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Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research / Edition 1

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Overview

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. It brings together the contributions of a wide spectrum of disciplines such as Statistics, Mathematics, Mathematical Economics and OR. The contributions include decision theory, shastic games, cooperative and noncooperative games. The papers in the volume are classified under five different sections. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games. The fifth section contains diverse applications of these various theories. Taken together they exhibit a rich versatility of these theories and lively interaction between the mathematical theory of games and significant economic problems.

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Editorial Reviews

Booknews
Contributions from a wide range of disciplines, including statistics, mathematics, mathematical economics, and operations research, to discuss decision theory, stochastic games, cooperative and non- cooperative games, two-person games, the linear complementarity problem and game theory, and of course the applications mentioned in the title. The 22 topics include incidence matrix games, consistency properties of the non-transferable cooperative game solutions, pure strategy Nash equilibrium points in large non-autonomous games, linear complementarity and the irreducible polystochastic game with the average cost criterion when one player controls the transition, and two-level negotiations in bargaining over water. The papers are from a January 1996 conference in Bangalore, India. No index. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781441947802
  • Publisher: Springer US
  • Publication date: 12/3/2010
  • Series: Theory and Decision Library C Series , #18
  • Edition description: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1997
  • Edition number: 1
  • Pages: 302
  • Product dimensions: 6.14 (w) x 9.21 (h) x 0.67 (d)

Table of Contents

Preface. Introduction. I: Two-Person Games. Computing Linear Minimax Estimators; K. Helmes, C. Srinivasan. Incidence Matrix Games; R.B. Bapat, S. Tijs. Completely Mixed Games and Real Jacobian Conjecture; T. Parthasarathy, et al. Probability of Obtaining a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Matrix Games with Random Pay-Offs; S. Mishra, T.K. Kumar. II: Cooperative Games. Nonlinear Self Dual Solutions for TU Games; P. Sudholter. The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution; T. Driessen, Y. Funaki. Consistency Properties of the Nontransferable Cooperative Game Solutions; E. Yanovskaya. Reduced Game Property of Egalitarian Division Rules for Cooperative Games; T. Driessen, Y. Funaki. III: Noncooperative Games. An Implementation of the Nucleolus of NTU Games; G. Bergantinos, J.A.M. Potters. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points in Large Non-Anonymous Games; M.A. Khan, et al. Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information. The Deterministic Symmetric Case; A. Neyman, S. Sorin. On Stable Sets of Equilibria; A.J. Vermeulen, et al. IV: Linear Complementarity Problems and Game Theory. A Chain Condition for Qo-Matrices; A.K. Biswas, G.S.R. Murthy. Linear Complementarity and the Irreducible Polyshastic Game with the Average Cost Criterion when one Player Controls Transition; S.R. Mohan, et al. On the Lipschitz Continuity of the Solution Map in Some Generalized Linear Complementarity Problems; R. Sznajder, M.S. Gowda. V: Economic And Or Applications. Pari-Mutuel as a System of Aggregation of Information; G. Owen. Genetic Algorithm of the Core of NTU Games; H.H. Chin. Some Recent Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Structured Cooperative Games;T.E.S. Raghavan. The Characterisation of the Uniform Reallocation Rule Without Pareto Optimality; B. Klaus. Two Level Negotiations in Bargaining Over Water; A. Richards, N. Singh. Price Rule and Volatility in Auctions with Resale Markets; A. Alkhan. Monetary Trade, Market Specialisation and Strategic Behaviour; M. Rajeev.

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