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Ethical Intuitionism / Edition 1
     

Ethical Intuitionism / Edition 1

5.0 1
by M. Huemer
 

ISBN-10: 1403989680

ISBN-13: 9781403989680

Pub. Date: 10/11/2005

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and

Overview

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781403989680
Publisher:
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Publication date:
10/11/2005
Edition description:
2005
Pages:
309
Product dimensions:
5.51(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.03(d)

Table of Contents

Preface Introduction PART I: ALTERNATIVE METAETHICAL THEORIES Non-Cognitivism Subjectivism Reductionism PART II: ETHICAL INTUITITIONISM Moral Knowledge Disagreement and Error Practical Reasons Further Objections Conclusion Index

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Ethical Intuitionism 5 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
A_Sloan More than 1 year ago
One of my favorite philosophers I agree with Huemer on most things. In Ethical Intuitionism he defends a thesis of objective moral properties, which are not reducible to ordinary, descriptive "natural" properties, and that we know at least some moral truths non-inferentially (what he calls rational intuition). His argument is almost entirely negative in that it consists of arguments against the metaethical alternatives. He does a good job taking them down, but it could use more by way of a positive case... and he doesn't spend much time at all dealing with error theory (a point best descrived by Richard Garner in Beyond Morality, although his thesis is quite different). To him, morality is committed to categorical reasons, which resonates strongly with me.