Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making / Edition 1

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How did the Montreal Protocol succeed in helping to protect the earth's ozone layer? Why did the Kyoto Protocol fail to materially dampen global climate change? Are treaties really needed? Can they be made to work better? This book develops a theory to answer these questions - one that integrates the approaches used in economics, political science, international law, and game theory.
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Editorial Reviews

Foreign Affairs
Barrett, a professor of economics at John Hopkins University, asks why some treaties are successful, some are mere showpieces with no effect, and still others are demonstrable failures. His focus is on resource conservation and the environment, although his analysis applies to other treaties as well. The main concern here is compliance with agreed commitments and the closely related issue of willingness to make treaty commitments in the first place. Using a game-theory framework augmented by numerical and real-life examples, Barrett makes conceptual points and then skillfully applies them to a host of environmental treaties, from the Fur Seal Treaty of 1911 (a sucess) to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (bound to fail). In addition to making a significant contribution to the analysis of treaty commitments among states, Barrett offers interesting analysis on the large inventory of environmental treaties currently in force.
From the Publisher
"A truly important contribution to the literature on international environmental cooperation. Because in most parts its style is not too technical, it makes modern economics also accessible to nonexpert readers. Therefore, Barrett's monograph not only deserves to have many readers but can also be expected to get them."—Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

"In addition to making a significant contribution to the analysis of treaty commitments among states Barrett offers interesting analysis on the large inventory of environmental treaties currently in force."—Foreign Affairs

"Environment and Statecraft is an extremely valuable contribution to the literature. As a descriptive matter, its rich and nuanced discussions of various treaties (including the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty, Montreal Protocol, and Kyoto Protocol) significantly add to our understanding of these treaties. Barrett traces with skill and insight the policy challenges facing international lawmakers."—The American Journal of International Law

As Scott Barrett notes in his important new book, the number of international environmental agreements has soared in recent decades, mainly because the international environmental impact of human activity has increased dramatically. Some of these agreements work effectively, while others are weak and ineffectual. Barrett's rigorous combination of game theory and environmental analysis illuminates the reasons for these successes and failures. Even more importantly, the book offers key tools for improved international environmental management in the years ahead, in an era when global wellbeing will depend critically on successful environmental statecraft.' -Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and Special Advisor to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan

Contrary to many theoretical analyses, Scott Barrett presents an ingenious theory of how nation states may be able to overcome dilemmas and protect transboundary environmental resources. Any theory that successfully helps to explain international agreements regarding biodiversity, the ozone layer, global climate as well as diverse fisheries is a powerful theory. Students of international relations as well as of environmental science will have many useful lessons to learn from a careful reading of this book.' -Elinor Ostrom, Co-Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change, Indiana University

Drawing on a range of intellectual disciplines including international relations, economics, international law, and game theory as well as a sweeping review of the existing set of environmental treaties, Scott Barrett offers a series of insights on what is required for successful global-scale environmental cooperation. The book will be a significant addition to the environmental literature.' -Dan Esty, Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law Policy

'Scott Barrett has produced a readable, understandable, and successful application of elementary game theory to the incentives that determine whether international treaties succeed or fail, and to the incentives to participate and, if participating, to comply. Barrett's mastery of incentive theory makes a lot of puzzling issues clear. From fur seals to ozone to carbon dioxide he has a theoretical framework that makes impressive sense.' -Thomas C. Schelling, Distinguished University Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, University of Maryland

"Every now and again, a treatise appears that alters the way we see events in an important way. Scott Barrett's Environment and Statecraft is one of those works. More than a decade in preparation, Barrett's book is a craft of inventiveness, meticulous research, intellectual insight and surprise . . . . Barrett's book is probably one of the most important publications in the last few decades in the contect of the increasingly important arena of global environmental problems . . . For students of politics, economics, and the environment,for the negotiatiors and politicians, this is a book to be carried round like a proverbial bible." — Times Higher Education Supplement

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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780199286096
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press
  • Publication date: 1/5/2006
  • Edition description: New Edition
  • Edition number: 1
  • Pages: 456
  • Sales rank: 877,275
  • Product dimensions: 9.10 (w) x 6.10 (h) x 0.90 (d)

Meet the Author

Scott Barrett is Professor of Environmental Economics and International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 The North Pacific fur seal treaty and the theory of international cooperation 19
3 Transnational cooperation dilemmas 49
4 Games with multiple equilibria 85
5 Customary rights and responsibilities 106
6 International environmental agreements 133
7 The treaty participation game 195
8 The montreal protocol 221
9 Tipping treaties 254
10 Compliance and the strategy of reciprocity 269
11 The depth and breadth of international cooperation 292
12 Trade leakage and trade linkage 307
13 The side payments game 335
14 Summary 355
15 Global climate change and the kyoto protocol 359
Afterword to the paperback edition on global climate change and the kyoto protocol 399
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