Experiments in Environmental Economics, Volumes I and II

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Contents:Experiments in Environmental Economics, Volume I: Motives and Methods: Vernon L. Smith (1982) Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science
Charles R. Plott (1991) Will Economics Become an Experimental Science?
Jason F. Shogren and Clifford Nowell (1992) Economics and Ecology: A Comparison of Experimental Methodologies and Philosophies
Alvin E. Roth (1994) Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ.: A Methodological Note
Colin F. Camerer (1997) Progress in Behavioral Game Theory. Environmental Risk: Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak (1964) Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method
David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979) Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981) The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Colin F. Camerer (1987) Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence
Robin M. Hogarth and Howard Kunreuther (1989) Risk, Ambiguity, and Insurance
Jason F. Shogren (1990) The Impact of Self-Protection and Self-Insurance on Individual Response to Risk
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991) The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze and Don L. Coursey (1993) Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events
John D. Hey and Chris Orme (1994) Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory using Experimental Data. Environmental Conflict: Lester B. Lave (1962) An Empirical Approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma Game
James M. Walker and Roy Gardner (1992) Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence
Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1992) Communication in Coordination Games
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1992) An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal (1994) Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study
Steven Hackett, Edella Schlager and James Walker (1994) The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators
Charles F. Mason and Owen R. Phillips (1997) Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation
Kyung Hwan Baik, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll and Jason F. Shogren (1999) Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament. Name Index. Experiments in Environmental Economics, Volume II: Environmental Cooperation: Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer (1982) The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests
Glenn W. Harrison and Michael McKee (1985) Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem
Glenn W. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E.E. Rutström and Matthew L. Spitzer (1987) Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in Experimental Markets
Jack Ochs and Alvin E. Roth (1989) An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining
Matthew Rabin (1993) Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Jason F. Shogren (1998) Coasean Bargaining with Symmetric Delay Costs. Environmental Control: Charles R. Plott (1983) Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets
R. Andrew Muller and Stuart Mestelman (1994) Emission Trading with Shares and Coupons: A Laboratory Experiment
R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker and Arlington W. Williams (1994) Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups
Timothy N. Cason (1995) An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction
Yan Chen and Charles R. Plott (1996) The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design
R. Mark Isaac and James M. Walker (1998) Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Daniel Rondeau, William D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe (1999) Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism
Peter Bohm and Björn Carlén (1999) Emission Quota Trade among the Few: Laboratory Evidence of Joint Implementation among Committed Countries. Environmental Valuation: Peter Bohm (1972) Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment
J. W. Bennett (1987) Strategic Behaviour: Some Experimental Evidence
Don L. Coursey, John L. Hovis and William D. Schulze (1987) The Disparity between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value
David S. Brookshire and Don L. Coursey (1987) Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990) Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Rebecca R. Boyce, Thomas C. Brown, Gary H. McClelland, George L. Peterson and William D. Schulze (1992) An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of the WTA-WTP Disparity
Jason F. Shogren, Seung Y. Shin, Dermot J. Hayes and James B. Kliebenstein (1994) Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept
Helen R. Neill, Ronald G. Cummings, Philip T. Ganderton, Glenn W. Harrison and Thomas McGuckin (1994) Hypothetical Surveys and Real Economic Commitments
John A. Fox, Jason F. Shogren, Dermot J. Hayes and James B. Kliebenstein (1998) CVM-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction Markets
Ronald G. Cummings and Laura O. Taylor (1999) Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method. Name Index.

About the Author:
: About the Editor: Jason F. Shogren, Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, USA

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