered whether any of this could be mapped onto stopping kids from getting guns and dove into the research on illegal gun markets. It turned out to be amazingly sparse, but tantalizing. There was evidence, for example, that drugs and guns were sold side by side on the streets. The money was clearly in the drugs—there were lots of repeat-customer drug addicts, but not many gun addicts—so could police use undercover officers and confidential informants to find the gun sellers, arrest them on stiff federal drug charges, and get the word out that selling guns was a pretty poor business decision? Could parents be offered a deal so that if they told police that their kid had a gun, the police could just take it without charging the kid? Could police officers pose as kids, as they sometimes did to investigate drug dealing in schools, and make their way to street gun dealers?
The idea that something like this might be worth trying was arguably supported by new literature on kids and guns that suggested very strongly that it was fear, rather than core criminality, that was driving a lot of the current craziness. Carnegie Mellon's Alfred Blumstein, perhaps America's most prominent criminologist, did research suggesting that while guns and gun violence had begun with new, young drug dealers in the new crack markets, it had "diffused" from there into broader youth culture: Kids not involved in the drug trade were getting, carrying, and using guns because their world had become so objectively dangerous. Research by Joseph Sheley and James Wright seemed to tell a similar story: Nearly a quarter of the inner-city kids they surveyed carried a gun at least some of the time, and gave self-protection as the most powerful reason why. It made sense to think that the chaos on the streets was feeding on itself—had become "decoupled" from crack and crack markets—and that steps to sap that energy in various ways also made sense. If guns were harder to get, scared kids would be less likely to have, carry, and use them; if there were fewer kids getting, carrying, and using guns, kids would be less scared.
Maybe. A year and a half before our team met the Boston cops on Warren Street, I wrote a paper called "Guns and Youth: Disrupting the Market," laying out the case that it might be true, and ways we might go about it. (My paper actually had a section on gangs that reviewed the many reasons gangs probably weren't driving the problem and read, in part, "since violence by any affiliated group tends to brand it as a gang, it's unclear that 'gang violence' is in any case much more than a tautology." Stay tuned on that one.)
I'd gotten to know Bill Bratton through the Harvard Executive Session. Bill was already a prominent, and would become a legendary, figure in policing. He'd begun his career as a street cop in Boston; taken over the New York City Transit Police, where with close advisor and my new friend George Kelling he'd reclaimed the city's subways; and come back to Boston, from whence he would shortly depart to launch the reinvention of the New York City Police Department and New York City's near-miraculous crime decline. In 1993, he was commissioner in Boston, where he was one of several police executives nationally taking a way-out-front role in support of the Brady Bill, the first serious gun-control mea sure to have a fighting chance politically in a generation. I went to see him in his office and gave him my paper. Brady is designed to keep adults with criminal records from buying guns at licensed gun stores, I told him. You know it won't help at all with what you're dealing with here in Boston, right? These kids aren't buying their guns at gun stores, they can't anyway. It's all illegal now. Brady won't touch it. Bratton stared at me from across his desk. He circulated my paper to a number of his command staff and kids-and-guns people. The distribution list included Superintendent-in-Chief Paul Evans, Superintendent James Claiborne, Lieutenant Kevin Foley, detectives Frederick Waggett and Robert Merner, and James Jordan. Jim Jordan I knew: He was the department's top civilian policy director. The rest I didn't know. Call Kennedy, Bratton said, this is worth thinking about. Nobody called.
Those names would return.
In November 1993, I presented my paper at my first American Society of Criminology conference, in Phoenix. After my panel was done, a tiny, whiskey-voiced, burnished walnut of a woman came up from the back of the room. "I've never thought of applying problem-oriented policing to guns," she said. "Who's supporting this work?" Nobody, I said, I just did this on my own time. (I had in fact written my paper while set up at home nursing a dying cat.) The woman was Lois Mock, whom I would come to know as a bulldog behind-the-scenes prime mover in American thinking on crime control. She went back to her post at the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the Department of Justice's research arm, and worked language into the next year's research program soliciting submissions to do problem-oriented policing on the youth homicide epidemic.
It would get us to Boston. In 1994, Anne Piehl, a Kennedy School economist focused on criminal justice issues, and I wrote a proposal to use problem-oriented policing to address juvenile gun violence. We'd actually planned to field the project in New Haven, Connecticut, which had a terrible reputation for youth violence, but hard numbers we got just a couple of days before the proposal was due showed a problem small enough that even a very successful intervention would have trouble showing impact statistically. In a panic, we reached out to Jim Jordan in the Boston Police Department, who carried the idea to Commissioner Paul Evans, who'd taken over from Bratton. Names, both of them, on Bratton's memo. Evans blessed it, we global-replaced "New Haven" with "Boston" in the document, folded in some numbers for the city, and sent it off to the Justice Department.
The problem-oriented policing script we were following was an odd one. It said, basically, pick a problem, research it, find partners, and figure out a way to fix it. Our problem, we thought, was "juvenile gun violence." We didn't think we knew all that much about the problem; researching it and understanding it would be one of our core tasks as scholars. Our key partner, at least at the outset, would be the Boston Police Department; we expected to add others, in law enforcement, the community, and elsewhere. We absolutely didn't know what the operational response should be. We came to call what we were proposing the Boston Gun Project, but in fact we weren't sure that was really right. This idea about addressing gun markets might be right, or it might not; the research and our partners might suggest very different directions.
Excerpted from Don't Shoot by David Kennedy Copyright © 2012 by David M. Kennedy. Excerpted by permission of Bloomsbury Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Posted March 30, 2012
This imposing work documents his 17 year effort to bring sanity to law enforcement's attempts to stop gun killings and open drug markets in various "hot "communities throughout our nation. More than law enforcement's heavy hand was involved...: the purveyors of violence, the gang bangers, thugs and wannabees, were involved as were the communities through moral voices (pastors, streetworkers, doctors and others) and "influentials" of these thugs (Aunties, moms, girl friends, siblings and incarcerated old heads or street legends). Finally Social Service providers were there and participating to provide training, addiction treatment or social services as needed and job opportunities. The thugs had to ask though and they had to stop the violence or face real criminal justice. It was part of the deal. From what Kennedy termed, the Call-in. Ask Freddie Cardoza from Boston, one of the first of the thugs given the treatment for ignoring the program's offer in Operation Ceasefire. He felt the heavy weight of a Federal indictment and conviction for POSSESSING one bullit, as his two prior convictions made him the perfect example for the other gunslingers in Boston. He went away for 20 years on that charge and is still doing the time as of today. The thugs got the message and the shootings stopped (at least for a while). This new approach worked and it traveled to other areas with different cultures, different problems and worked there as well. Check it out and visit the website. These folks are making changes for the better and we can all be proud of the work these Americans are doing. Our streets and parks can be made safe for our citizens. No saints here, only hard, dedicated workers. God Bless Them.
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Posted January 18, 2013
This important book explains the strategy used in several cities that has drastically cut the number of killings by coordinating the actions and reactions between all the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness. It's not an easy read, but when the strategy is applied, it works. It saves lives as well as improving the quality of lives, neighborhoods and cities.Was this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted February 2, 2013
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Posted January 5, 2012
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