...a carefully reasoned and admirably balanced
account that should be required reading for anyone
with an interest in the atomic bomb and the end of
the war...a well-informed, thoughtful and
judicious account...New York Times Book Review
The premise behind this excellent history of the concluding stages of WWII in the Pacific is that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has cast a light so bright that it has blinded historians to many of the political, diplomatic and military realities that existed before August 6, 1945. In his comprehensive study of the last months of WWII, Frank (Guadalcanal) aims to present events "as they were perceived and recorded by American and Japanese participants in 1945--not years or decades thereafter." In 1945, American strategists developed their plan, "Operation Downfall," for forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan. Japanese leaders, meanwhile, mobilized all available military and civilian resources for a final defense of the homeland. Though they knew the war was lost, Japanese military strategists believed their preparations were sufficient to compel the Allies to offer more generous terms on which the war might end. Frank immerses his readers in the flow of intelligence estimates, battle experience and shifting strategy on both sides. The centerpiece of the book is an exacting and dispassionate examination both of the American decision to use the atomic bomb and of whether Japan would have surrendered absent the bomb. Frank marshals an impressive and complex array of evidence to support his contention that surrender by Japan was by no means imminent in August 1945, and that alternatives to the bomb, such as incendiary bombing, carried no certainty of causing less suffering and fewer deaths than the atomic bomb. In his balanced use of sources and in his tough-minded sensitivity to moral issues, Frank has enriched the debate about the war's conclusion. Agent, Robert Gottlieb of William Morris. (Oct.) Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.
Publishers Weekly - Publisher's Weekly
Few historical issues have generated as much controversy as the question of whether the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was necessary to compel Japan's surrender. No single book can be expected to end such a heated debate, but Frank's masterly study of Japan's decision to surrender comes close to doing so. Based on extensive documentation from contemporary U.S. and Japanese diplomatic and military sources, it is the most authoritative treatment available of the end of the Pacific War. Frank (Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Campaign) emphasizes the enormous reluctance of Japan's military and civilian leaders even to consider, let alone accept, Allied demands for unconditional surrender prior to the atomic bombings. Skillfully weaving together the strands of military and diplomatic events, Frank contends that absent the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the war would have continued for at least several more months, at a cost in Japanese and Allied civilian and combatant lives far in excess of the admittedly awful toll that the atomic bombs exacted. A powerful work of history that belongs in all libraries.--Steven I. Levine, Univ. of Montana, Missoula Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.
The publication of Richard Frank's long-awaited Downfall is an event of great importance, not only to historians, but to the general public. No aspect of World War II is more controversial today than the use of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945. Some have argued that this act was cruel and unnecessary since Japan was on the verge of surrender.
By Means of exhaustive research, and the employment of previously neglected and recently declassifed sources, Frank proves in this definitive book that neither the Emperor nor the Japanese armed forces were anywhere close to surrendering in August 1945. In a stunning tour de force, Frank recreates the end of the war, not as it seemed to people writing much later, but as it appeared to American and Japanese decision-makers at the time.
Often seen as the worst possible way of ending the Pacific War, Frank established that using the bomb was superior to all the existing alternatives, and saved not only allied but Japanese lives as well. Masterful in conception brilliantly reasoned, superbly researched, Downfall is all but impossible to put down. Anyone concerned with the moral, military, and political issues surrounding the end of the Pacific War must read this book.
Military historian Frank (Guadalcanal, 1990) constructs a detailed history of the last months of the US war with Japan using both Japanese and American sources. Frank insists that events of the time be understood as they were perceived then, by both sides, not as they are now interpreted and judged. Using this method, Frank arrives at three conclusions: the US considered the use of atomic weapons not as extraordinary events but as part of a larger strategy of blockade and bombardment; not until after the use of atomic weapons did the Japanese indicate they were willing to surrender; and the use of atomic weapons was justified. The moral dimension of US actions was conditioned by the war in Europe and also by what was known of Japanese intentions. Devastating strategic bombing had taken place in Germany and continued in Japan. In March of 1945, up to 100,000 people perished in the firebombing of Tokyo. The use of atomic weapons was the culmination of strategic thinking, not a departure from it. On the Japanese side, according to that nation's sources as well as US intelligence reports, while offers of a negotiated settlement were floated, there was still strong support among top leaders, including the emperor, for ketsu-go, a last ditch effort to resist an invasion of the Japanese main islands. Thus, on the US side there was a general certainty that an invasion of Japan would create large numbers of US casualties. Frank discusses in great detail these and other themes, and his defense of the use of atomic weapons is convincing. Still, his contention that both sides would have readily accepted the bombing had they known it would have led to two generations of peace and prosperity isa violation of his own method of describing events as they were seen then, and so is a disingenuous defense that allows him to ignore deeper moral questions raised by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (maps, not seen)
