Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups

Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups

by Randolph Sloof
     
 

This volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. It is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. Moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of influence that may differ in their effectiveness, and between which

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Overview

This volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. It is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. Moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of influence that may differ in their effectiveness, and between which interaction effects may occur. Theoretical models analyzing the choice of an interest group between different means of influence are relatively scarce, though. The three game-theoretic models presented in the main part of this volume are meant to help fill this gap. First, the choice of an interest group between campaign contributions and direct endorsements to influence voter behavior is investigated. Second, the choice between using 'words' (lobbying) and using 'actions' (pressure) in influencing a policymaker is analyzed. Third, the question is addressed at what level of government an interest group should direct its lobbying activities. Also in this third model, the problem faced by politicians as to when to delegate policy authority to bureaucrats is studied within the context of interest group influence. The theoretical predictions obtained from the models are evaluated in the light of existing empirical evidence.

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Editorial Reviews

Booknews
In this work, based on a doctoral dissertation, Sloof (U. of Amsterdam) presents a number of game-theoretical models that extend previous models, striving to make the earlier models more realistic and to address some largely ignored issues with regard to the considerable influence of interest groups. Results are presented in the body of the text, and formal derivations and technical discussions are relegated to chapter appendices. After an introduction, a review of the literature, and coverage of game-theoretic preliminaries, discussion focuses on interest groups' choice between campaign contributions and direct endorsements; lobbying (words) and pressure (action); and which level of government to approach. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781441950505
Publisher:
Springer US
Publication date:
12/03/2010
Edition description:
Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1998
Pages:
262
Product dimensions:
0.58(w) x 9.21(h) x 6.14(d)

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