Game Theory and Economic Behaviou

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Editorial Reviews

This two-volume set provides an overview of the work of Selten, the Nobel Prize winner who refined the Nash equilibrium concept of non- cooperative games for analyzing dynamic strategic interaction and applied these concepts to analyses of oligopoly. Twenty-five essays discuss topics including axiomatic characterizations, learning, political and social interaction, theories of oligopolistic competition, oligopoly experiments, and bilateral and coalition bargaining. Lacks a subject index. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781858988726
  • Publisher: Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.
  • Publication date: 1/1/1999
  • Pages: 912

Table of Contents

Vol. 1
Acknowledgements vii
Foreword ix
Introduction xi
Bibliography of Reinhard Selten's writings xxiii
Nobel Prize citation xxxi
Part I
1 'In Search of a Better Understanding of Economic Behaviour' in The Makers of Modern Economics, Vol. 1, Arnold Heertje (ed.), 1993, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 115-39 3
Part II Axiomatic Characterizations
2 'Valuation of n-Person Games', Advances in Game Theory: Annals of Mathematics Studies, 52, 1964, 577-626 31
3 'Properties of a Measure of Predictive Success', Mathematical Social Sciences, 21, 1991, 153-67 81
4 'An Axiomatic Approach to Consumers' Welfare', with Eyal Winter, Mathematical Social Sciences, 27, 1994, 19-30 96
5 'An Axiomatic Theory of a Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar Games with Linear Incentives', Games and Economic Behavior, 8 (1), January 1995, 213-63 108
Part III Learning
6 'Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior', Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 1991, 3-24 161
7 'Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games' in Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics, Reinhard Selten (ed.), 1991, Springer-Verlag, 98-154 183
8 'End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach', with Rolf Stoecker, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7, 1986, 47-70 240
9 'Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions', with Joachim Buchta in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, David V. Budescu, Ido Erev and Rami Zwick (eds), 1998, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., 79-102 264
Part IV Political and Social Interaction
10 'The Scenario Bundle Method', Research Conference on Strategic Decision Analysis Focusing on the Persian Gulf, Verein zur Forderung der Arms Control, e. V. SADAC, 5-56, reset with minor revisions 291
11 'Balance of Power in a Parlor Game' in Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction, Reinhard Selten (ed.), 1991, Springer-Verlag, 150-209 326
12 'The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium', with Jonathan Pool in Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction, Reinhard Selten (ed.), 1991, Springer-Verlag, 64-87 386
Name index 411
Vol. 2
Acknowledgements vii
Biographical sketch ix
Part I Theories of Oligopolistic Competition
1 'Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames', in Lex Prix Nobel 1994, Tore Frangsmyr (ed.), The Nobel Foundation, 320-49 3
2 'Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria', with Thomas Marschak, Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCII, February 1978, 71-93 33
3 'Oligopolistic Economies as Games of Limited Information', with Thomas Marschak, Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 133 (3), October 1977, 385-409 56
4 'Elementary Theory of Slack-Ridden Imperfect Competition', in New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, Joseph E. Stiglitz and G. Frank Mathewson (eds), 1986, Macmillan Press, 126-44 81
Part II Oligopoly Experiments
5 'An Experiment in Oligopoly', with Heinz Sauermann, General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, V, 1960, 85-114 103
6 'Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players', with Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich, Econometrica, 65 (3), May 1997, 517-55 133
Part III Bilateral Bargaining
7 'Game Theoretical Analysis of Wage Bargaining in a Simple Business Cycle Model', with Werner Guth, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 1982, 177-95 175
8 'Equilibrium Point Selection in a Bargaining Situation with Opportunity Costs', with Ulrike Leopold, Economie Appliquee, XXXVI (4), 1983, 611-48 194
9 'Original or Fake--a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information', with Werner Guth in Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining, Reinhard Selten (ed.), 1991, Springer-Verlag, 186-229 232
10 'Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information', with Austin Hoggatt, D. Crockett, S. Gill and J. Moore in Bargaining Behavior, Heinz Sauermann (ed.), 1978, J.C.B. Mohr, 127-78 276
Part IV Coalition Bargaining
11 'Equity and Coalition Bargaining in Experimental Three-Person Games', in Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View, Alvin E. Roth (ed.), 1987, Cambridge University Press, 42-98 331
12 'A Demand Commitment Model of Coalition Bargaining' in Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten (ed.), 1992, Springer-Verlag, 245-82 388
13 'Demand Commitment Bargaining in Three-Person Quota Game Experiments', with Bettina Kuon, International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 1993, 261-77 426
Name index 443
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