Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary

Hardcover (Print)
Used and New from Other Sellers
Used and New from Other Sellers
from $75.00
Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Other sellers (Hardcover)
  • All (9) from $75.00   
  • New (3) from $155.00   
  • Used (6) from $75.00   
Close
Sort by
Page 1 of 1
Showing All
Note: Marketplace items are not eligible for any BN.com coupons and promotions
$155.00
Seller since 2014

Feedback rating:

(162)

Condition:

New — never opened or used in original packaging.

Like New — packaging may have been opened. A "Like New" item is suitable to give as a gift.

Very Good — may have minor signs of wear on packaging but item works perfectly and has no damage.

Good — item is in good condition but packaging may have signs of shelf wear/aging or torn packaging. All specific defects should be noted in the Comments section associated with each item.

Acceptable — item is in working order but may show signs of wear such as scratches or torn packaging. All specific defects should be noted in the Comments section associated with each item.

Used — An item that has been opened and may show signs of wear. All specific defects should be noted in the Comments section associated with each item.

Refurbished — A used item that has been renewed or updated and verified to be in proper working condition. Not necessarily completed by the original manufacturer.

New
Brand new.

Ships from: acton, MA

Usually ships in 1-2 business days

  • Standard, 48 States
  • Standard (AK, HI)
$176.08
Seller since 2014

Feedback rating:

(273)

Condition: New
Brand New Item.

Ships from: Chatham, NJ

Usually ships in 1-2 business days

  • Canadian
  • International
  • Standard, 48 States
  • Standard (AK, HI)
  • Express, 48 States
  • Express (AK, HI)
$438.64
Seller since 2014

Feedback rating:

(0)

Condition: New
Cumberland, Rhode Island, U.S.A. 2001 Hardcover New 0300084889. BRAND NEW, FLAWLESS COPY, NEVER OPENED-192 pages--DESCRIPTION: This volume presents six lively conversations with ... Hans-Georg Gadamer (born 1900), one of the twentieth century's master philosophers. Looking back over his life and thought, Gadamer takes up key issues in his philosophy, addresses points of controversy, and replies to his critics, including those who accuse him of having been in complicity with the Nazis. A genial and direct conversationalist, Gadamer is here captured at his best and most accessible. The interviews took place between 1989 and 1996, and all but one appear in English for the first time in this volume. The first three conversations, conducted by Heidelberg philosopher Carsten Dutt, deal with hermeneutics, aesthetics, and practical philosophy and the question of ethics. In a fourth conversation, with University of Heidelberg classics professor Glenn W. Most, Gadamer argues for the vital importance of the Greeks for ou Read more Show Less

Ships from: New Hampton, NY

Usually ships in 1-2 business days

  • Canadian
  • International
  • Standard, 48 States
  • Standard (AK, HI)
  • Express, 48 States
  • Express (AK, HI)
Page 1 of 1
Showing All
Close
Sort by

Overview

This volume presents six lively conversations with Hans-Georg Gadamer (born 1900), one of the twentieth century's master philosophers. Looking back over his life and thought, Gadamer takes up key issues in his philosophy, addresses points of controversy, and replies to his critics, including those who accuse him of having been in complicity with the Nazis. A genial and direct conversationalist, Gadamer is here captured at his best and most accessible. The interviews took place between 1989 and 1996, and all but one appear in English for the first time in this volume. The first three conversations, conducted by Heidelberg philosopher Carsten Dutt, deal with hermeneutics, aesthetics, and practical philosophy and the question of ethics. In a fourth conversation, with University of Heidelberg classics professor Glenn W. Most, Gadamer argues for the vital importance of the Greeks for our contemporary thinking. In the next, the philosopher reaffirms his connection with phenomenology and clarifies his relation to Husserl and Heidegger in a conversation with London philosopher Alfons Grieder. In the final interview, with German Nazi expert Dorte von Westernhagen, Gadamer describes his life as a struggling young professor in Germany in the 1930s and refutes accusations of his complicity with the Nazis. These conversations are a lucid introduction for readers new to the philosopher's thought, and for experts they present an invaluable commentary on Gadamer's most important themes.
Read More Show Less

Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780300084887
  • Publisher: Yale University Press
  • Publication date: 12/28/2001
  • Series: Yale Studies in Hermeneutics
  • Edition description: New Edition
  • Pages: 192
  • Product dimensions: 5.82 (w) x 8.46 (h) x 0.79 (d)

Read an Excerpt

GADAMER IN CONVERSATION

REFLECTIONS AND COMMENTARY
By Hans-Georg Gadamer Carsten Dutt Glenn W. Most Alfons Grieder Dorte von Westernhagen

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2001 Yale University
All right reserved.

ISBN: 0-300-08488-9


Chapter One

HERMENEUTICS

DUTT: Professor Gadamer, the term "hermeneutics," generally associated with your path of thinking, was not originally a philosophical term. When one looks up "hermeneutics" in a dictionary, the definition is basically "the art of interpretation" [Auslegungskunst art of explication] or "a teaching about interpretation" [Auslegungslehre]. When hermeneutics is defined in this way, it has a long history. So could I first ask you to discuss this history, which can be called the prehistory of philosophical hermeneutics?

GADAMER: If one goes back to the original meaning of the Greek term hermeneia, and "hermeneutics" as meaning translation and interpretation, this depicts quite clearly the situation in which early Christianity found itself in relation to Greek philosophy, and how Augustine in the De Doctrina Christiana tried to translate into conceptual terms the way one was to speak of the Christian message. Homo timens Deum, voluntatem eius in Scripturis sanctis diligenter inquirit [Man, fear God and diligently inquire into the Scriptures]. You know this famous text. Now this idea [of translating Scripture into conceptual terms, as Augustine did] was accomplished in a different form by the Scholastics in the Middle Ages through their wonderful intellectual achievement in receiving and making use of Aristotelian metaphysics. But only with Luther and, above all, Melanchthon was hermeneutics accorded a new function in relation to reading the Bible, a function they described in terms of the tools provided by Aristotelian rhetoric. With this step, hermeneutics [as the discipline of interpreting Scripture with the help of rhetorical principles] took its place alongside the explication of the law in the new jurisprudence of the time. This marks a clear boundary that separates hermeneutics from the form taken by modern science with its mathematical development. With the spread of a humanistic reading-culture, hermeneutics was developed as an aid to the interpreter in understanding sentences and texts as such.

In the Romantic era Schleiermacher and Friedrich Schlegel showed that all understanding is always already interpretation [Auslegung, explication]. You will recall that previously, in the eighteenth century, one had distinguished the subtilitas intelligendi, power of understanding, from subtilitas explicandi, the power of interpretation. Romanticism, however, recognized the unity of these two moments in the process, and by virtue of this the universal role of language. In other words, one should not imagine that interpretive concepts only enter into one's understanding subsequently, as if one drew them out of a linguistic storeroom, so to speak, and applied them as needed to the "thing to be understood." Such a conception is completely wrong, and there is really nobody today who holds it. No, understanding does not reach out and take hold of language; it is carried out within language.

Then, in our century, it was Heidegger who took the decisive step in thought, following the lead of Dilthey. Heidegger asserted that in all understanding there is a third moment involved in the process: that of understanding oneself-Sich selbst-Verstehen; this is a kind of application, which in the era of German pietism [eighteenth century] was called the subtilitas applicandi. Following the lead of Heidegger, I myself used this third moment in order to demonstrate the limits of the scientific concept of method. For the hermeneutic process involves not only the moments of understanding and of interpretation but also the moment of application; that is to say, understanding oneself is a part of this process. Now I am willing to admit that the concept of Applikation, a concept that is accidental and offered itself historically, is artificial and misleading. But I certainly had not anticipated that one could think that, according to it, understanding should be applied to something else. No, I mean that it is to be applied to oneself.

DUTT: Along with the moment of application contained in all understanding you have now indicated an important point which interests me very much and which I would like to pursue further. Although we have agreed to speak about some of the results of your work, could we perhaps take a moment to discuss your presuppositions? You yourself have mentioned your teacher, Martin Heidegger. In the history of hermeneutics, the "hermeneutics of facticity," which Heidegger developed within his ontological standpoint of questioning, signifies an innovation that has been foundational for your own approach. The writing of the history of philosophy quite legitimately takes away the novelty of the sudden appearance of the new by identifying all the preliminary stages and advance indications. This holds true in the case of Heidegger also, for whom Dilthey is the most important of the names one could suggest in relation to hermeneutics. You yourself have also just mentioned him. Could I now perhaps link my question about Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity with the question of your own relationship to Dilthey's analyses of understanding?

GADAMER: The debate in hermeneutics that is going on today is, as a matter of fact, dominated by the question of Dilthey and his influence. How are we to assess this influence in relation to the development of hermeneutical philosophy? Well, certainly Dilthey's work mediated essential stimuli to the thinking of the young Heidegger, and he used these to further develop and reshape Husserlian phenomenology. But what Dilthey was dealing with was psychology. Only after Heidegger had developed a hermeneutics of facticity-that is to say, a hermeneutics of the human being as concretely existing here and now-and published this in Being and Time in 1927 did the Dilthey school through Georg Misch begin to be interested in the development of hermeneutics.

Since that time people have even gone so far as to call hermeneutics the true koine [common language] of philosophizing in our time. Now why is it that hermeneutics came to have such a special meaning in Heidegger-although even he later rejected this designation? My answer is: that Heidegger and only Heidegger opened our eyes to the fact that what we were dealing with here is the concept of being. Certainly Heidegger would not have been led to see Being in the horizon of time and, on the basis of the movement of human existing, to think that the human being projected its future and came from out of its heritage, without the stimuli he received from Dilthey, from Bergson, and from Aristotle. So Heidegger designated understanding as an existentiale; that is, as a categorical and basic determinant of our being-in-the-world. When we see the matter from this standpoint, we realize that Heidegger did not have as his aim either a theory of the humanities and social sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] or a critique of historical reason, which were the tasks Dilthey had posed for himself.

Of course, the task still remained of taking the philosophical awakening of Heidegger and applying it to the Geisteswissenschaften and to show its validity there. This is the task to which I have tried to contribute. What I tried to do, following Heidegger, was to see the linguisticality of human beings not just in terms of the subjectivity of consciousness and the capacity for language in that consciousness, as German idealism and Humboldt had done. Instead, I moved the idea of conversation to the very center of hermeneutics. Perhaps a phrase from Holderlin will make clear to you what kind of turn this move involved. Because Heidegger could no longer accept the dialectical reconciliation with Christianity that had marked the whole post-Hegelian epoch, he sought the Word through Holderlin, whose words "Seit ein Gesprach wir sind/Und horen konnen voneinander" [Since we are a conversation/And can hear one another] inspired him. Now Heidegger had understood this as the conversation of human beings with the gods. Perhaps correctly so. But the hermeneutic turn, which is grounded in the linguisticality of the human being, at least also includes us in Holderlin's "one another," and at the same time it contains the idea that we as human beings have to learn from each other. We do not need just to hear one another but to listen to one another. Only when this happens is there understanding.

DUTT: In your masterwork Truth and Method of 1960, both strands of your work that are indebted to Heidegger are represented: your discussion of understanding in the humanities and social sciences in the second part and in the third part of that work, your grounding of hermeneutics in a theory of language. The first part of your book developed a hermeneutical perspective on the experience of art. With your permission, I would like to put this general structure aside and take up the part that has found the greatest international resonance, that is, the part on the humanities and social sciences. In relation to this the introduction to Truth and Method announces that it will undertake "the quest for an understanding of what the humanities and social sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] really are beyond their own methodological self-awareness and take up what links them with the totality of our experience of the world" (GW 1: 3/TM xxiii). Could you explain what change of perspective you are suggesting? How would it differ from the present methodological thematization of these disciplines?

GADAMER: The term "method" in the title of my book already points toward this difference. I was not trying to do what Betti in his debate with Croce and Gentile tried to do, namely, to extend the methods originally belonging to theological and juristic hermeneutics into other disciplines in order to ensure that the concept of method had the widest possible scope of application; no, on the contrary, what I sought to show was that the concept of method was not an appropriate way of achieving legitimation in the humanities and social sciences. What is involved is not just a matter of using certain procedures to deal with a certain region of objects. The humanities and social sciences, whose honor I am trying to defend by offering a more appropriate theoretical justification, really belong in the same line of succession, and have the same heritage as philosophy. They may be distinguished from the natural sciences not only through their ways of proceeding but also through the preliminary relationship they have to their subject matter; that is, through their participation in the heritage that they renew and articulate for us again and again. This is the reason I have suggested that the ideal of objective knowledge which dominates our concepts of knowledge, science, and truth, needs to be supplemented by the ideal of sharing in something, of participation. We participate in the essential expressions of human experience that have been developed in our artistic, religious, and historical tradition-and not only in ours but in all cultures; this possible participation is the true criterion for the wealth or the poverty of what we produce in our humanities and social sciences. One could express this in another way by saying that philosophy is deeply embedded in all the humanities and social sciences, but this is never completely conceptualized.

DUTT: Your critics have seen in your argument a rejection of methodology in general. Some of them have interpreted the title of your book to mean "truth versus method."

GADAMER: This interpretation conveys the one-sided impression that I think there are no methods in the humanities and social sciences. Of course there are methods, and certainly one must learn them and apply them. But I would say that the fact that we are able to apply certain methods to certain objects does not establish why we are pursuing knowledge in the humanities and social sciences. To me it seems self-evident that in the natural sciences one pursues knowledge ultimately because through them one can stand on one's own feet: one can orient oneself and through measurement, reckoning, and construction eventually gain control of the surrounding world. By doing this we can-at least this is their intention-live better and survive better than if we just confronted a nature that is indifferent to us. But in the humanities and social sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] there can be nothing like such ruling over the historical world. The humanities and social sciences bring something different into our lives through their form of participation in what has been handed down to us, something that is not knowledge for the sake of control [Herrschaftswissen], yet it is no less important. We customarily call it "culture."

DUTT: What you are talking about is a thinking that goes way beyond the methodological self-understanding of the humanistic [geisteswissenschaftlichen] disciplines ...

GADAMER: ... to their philosophical content. Which relativizes the concept of method but does not cancel it out.

DUTT: This clarification is important.

GADAMER: Of course, otherwise we are faced with false alternatives. As tools, methods are always good to have. But one must understand where these can be fruitfully used. Methodical sterility is a generally known phenomenon. Every once in a while, for instance, we find tried and true or merely fashionable methods applied in a field where they are simply unproductive. What does the truly productive researcher do? What does an Ernst Robert Curtius or a Leo Spitzer do? Are they creative because they have mastered the methods in that field? Applying method is what the person does who never finds out anything new, who never brings to light an interpretation that has revelatory power. No, it is not their mastery of methods but their hermeneutical imagination that distinguishes truly productive researchers. And what is hermeneutical imagination? It is a sense of the questionableness of something and what this requires of us.

By the way, the question of whether there is also a hermeneutics appropriate to the natural sciences needs to be taken seriously. In the philosophy of science since Thomas Kuhn this point has been widely discussed. I think this is above all because natural scientific methods do not show us how to apply the results of natural scientific work to the practice of living life in a rational way. As Kant has said: There is no rule for how one learns to apply the rules correctly.

DUTT: Indeed, one finds a hermeneutic structure in the way the fields of the natural sciences are formed.

Continues...


Excerpted from GADAMER IN CONVERSATION by Hans-Georg Gadamer Carsten Dutt Glenn W. Most Alfons Grieder Dorte von Westernhagen Copyright © 2001 by Yale University. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Read More Show Less

Table of Contents

Preface
Introduction 1
Pt. I Gadamer in Conversation with Carsten Dutt 31
Preface 33
1 Hermeneutics 36
2 Aesthetics 61
3 Practical Philosophy 78
Pt. II Three Other Conversations 87
4 The Greeks, Our Teachers, with Glenn W. Most 89
5 On Phenomenology, with Alfons Grieder 103
6 "The real Nazis had no interest at all in us ..." with Dorte von Westernhagen 115
Bibliographical App. A Translations of Hermeneutik-Asthetik-Praktische Philosophie: Hans-Georg Gadamer im Gesprach 133
Bibliographical App. B English-Language Books By and About Gadamer 134
Bibliographical App. C How to Find Theses, Articles, and Other Writings By and About Gadamer 140
Notes 145
Index 167
Read More Show Less

Customer Reviews

Be the first to write a review
( 0 )
Rating Distribution

5 Star

(0)

4 Star

(0)

3 Star

(0)

2 Star

(0)

1 Star

(0)

Your Rating:

Your Name: Create a Pen Name or

Barnes & Noble.com Review Rules

Our reader reviews allow you to share your comments on titles you liked, or didn't, with others. By submitting an online review, you are representing to Barnes & Noble.com that all information contained in your review is original and accurate in all respects, and that the submission of such content by you and the posting of such content by Barnes & Noble.com does not and will not violate the rights of any third party. Please follow the rules below to help ensure that your review can be posted.

Reviews by Our Customers Under the Age of 13

We highly value and respect everyone's opinion concerning the titles we offer. However, we cannot allow persons under the age of 13 to have accounts at BN.com or to post customer reviews. Please see our Terms of Use for more details.

What to exclude from your review:

Please do not write about reviews, commentary, or information posted on the product page. If you see any errors in the information on the product page, please send us an email.

Reviews should not contain any of the following:

  • - HTML tags, profanity, obscenities, vulgarities, or comments that defame anyone
  • - Time-sensitive information such as tour dates, signings, lectures, etc.
  • - Single-word reviews. Other people will read your review to discover why you liked or didn't like the title. Be descriptive.
  • - Comments focusing on the author or that may ruin the ending for others
  • - Phone numbers, addresses, URLs
  • - Pricing and availability information or alternative ordering information
  • - Advertisements or commercial solicitation

Reminder:

  • - By submitting a review, you grant to Barnes & Noble.com and its sublicensees the royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable right and license to use the review in accordance with the Barnes & Noble.com Terms of Use.
  • - Barnes & Noble.com reserves the right not to post any review -- particularly those that do not follow the terms and conditions of these Rules. Barnes & Noble.com also reserves the right to remove any review at any time without notice.
  • - See Terms of Use for other conditions and disclaimers.
Search for Products You'd Like to Recommend

Recommend other products that relate to your review. Just search for them below and share!

Create a Pen Name

Your Pen Name is your unique identity on BN.com. It will appear on the reviews you write and other website activities. Your Pen Name cannot be edited, changed or deleted once submitted.

 
Your Pen Name can be any combination of alphanumeric characters (plus - and _), and must be at least two characters long.

Continue Anonymously
Sort by: Showing 1 Customer Reviews
  • Anonymous

    Posted February 1, 2002

    Outstanding

    This is nothing short of an outstanding introduction to Gadamer, cleverly and thoughtfully translated by one of the foremost English-language authorities on the subject. It also serves as a formidable intellectual counterpoint to some recent hostile commmentaries on Gadamer and Heidegger. This book will amply reward even the most casual student of hermeneutics.

    Was this review helpful? Yes  No   Report this review
Sort by: Showing 1 Customer Reviews

If you find inappropriate content, please report it to Barnes & Noble
Why is this product inappropriate?
Comments (optional)