Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

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Editorial Reviews

Because there are no supranational institutions that can enforce international environmental agreements, and so countries must deal with each other directly over such matters as global emissions, Finus (U. of Hagen, Germany) finds game theory particularly suited for analyzing international environmental problems. He investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree, and comply to an international environmental agreement. He shows that by integrating real-world restrictions into a model, game theory becomes a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between first-best policy recommendations and second-best designs of actual agreements. He suggests that small coalitions might be more stable and accomplish more than a single, overarching agreement. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (
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Product Details

Table of Contents

List of figures
List of tables
1 Introduction 1
2 Important terms, notation and classification of games 7
3 Static games with discrete strategy space 21
4 Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a first approach 42
5 Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a first approach 63
6 Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a second approach 75
7 Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a second approach 89
8 Issue linkage 103
9 Static games with continuous strategy space: global emission game 119
10 Finite dynamic games with continuous strategy space and static representations of dynamic games 149
11 Bargaining over a uniform emission reduction quota and a uniform emission tax 176
12 Infinite dynamic games with continuous strategy space 194
13 Coalition models: a first appraoch 219
14 Coalition models: a second approach 258
15 Coalition models: a third approach 283
16 Summary and conclusions 310
Appendices 317
References 380
Index 405
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