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Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach have experienced first-hand the monumental strategy changes in our country’s counterterrorism strategy within the intelligence, defense, and political communities. In this book, they show how America learned to be very good at taking on the terrorists, often one at a time, in ever more lethally incisive operations. They offer new details behind some headlines from the last decade. They are frank about the mistakes that have been made. And they explain how a concept coined by General Grant during the Civil War has been reinvented in the age of satellite technology to manage a globally distributed foe, allowing the U.S. to find, fix, and finish its enemies.
“A skillful combination of antiterrorism fireworks with perceptive analysis of our strategies.”
“Outstanding Regardless of your personal views on the so-called "War on Terror" "Find, Fix, Finish" is a comprehensive source book on the facts of terror attacks and how many such attacks were foiled by law enforcement and security agencies.”
The Spectator (UK)
“If you are a student of counter-terrorism or are interested in the legal limbo of rendition, detention and targeted killings, you should probably read it... [The authors] give a revealing account of the massaging of intelligence in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq The authors are no bleeding heart liberals. They acknowledge that too much bureaucracy impedes counter-terrorism and harms national security and they argue for legal but effective measures to assist both."
“This title explicates the new U.S. policy of finding terrorists, isolating them in one location, then finishing them off. Peritz (formerly, CIA Counterterrorism Ctr.) and Rosenbach (deputy assistant secretary of defense) describe the extensive evaluations of, and changes in, counterterrorism policy after 9/11 and the many expensive mistakes made along the way General readers and undergraduates will find this accessible and useful for debate.”
“Peritz and Rosenbach provide more context, delving into the now-familiar difficulties experts faced in persuading the U.S. government to take the al Qaeda threat seriously before 9/11 and examining the problems created by the post-9/11 counterterrorism overdrive.”