The Dynamics of Normsby Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
Pub. Date: 04/09/2009
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
A 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays, presenting some of the best contemporary research into norms. See more details below
A 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays, presenting some of the best contemporary research into norms.
- Cambridge University Press
- Publication date:
- Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory Series
- Product dimensions:
- 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.70(d)
Table of Contents
1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod; 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri; 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco; 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning; 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni; 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger; 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford; 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan; 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko; 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.
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