Explaining the Brain / Edition 1

Explaining the Brain / Edition 1

4.0 1
by Carl F. Craver
     
 

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ISBN-10: 0199299315

ISBN-13: 9780199299317

Pub. Date: 08/02/2007

Publisher: Oxford University Press

What distinguishes good explanations in neuroscience from bad? Carl F. Craver constructs and defends standards for evaluating neuroscientific explanations that are grounded in a systematic view of what neuroscientific explanations are: descriptions of multilevel mechanisms. In developing this approach, he draws on a wide range of examples in the history of

Overview

What distinguishes good explanations in neuroscience from bad? Carl F. Craver constructs and defends standards for evaluating neuroscientific explanations that are grounded in a systematic view of what neuroscientific explanations are: descriptions of multilevel mechanisms. In developing this approach, he draws on a wide range of examples in the history of neuroscience (e.g. Hodgkin and Huxleys model of the action potential and LTP as a putative explanation for different kinds of memory), as well as recent philosophical work on the nature of scientific explanation. Readers in neuroscience, psychology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science will find much to provoke and stimulate them in this book.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780199299317
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Publication date:
08/02/2007
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
272
Sales rank:
808,475
Product dimensions:
9.30(w) x 6.00(h) x 1.00(d)

Table of Contents

Preface
1. Introduction: Starting With Neuroscience
2. Explanation and Causal Relevance
3. Causal Relevance and Manipulation
4. The Norms of Mechanistic Explanation
5. A Field-Guide to Levels
6. Nonfundamental Explanation
7. The Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience

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Explaining the Brain 4 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
Guest More than 1 year ago
If you've been disappointed by the depth of analysis regarding 1) what mechanisms are, 2) how they are used to provide scientific explanations, provided by the 'New Mechanists' (such as Bechtel, Darden, Glennan etc.) then you will enjoy this book. It is more substantive than other accounts of biological mechanisms to date. Its greatest virtue is that it comes to terms with the fact that a philosophical account of biological mechanisms will be most interesting if it provides some normative standard by which to evaluate putative explanations. In general, Craver's account leans *heavily* on the Woodward/Pearl model of causal explanation. The most interesting discussion in my view comes in chapter 4, where Craver tried to provide an account of when a part should be considered a 'component' of a mechanism. The book engages with Cummins, Salmon, Kitcher, Kim, Woodward, and others. I would suspect that it will be of primary interest to philosophers of science, and less so to neuroscientists.