The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement (The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy Series) / Edition 1

The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement (The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy Series) / Edition 1

by Clifford S. Russell
     
 

ISBN-10: 0754621960

ISBN-13: 9780754621966

Pub. Date: 03/07/2003

Publisher: Ashgate Publishing, Limited

The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy explores the influence of economics on the development of environmental and natural resource policy. In a series of twenty five volumes, the most significant journal essays in key areas of contemporary environmental and resource policy are collected.

This volume examines monitoring and enforcement,

Overview

The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy explores the influence of economics on the development of environmental and natural resource policy. In a series of twenty five volumes, the most significant journal essays in key areas of contemporary environmental and resource policy are collected.

This volume examines monitoring and enforcement, collecting some of the best papers from the last 30 years of work on the subject. Organized according to subject area, the book allows unprecedented access to the often ignored concepts of the compliance challenge. Empirically rich and exhibiting a high level of ingenuity, this is an indispensable resource for studies and research in environmental economics.

Contents: Optimality Overall
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000) The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law. The Choice of Policy Instruments
Paul B. Downing and William D. Watson, Jr (1974) The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Controls
Jon D. Harford (1978) Firm Behavior Under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes
Arun S. Malik (1992) Enforcement Costs and The Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution. Elaboration of Themes
The Design of Penalties
Kathleen Segerson and Tom Tietenberg (1992) The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement
An Economic Analysis
Joseph E. Swierzbinski (1994) Guilty Until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement
Don Fullerton and Thomas C. Kinnaman (1995) Garbage Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping. Self-Reporting Discharges
Jon D. Harford (1987) Self-Reporting of Pollution and the Firm's Behavior UnderImperfectly Enforceable Regulations
Arun S. Malik (1993) Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution. Stochasticity of Discharges and Errors of Inference in Monitoring
Brian Beavis and Ian Dobbs (1987) Firm Behaviour under Regulatory Control of Stochastic Environmental Wastes by Probabilistic Constraints. Extensions of The Basic Template
Using Ex-Post Liability
Kathleen Segerson (1988) Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution. Using the Regulatory Record
John T. Scholz (1984) Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement
Clifford S. Russell (1990) Game Models for Structuring Monitoring and Enforcement Systems
E. Hentschel and A. Randall (2000) An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs. Private and Voluntary Approaches
W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser (1979) Optimal Standards with Incomplete Enforcement
John K. Stranlund (1995) Public Mechanisms to Support Compliance to an Environmental Norm
Wendy Naysnerski and Tom Tietenberg (1992) Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law. Empirical Work
Describing the M&E Situation in the US
Clifford S. Russell (1990) Monitoring and Enforcement
Mark A. Cohen (1992) Environmental Crime and Punishment
Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes. Do Monitoring and Enforcement Efforts Make a Difference?
Wesley A. Magat and W. Kip Viscusi (1990) Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement
The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards
Benoît Laplante and Paul Rilstone (1996) Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec. Cost and Benefits of Monitoring and Enforcement
Mark A. Cohen (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Oil Spill Prevention and Enforcement. Explaining the Behaviour of Enforcement Agencies
Carol Adaire Jones (1989) Standard Setting with Incomplete Enforcement Revisited
Eric Helland (1998) The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs
Stringency, Enforcement and Substitution
Name Index.

Author Biography: About the Editor: Clifford S. Russell, Professor, Director, Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780754621966
Publisher:
Ashgate Publishing, Limited
Publication date:
03/07/2003
Series:
International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy Series
Pages:
573
Product dimensions:
6.89(w) x 9.84(h) x 1.97(d)

Related Subjects

Table of Contents

Acknowledgementsix
Series Prefacexi
Introductionxiii
Part IOptimality Overall
1'The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law', Journal of Economic Literature, 38, pp. 45-76. (2000)3
Part IIThe Choice of Policy Instruments
2'The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Controls', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1, pp. 219-36. (1974)37
3'Firm Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 5, pp. 26-43. (1978)55
4'Enforcement Costs and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution', Economic Inquiry, 30, pp. 714-21. (1992)73
Part IIIElaboration of Themes
The Design of Penalties
5'The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 23, pp. 179-200. (1992)85
6'Guilty until Proven Innocent--Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27, pp. 127-46. (1994)107
7'Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, pp. 78-91. (1995)127
Self-Reporting Discharges
8'Self-Reporting of Pollution and the Firm's Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Regulations', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 14, pp. 293-303. (1987)143
9'Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24, pp. 241-57. (1993)155
Stochasticity of Discharges and Errors of Inference in Monitoring
10'Firm Behaviour under Regulatory Control of Stochastic Environmental Wastes by Probabilistic Constraints', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 14, pp. 112-27. (1987)175
Part IVExtensions of the Basic Template
Using Ex-Post Liability
11'Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 15, pp. 87-98. (1988)195
Using the Regulatory Record
12'Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement', Law and Society Review, 18, pp. 179-224. (1984)209
13'Game Models for Structuring Monitoring and Enforcement Systems', Natural Resource Modeling, 4, pp. 143-73. (1990)255
14'An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs', Environmental and Resource Economics, 15, pp. 57-74. (2000)287
Private and Voluntary Approaches
15'Optimal Standards with Incomplete Enforcement', Public Policy, 27, pp. 437-56. (1979)307
16'Public Mechanisms to Support Compliance to an Environmental Norm', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28, pp. 205-22. (1995)327
17'Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law', Land Economics, 68, pp. 28-48. (1992)345
Part VEmpirical Work
Describing the M&E Situation in the US
18'Monitoring and Enforcement', in P.R. Portney (ed.), Public Policies for Environmental Protection, Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, pp. 243-74. (1990)371
19'Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes', Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 82, pp. 1054-108. (1992)403
Do Monitoring and Enforcement Efforts Make a Difference?
20'Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards', Journal of Law & Economics, 33, pp. 331-60. (1990)461
21'Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31, pp. 19-36. (1996)491
Costs and Benefits of Monitoring and Enforcement
22'The Costs and Benefits of Oil Spill Prevention and Enforcement', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 13, pp. 167-88. (1986)511
Explaining the Behaviour of Enforcement Agencies
23'Standard Setting with Incomplete Enforcement Revisited', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 8, pp. 72-87. (1989)535
24'The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 35, pp. 242-61. (1998)551
Name Index571

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