Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory / Edition 1by Fioravante Patrone
Pub. Date: 03/31/1998
Publisher: Springer US
This collection of papers is an outgrowth of the "Game Practice I" th th conference held in Genoa from 28 to 30 June 1998. More precisely, it is the result of the call for papers that was issued in association with that conference: actually, nearly half of the contributions to this book are papers that were presented in Genoa. The name chosen for the conference and for this book is in evident and provocative contrast with "Game Theory": this choice needs some explanation, and to that we shall devote a few words of this Preface. Let us say at the outset that "Game Practice" would not exist without Game Theory. As one can see, the overall content of this book is firmly rooted in the existing Game Theory. It could be hardly otherwise, given the success and influence of Game Theory (just think of the basic issues in Economic Theory), and the tremendous development that has taken place within Game Theory. This success, however, makes even more evident the existence of problems with respect to the verification of the theory. This is patent from the point of view of the predictive value of Game Theory (the "positive" side): a lot of experimental and observational evidence demon strates that there is a large gap between theory and "practice".
Table of ContentsPreface. 1. Some Tips Concerning Application of Game Theory to Real Problems; M. Maschler. 2. Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design; A.E. Roth. 3. On the Exploitation of Casino Games: How to Distinguish Between Games of Chance and Games of Skill? P. Borm, B. van der Genutgen. 4. Agreement Through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case; S.J. Brams, J.M. Togman. 5. The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction; E. van Damme. 6. Bird's Tree Allocations Revisited; V. Feltkamp, et al. 7. How to Share Railways Infrastructure Costs? V. Fragnelli, et al. 8. Why punish? Norms and Revenge in an Experimental Game; U. Gneezy, A. Stoler. 9. A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion; M. Grillo. 10. Structural Estimation of Auction Models; H. Hong, M. Shum. 11. A Multiplicative Variant of the Shapley Value for Factorizing the Risk of Disease; M. Land, O. Gefeller. 12. Experiments on Auctions with Random Prizes and EU/non-EU Bidders; L. Parisio. 13. Dynamic Games and Oligopoly Models of Technological Innovation. 14. The Structure of Fair-Division Problems and the Design of Fair-Negotiation Procedures; M.G. Raith. 15. Effectivity Functions and Parliamentary Governance Structures; S. Vannucci. 16. Sequential Production Situations and Potentials; M. Voorneveld, et al. 17. Approximate Envy-Fee Procedures; D.-Z. Zeng. Index.
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