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G-Zero — \JEE-ZEER-oh\ —n
A world order in which no single country or durable alliance of countries can meet the challenges of global leadership. What happens when the G20 doesn’t work and the G7 is history.
If the worst threatened—a rogue nuclear state with a horrible surprise, a global health crisis, the collapse of financial institutions from New York to Shanghai and Mumbai—where would the world ...
G-Zero — \JEE-ZEER-oh\ —n
A world order in which no single country or durable alliance of countries can meet the challenges of global leadership. What happens when the G20 doesn’t work and the G7 is history.
If the worst threatened—a rogue nuclear state with a horrible surprise, a global health crisis, the collapse of financial institutions from New York to Shanghai and Mumbai—where would the world look for leadership? The United States, with its paralyzed politics and battered balance sheet? A European Union reeling from self-inflicted wounds? China’s “people’s democracy”? Perhaps Brazil, Turkey, or India, the geopolitical Rookies of the Year? Or some grand coalition of survivors, the last nations standing after half a decade of recession-induced turmoil?
How about none of the above?
For the first time in seven decades, there is no single power or alliance of powers ready to take on the challenges of global leadership. A generation ago, the United States, Europe, and Japan were the world’s powerhouses, the free-market democracies that propelled the global economy forward. Today, they struggle just to find their footing.
Acclaimed geopolitical analyst Ian Bremmer argues that the world is facing a leadership vacuum. The diverse political and economic values of the G20 have produced global gridlock. Now that so many challenges transcend borders—from the stability of the global economy and climate change to cyber-attacks, terrorism, and the security of food and water—the need for international cooperation has never been greater. A lack of global leadership will provoke uncertainty, volatility, competition, and, in some cases, open conflict. Bremmer explains the risk that the world will become a series of gated communities as power is regionalized instead of globalized. In the generation to come, negotiations on economic and trade issues are likely to be just as fraught as recent debates over nuclear nonproliferation and climate change.
Disaster, thankfully, is never assured, and Bremmer details where the levers of power can still be found and how to exercise them for the common good. That’s important, because the one certainty of weakened nations and enfeebled institutions is that someone will try to take advantage of them.
Every Nation for Itself offers essential insights for anyone attempting to navigate the new global playing field.
Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World
Fareed Zakaria- What is a G-Zero world, and how did we get here?
Ian Bremmer- The G-Zero is a world without effective, consistent leadership. It’s not the G7 world where Western industrialized powers set the agenda. It’s not a G20 world where developed and developing states find some way to work together on tough transnational problems. It’s a world where no can be counted either to pay the piper or call the tune.
I love the story in your book The Post American World about Colin Powell making peace between Spain and Morocco over a disputed island in time to go swimming with his grandkids. I included a story in Every Nation for Itself about how Lyndon Johnson diverted about 20 percent of America’s wheat crop in 1965 to help India feed its people during a drought. The leadership capacity that these two stories illustrate isn’t what it used to be, and Europe has too many serious problems of its own to try to take up the slack. At the same time, we can’t expect emerging powers like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Russia, or the wealthy Gulf monarchies to fill this vacuum because their governments have neither the bandwidth nor the desire to accept the risks and burdens that come with much greater international leadership.
But Every Nation for Itself is not about the shifting balance of international power. In fact, we can’t know what the longer-term future holds for America, Europe, China or any of these other countries. There are good reasons to bet on US resilience, but that will depend on the quality of American leadership in years to come. The rest will continue to rise, but some of them will have more staying power than others.
We can forecast with great confidence, however, that the world has entered a period of transition, one in which global leadership will be in short supply. Every Nation for Itself is about that historic shift and the tremendous challenges and opportunities it will create—for the global economy, for relations between the world’s most powerful governments, and for the world’s ability to cope with a variety of what we might call “problems without borders.”
Zakaria- What do you mean by problems without borders?
Bremmer- First, there’s the traditional threat to regional peace and stability. US and European elected officials know that voters tend to support costly, extended military commitments only when they believe that vital national interests are at stake. That’s why, from Yugoslavia to Rwanda and from Sudan to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, they’ve remained on the sidelines as much as possible. Given the need for austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, we’re likely to see both a larger number of local conflicts around the world and an even deeper Western reluctance to engage.
But conventional conflict is not the only potential source of trouble. Given the market volatility of the past four years, governments of both established and leading emerging powers are more worried than ever about creating jobs and boosting growth, and the most important instruments of power and influence in coming years will be economic tools like market access, investment rules, and currency policies.
This will also be a world in which great power competition takes place in cyberspace as state-backed industrial espionage becomes an ever more widely used weapon in the battle for natural resources and market share. It’s a world in which some authoritarian emerging players will find new ways to reestablish state control over the flow of ideas, information, people, money, goods and services. Add climate change, the risk of food price shocks, threats to public health and other problems that flow easily across borders and the world will be without international leadership just at the moment when it needs it most.
Zakaria- Who are the biggest winners in this G-Zero world?
Bremmer-The first key to success in this period of transition is a recognition that changes to the global system will enable an unprecedented number of governments to play by their own rules. Those who still operate as if borders are opening, barriers are falling, and the world is becoming a single market will find themselves reacting to events they don’t understand. In a G-Zero world, the winners will be those players that can develop and maintain choices. The most important option a government can have is a choice among potential commercial and security partners.
Among the most fortunate are the “pivot states,” those that are able to build profitable relationships with multiple partners without becoming overly reliant on any one of them. Then there are “rogues with powerful friends,” states that openly flout international rules with cover from other governments. In a world where newly cost-conscious established powers will have to resort more often to political and economic (rather than military) pressure to get their way, these ties will be more important than ever.
Companies will have new opportunities too. Among multinationals, watch out for what I call the “adapters,” those that understand the changing competitive landscape and are agile enough to exploit the advantages it provides. Some companies can respond to a world with fewer enforceable rules by exploiting arbitrage opportunities to minimize tax and regulatory burdens. Others can transform a state-backed rival into a commercial partner by offering something that a government-controlled enterprise can’t get anywhere else, like access to battle-tested advanced technology or services that demand unique expertise.
Finally, because the G-Zero is a period of transition, significant changes in the international balance of power stoke both competition among would-be regional powers and anxiety among those who fear they aren’t yet ready to compete. That’s why a group of companies we might call “protectors” will also figure among the likeliest winners. Firms involved in defense against conventional military strikes, cyber-attack, terrorism or commercial piracy will prosper in a G-Zero world, particularly if they’re able to align themselves with deep-pocketed emerging market governments.
Zakaria- Say more about this idea of pivot states?
Bremmer- Over the past 30 years, the big winners were states that adapted to and profited from the processes of Western-led globalization. But in a world that is more likely to have several regional centers of gravity, one in which no single country can afford to play the global leader, governments will have to create more of their own opportunities. The ability to pivot will be a critical advantage.
For example, Brazil has built strong political ties and promising commercial relations with the United States, China and a growing number of other emerging market countries. As a result, its economy continues to enjoy access to American consumers, but its ties with China, now Brazil’s largest trade partner, ensure that it isn’t overly dependent on US purchasing power for growth. A serious downturn in the US will still take a heavy toll on Mexico. That’s much less true for Brazil.
The book profiles several pivot states, from Turkey and Vietnam to Canada and Kazakhstan.
Zakaria- What does the G-Zero mean for the United States?
Bremmer- It means that America will have to learn to do something it doesn’t do very well these days: Invest in the future. In a country where political leaders focus so much of their energies on winning the next news cycle, and business leaders try to maximize quarterly profits at the expense of long-term reinvestment, Americans need to look beyond the horizon described in this book.
Anyone who believes that American decline is inevitable has chosen to ignore the entire history of the United States and its people. For the moment, America can’t lead in quite the same way it did during the second half of the 20th century, because the world and its balance of power have changed profoundly. But the G-Zero will provoke a tremendous amount of trouble for a wide variety of people. It can’t last, because tomorrow’s most important powers, whoever those powers happen to be, can’t afford for it to continue. That’s why, if Americans can rebuild for the future, the country’s underlying strengths—its hard power capacities and its democratic, entrepreneurial values—will ensure that US leadership can again prove indispensable for international security and prosperity. I argue in the book’s final chapter that leadership of a post-G-Zero world should be the goal that guides American foreign and domestic policies in years to come.
Zakaria- Why do you believe, as you say in the book, that “China is the major power least likely to develop along a predictable path?”
Bremmer- China’s leaders have acknowledged that the country’s growth model is “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable,” and they know that their ability to guide China through the next stage of its development is far from certain. India, Brazil, and Turkey can continue to grow for the next ten years with the same basic formula that triggered growth over the past ten. The United States, Europe, and Japan will reinvest in economic systems that have a long history of success. But China has to undertake enormously complex and ambitious reforms to continue its drive to become a modern, middle-class power.
At the same time, the international environment is becoming less friendly to China’s expansion. Higher prices for the oil, gas, metals and minerals that China needs to power its economy will weigh on growth. The rise of many other emerging powers will add to the upward pressure on food and other commodity prices, undermining public confidence in government, the most important source of China’s social stability. As state-backed Chinese companies draw their government into the political and economic lives of so many other countries, particularly in the developing world, they risk the same backlash from local companies and workers that plagues so many other foreign firms doing business far from home. And because the Chinese government has such a direct stake in the success of these companies, Beijing will be drawn into conflicts it has never coped with before.
Zakaria- I’m interested to see that your book is quite bullish on Africa’s political and economic future? Why is the G-Zero world good for Africa?
Bremmer- Africa has become the world’s most underrated growth story, in part because it has become a kind of “pivot continent.” For many years, cash-strapped African states had to turn almost exclusively to the IMF, World Bank and Western governments for the aid and investment they needed to bankroll development, and the money often came with strings attached—like demands for democratic reforms and greater openness to Western investment. Over the past decade, however, just as we’ve seen in Brazil and other parts of the emerging market world, China has sharply increased its investment in the region. But this is not a story about US-Chinese competition. The winner here is Africa, which can now expect multinational and state-owned companies from the established and emerging market worlds—from America, Europe, Japan, China, India and elsewhere—to compete for access to African consumers and favorable investment terms. The world’s largest emerging markets get this. That’s one big reason why the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) invited South Africa to join their club in December 2010.
The Post-American World: Release 2.0
Ian Bremmer- You made clear from the opening sentence of The Post-American World that you do not believe that America faces some kind of inevitable, irreversible decline. But how can US policymakers ensure that the rise of the rest actually strengthens the United States?
Fareed Zakaria - If more countries thrive in the existing global system, it means a larger world economy – more consumers and producers, investors and inventors. That’s great for America. As Europe boomed after World War II, America boomed with it. The rise of Japan and Korea and Taiwan has not meant the decline of America. But the key has been that we have to be able to adjust and adapt. The US economy was enormously productive in the 1950s and 1960s – leading the world in almost every way, from technology to infrastructure to mass education. Our problem is that we no longer lead the world on many of these dimensions – think of infrastructure or K-12 education – and the rest of the world has been hard at work catching up. So, the fault lies not in our competitors but in ourselves. The good news is, if we can rectify these mistakes, we should still do well in the emerging world.
Bremmer- Given everything that has happened since 2008—the financial market meltdown, the Eurozone crisis, the Arab Spring—have you become more confident or less that the United States can successfully transition from its previous role as global hegemon to a new role as the most powerful among other powerful countries?
Zakaria- There are two distinct (though related) challenges for Washington in a Post-American World. The first is economic, which I outline above. The second is political. Here the structural challenge might seem daunting. Political power is not like economic power. In economics, others can grow and that can be good for you – win, win. In politics, power is relative. As China and India and Brazil and Turkey all prosper and gain strength and confidence, whose dominant influence are they cutting into? The US. But even here, the picture is actually quite hopeful for America. The truth is, only America has power along all dimensions – economic, military, political, cultural. And that gives it great strength, particularly as an agenda-setter. Also, the rise of these other countries creates uncertainty and anxiety in the international system. If the United States plays its cards well, it can be the crucial stabilizing force in the system. You can see that dynamic at work in Asia where China’s rise has unsettled many Asian countries and they look to America to play a stabilizing role. It’s a new diplomatic challenge for America, to be more of a catalyst and broker than hegemon and arbiter. It emphasizes brains more than brawn. Let’s hope we’re up to it.
Bremmer- How can policymakers overcome the polarization of American politics to get this right?
Zakaria- That’s the Trillion dollar question. America’s economy and society remain dynamic. It’s political system is broken. First, recognize the problem. Stop mouthing slogans about how we have the world’s greatest democracy. Our system is now highly dysfunctional and corrupt. We need to fix it.
Bremmer- Among rising states, which do you think have the most staying power and why? Will some of the rest be left behind?
Zakaria- China is in a league apart from every other rising power. It has the scale – in terms of sheer numbers—to have a huge global impact. It is also run by a competent elite, technocrats who plan for the long term and are moving China up the value chain. They are making huge investments in education and infrastructure, which will pay off over the long run. I agree with you that China continues to have a long-term political challenge, how to combine a vigorous and open economy with a closed and bureaucratic political system. But so far they have managed to balance it – I think they will need to make much larger political changes in the next decade than they have in the last decade.
Bremmer-How well do you think America is responding to China’s continued rise?
Zakaria- American business has been responding well to China’s rise, helping it but also benefitting from it. American society is more closed and parochial than American business and so there has been little contact, which is a pity because we can always learn from others. Washington, at a foreign policy level, has actually done quite well in its handling of China. It has encouraged the integration of China into the global economy, it has tried to get China to be more rule-based and more committed to producing (rather than consuming) global public goods. And it has carefully and systematically shored up its alliances with key Asian countries, from India to Japan to South Korea to Australia, which is an important hedge against Chinese expansion. All in all, a solid performance.
Bremmer- You devote a chapter to India’s growing prominence. Are you optimistic that India’s government will help spur the country toward the next stage of its economic development? Or is this still a country where progress will come mainly in spite of government?
Zakaria- China grows because of its government, and India grows in spite of its government. I don’t expect much improvement in India’s public policy. The infrastructure will continue to lag, the education system will be poor, the government will keep doling out subsidies, and tax and regulatory policy will be uncompetitive. But Indian businesses are world class. They manage under very difficult conditions to perform amazingly well. They manage capital efficiently, understand global markets and brands, and have high quality management. India has good demographics, with lots of young consumers. India’s story is a bottom-up story, rather than China’s top-down story. But don’t kid yourself. Ultimately, you need good government policy to go to the next stage. Unless there is massive and intelligent investment in human and physical capital, India will lag behind China substantially. Whether in India or America, bad government will be a huge limiting factor on a country’s success, no matter how dynamic the society and the economy.
Chapter1 What is the G-Zero? 7
Chapter 2 The Road to the G-Zero 37
Chapter 3 The G-Zero Impact 67
Chapter 4 Winners and Losers 109
Chapter 5 What Comes Next? 151
Chapter 6 G-Zero America 185
Posted May 1, 2012
Every Nation for Itself is a rare thing: it informs and it entertains. Ian Bremmer has managed to outline the birth of the US-led global order after World War II, map its evolution through all of history's flashiest highlights, and explain how the system has broken down in the wake of the financial crisis. From here, he explains what the G-Zero environment entails: a lack of global leadership means all of the most pressing international challenges will go unmet. Issues like climate change, nuclear proliferation, resource scarcity, trade wars--you name it-- will not be addressed. The first step: countries and companies need to accept this new reality. Second? They can learn how to benefit from a turbulent new world order that is increasingly volatile, regional, and devoid of referees. Chapter 4 focuses on these winners and losers, mapping out the ingredients for success in today's global environment. One such example: bet on Brazil, because it can play a dangerous game increasingly well--its significant trade with the US and China lets it avoid relying too heavily on either one. This `eggs in every basket' approach is one winning strategy--if a country can pull it off. We've seen Taiwan continue reaching out to the United States and the West, but there is only so much it can do when its stuck in China's shadow--Taiwan is an example of a loser in the G-Zero world.
From here, Bremmer goes on to predict the future, quite literally. He has a very clever metric for mapping out the different scenarios that could unfold in the years to come. The four main possibilities: we could see a harmonious world order that resembles the G20, a harmonious system propped up by the US and China, a more hostile power balance where the US and China engage in a Cold War 2.0, or a conflict-laced dynamic where regions play the biggest roles and the way neighbors coordinate or clash is of the utmost importance. Bremmer concludes by offering advice to the US if it wants to be successful in righting the ship and navigating such a difficult global environment.
This book is packed with insights about the world we live in today--and it's a quick, easy read. I couldn't recommend it more highly.
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Posted May 16, 2012
The debate over America's role in the world has only become more contorted as the 2012 presidential election cycle warms up. Frequently, and to deafening applause, Republican audiences would cheer whichever candidate made a point of applauding the permanent fixture of Pax Americana on the international stage. Ian Bremmer's new book addresses the insecurity that this nativism appeals to: how will China's rise affect the international order?
We've become used to an order where the Washington Consensus, the free market, and the reliance on post-World War II institutions (i.e. Bretton Woods institutions) were accepted, nay encouraged. A new order, which Bremmer detailed in his last book, The End of the Free Market, looks at how these neo-corporatist states look at the global stage. Bremmer's new book, Ever Nation for Itself (ENFI), ruthlessly exposes the perspective that Beijing, and other emerging nations, are surveying the world with. The emerging markets, ever the misnomer, have created an entire ecosystem of self-sustaining FDI until we saw the destruction (creative?) of the 2008 economic crisis. Brazil, perhaps learning its lessons from the E.Asian crisis of 1997-98, decided to throw up capital barriers to divestment and others flew the economically illiterate flag of protectionism. These were the opening salvos of a post-G20 world, which this book appropriately names "G-zero."
Overall, we are all going to do OK - if we're to believe Bremmer, which I think we should. As someone who has covered the global political economy for more than 15 years his insight is worth more than most. A recent article in the New York Review of Books by Benjamin Friedman (Whither China?) explores this idea in a more academic lens. But Bremmer continues the depth into this idea that any intelligent reviewer of global politics would seek. It covers the current geopolitical landscape with facts lubricating the plot (e.g., did you know India was offered a seat on the Security Council in 1955? I didn't) which leads to a narrative where you're flipping the pages before you have a chance to make notes.
What I particularly liked about ENFI is that it addresses the current intellectual ethos (pathos?) that those of use concerned about the international order care (obsess? Too many parenthesis?) about. The only reason for reworking the international order is one fact: China is now the second largest economy in the world. If they will be a revisionist power per se we'll see. The recent appointment by the World Bank of Dr. Jim Kim an American may devil most of us - but don't be fooled - the Chinese had to of acquiesced. Further, Bremmer's new book explores and explains the new international landscape for a 21st century.
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Posted May 1, 2012