Dynamic Models of Oligopoly

by D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole

Overview

Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780415269179
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	12/06/2001
Series:	Harwood Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics Ser.
Pages:	94
Product dimensions:	5.44(w) x 8.50(h) x (d)

About the Author

Jean Tirole is chairman of the board of the Jean-Jacques Laffont Foundation at the Toulouse School of Economics, and scientific director of the Industrial Economics Institute (IDEI) in Toulouse. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Science in 2014.

Table of Contents

Part 1 †This survey is the outgrowth of lectures we gave at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (IMSSS), Stanford University, in the summer of 1983. Our research was supported by National Science Foundation grants SES 81–04769 and SES 82–01373 at the IMSSS, and by SES 82–07925 at the University of California, Berkeley. The authors would like to thank John Geanakoplos, David Kreps, Eric Maskin, John Roberts, Jose Scheinkman and Robert Wilson for helpful conversations, and Mordecai Kurz for encouraging us to undertake this project., Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole; Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 Competition in Tangible Variables; Chapter 3 Preemption; Chapter 4 Short-Run Commitment, Fixed Costs, and Natural Monopolies; Chapter 5 Price Wars and Tacit Collusion; Chapter 6 Investing in Disinformation;