The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement (The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy Series) / Edition 1

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Overview

The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy explores the influence of economics on the development of environmental and natural resource policy. In a series of twenty five volumes, the most significant journal essays in key areas of contemporary environmental and resource policy are collected.

This volume examines monitoring and enforcement, collecting some of the best papers from the last 30 years of work on the subject. Organized according to subject area, the book allows unprecedented access to the often ignored concepts of the compliance challenge. Empirically rich and exhibiting a high level of ingenuity, this is an indispensable resource for studies and research in environmental economics.

Contents: Optimality Overall
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000) The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law. The Choice of Policy Instruments
Paul B. Downing and William D. Watson, Jr (1974) The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Controls
Jon D. Harford (1978) Firm Behavior Under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes
Arun S. Malik (1992) Enforcement Costs and The Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution. Elaboration of Themes
The Design of Penalties
Kathleen Segerson and Tom Tietenberg (1992) The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement
An Economic Analysis
Joseph E. Swierzbinski (1994) Guilty Until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement
Don Fullerton and Thomas C. Kinnaman (1995) Garbage Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping. Self-Reporting Discharges
Jon D. Harford (1987) Self-Reporting of Pollution and the Firm's Behavior UnderImperfectly Enforceable Regulations
Arun S. Malik (1993) Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution. Stochasticity of Discharges and Errors of Inference in Monitoring
Brian Beavis and Ian Dobbs (1987) Firm Behaviour under Regulatory Control of Stochastic Environmental Wastes by Probabilistic Constraints. Extensions of The Basic Template
Using Ex-Post Liability
Kathleen Segerson (1988) Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution. Using the Regulatory Record
John T. Scholz (1984) Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement
Clifford S. Russell (1990) Game Models for Structuring Monitoring and Enforcement Systems
E. Hentschel and A. Randall (2000) An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs. Private and Voluntary Approaches
W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser (1979) Optimal Standards with Incomplete Enforcement
John K. Stranlund (1995) Public Mechanisms to Support Compliance to an Environmental Norm
Wendy Naysnerski and Tom Tietenberg (1992) Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law. Empirical Work
Describing the M&E Situation in the US
Clifford S. Russell (1990) Monitoring and Enforcement
Mark A. Cohen (1992) Environmental Crime and Punishment
Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes. Do Monitoring and Enforcement Efforts Make a Difference?
Wesley A. Magat and W. Kip Viscusi (1990) Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement
The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards
BenoƮt Laplante and Paul Rilstone (1996) Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec. Cost and Benefits of Monitoring and Enforcement
Mark A. Cohen (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Oil Spill Prevention and Enforcement. Explaining the Behaviour of Enforcement Agencies
Carol Adaire Jones (1989) Standard Setting with Incomplete Enforcement Revisited
Eric Helland (1998) The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs
Stringency, Enforcement and Substitution
Name Index.

Author Biography: About the Editor: Clifford S. Russell, Professor, Director, Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA

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Product Details

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements
Series Preface
Introduction
Pt. I Optimality Overall
1 The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law 3
Pt. II The Choice of Policy Instruments
2 The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Controls 37
3 Firm Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes 55
4 Enforcement Costs and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution 73
Pt. III Elaboration of Themes
5 The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis 85
6 Guilty until Proven Innocent - Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement 107
7 Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping 127
8 Self-Reporting of Pollution and the Firm's Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Regulations 143
9 Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution 155
10 Firm Behaviour under Regulatory Control of Stochastic Environmental Wastes by Probabilistic Constraints 175
Pt. IV Extensions of the Basic Template
11 Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control 195
12 Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement 209
13 Game Models for Structuring Monitoring and Enforcement Systems 255
14 An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs 287
15 Optimal Standards with Incomplete Enforcement 307
16 Public Mechanisms to Support Compliance to an Environmental Norm 327
17 Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law 345
Pt. V Empirical Work
18 Monitoring and Enforcement 371
19 Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes 403
20 Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards 461
21 Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec 491
22 The Costs and Benefits of Oil Spill Prevention and Enforcement 511
23 Standard Setting with Incomplete Enforcement Revisited 535
24 The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution 551
Name Index 571
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