xii, 627 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. Hardcover. Good binding and cover. Clean, unmarked pages. <br> Contents: Part I. Descriptive theory --Competitive coalition theory / Peter C. Ordeshook
and Richard D. McKelvey --A solution theory for noncooperative games and its implications for cooperative games / John C. Harsanyi --A model of cooperative games with binding commitments / Robert W. Rosenthal --The theory of dynamic games / Norman Schofield --Toward a theory of legislativedecision / John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Herbert F. Weisberg --Discrete partition function games / William F. Lucas and John C. Maceli --Part II. Experiments --An experimental and game-theoretic study of committees / James D. Laing and Scott Olmsted --Cooperative game models of the influence of the closed rule in three person majority rule committees : Theory and experiments / R. Mark Isaac and Charles R. Plott --Experimental mechanisms for public choice / Vernon L. Smith --Part III. Applications --The mean versus the median in spatial voting games / Melvin J. Hinich --Existence of electoral equilibrium / Gerald H. Kramer --A tactical lobbying game / H.P. Young --Coalition formation, policy distance, and the theory of games without sidepayments : An application to the French apparentement system / Richard D. McKelvey and Howard Rosenthal --Part IV. Value theory and applications --A note on the Banzhaf-Coleman index / Guillermo Owen --Power and position : The utility of playing a simple game / Alvin E. Roth --Probability models for power indices / Philip D. Straffin, Jr. --The nucleous as a oncooperative game solution / Martin Shubik and H.P. Young --Power and satisfaction in a representative democracy / Steven J. Brams and Mark Lake --A new theory of social justice based on the mathematical theory of games / Horace W. Brock.
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