Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups / Edition 1 by Randolph Sloof | 9780792382300 | Hardcover | Barnes & Noble
Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups / Edition 1

Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups / Edition 1

by Randolph Sloof
     
 

ISBN-10: 0792382307

ISBN-13: 9780792382300

Pub. Date: 08/31/1998

Publisher: Springer US

This volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. It is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. Moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of influence that may differ in their effectiveness, and between which

Overview

This volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. It is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. Moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of influence that may differ in their effectiveness, and between which interaction effects may occur. Theoretical models analyzing the choice of an interest group between different means of influence are relatively scarce, though. The three game-theoretic models presented in the main part of this volume are meant to help fill this gap. First, the choice of an interest group between campaign contributions and direct endorsements to influence voter behavior is investigated. Second, the choice between using 'words' (lobbying) and using 'actions' (pressure) in influencing a policymaker is analyzed. Third, the question is addressed at what level of government an interest group should direct its lobbying activities. Also in this third model, the problem faced by politicians as to when to delegate policy authority to bureaucrats is studied within the context of interest group influence. The theoretical predictions obtained from the models are evaluated in the light of existing empirical evidence.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780792382300
Publisher:
Springer US
Publication date:
08/31/1998
Edition description:
1998
Pages:
262
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.03(d)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgementsix
1Introduction1
1.1Motivation1
1.2Outline of the book4
Notes6
References7
2Review of the Literature9
2.1The political influence of interest groups: empirical evidence9
2.2The political influence of interest groups: theoretical models26
2.3Summary30
Notes31
References36
3Game-Theoretic Preliminaries45
3.1A basic signaling game45
3.2The three ways in which the basic signaling game will be applied54
3.3Extensions of the basic signaling game59
3.4Summary64
Notes65
References70
4Campaign Contributions or Direct Endorsements?75
4.1Campaign expenditures, direct endorsements and voting76
4.2Campaign contributions and voting79
4.3Campaign contributions versus direct endorsements85
4.4Directly observable contributions88
4.5Concluding discussion91
Appendix 4.A96
Appendix 4.B106
Notes116
References120
5Lobbying or Pressure?123
5.1Description of the general model124
5.2The AL game: pressure as a means to build up reputation131
5.3The LA game: lobbying and the maintenance of reputation136
5.4The LL game: reputation building when repeated lobbying is possible141
5.5Welfare comparison and institutional design145
5.6Concluding discussion146
Appendix 5.A149
Appendix 5.B151
Appendix 5.C168
Notes176
References184
6Lobbying Politicians or Bureaucrats?187
6.1Description of the model and its relationship to recent delegation studies188
6.2Equilibrium analysis193
6.3Generalizations and alternative modeling assumptions214
6.4Concluding discussion220
Appendix 6.A225
Notes233
References239
7Summary and Evaluation241
7.1Summary241
7.2Evaluation245
Notes251
References252
Author Index253
Subject Index259

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