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Game Theory and Politics
     

Game Theory and Politics

by Steven J. Brams
 

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ISBN-10: 0486434974

ISBN-13: 2900486434970

Pub. Date: 11/24/2011

Publisher: Dover Publications

In this illuminating and instructive survey, author Steven J. Brams demonstrates both the insights and the pitfalls that can result from applying game theoretic models to the analysis of problems in political science. Using plenty of real-life examples, Brams shows how game theory can explain and elucidate complex political situations, from warfare to presidential

Overview

In this illuminating and instructive survey, author Steven J. Brams demonstrates both the insights and the pitfalls that can result from applying game theoretic models to the analysis of problems in political science. Using plenty of real-life examples, Brams shows how game theory can explain and elucidate complex political situations, from warfare to presidential vetoes. In these cases and others, game theory's mathematical structure provides a rigorous, consistent method for formulating, analyzing, and solving strategic problems. Minimal mathematical background is necessary, making the book accessible to a wide audience of students and teachers of politics and social science, as well as other readers with a serious interest in politics.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
2900486434970
Publisher:
Dover Publications
Publication date:
11/24/2011
Pages:
336

Table of Contents

Preface to the Dover Editionix
Prefacexi
Introductory Notexv
List of Tablesxvii
List of Figuresxix
1.International Relations Games1
1.1.Introduction1
1.2.Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddlepoints2
1.3.Information in Games8
1.4.Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddlepoints13
1.5.Pure and Mixed Strategies17
1.6.Interpretation of Mixed Strategies20
1.7.Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games26
1.8.Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames30
1.9.Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis39
1.10.Summary and Conclusion47
2.Qualitative Voting Games51
2.1.Introduction51
2.2.Voting Procedures52
2.3.Sincere Voting56
2.4.Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures60
2.5.Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability63
2.6.Desirable Strategies and Equilibria67
2.7.The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies69
2.8.Sophisticated Voting73
2.9.Coalitions and Information78
2.10.Voting on Voting Procedures82
2.11.The Paradox of Voting85
2.12.Empirical Examples88
2.13.Summary and Conclusion96
3.Quantitative Voting Games101
3.1.Introduction101
3.2.Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation102
3.3.Rules that Meet the Requirements104
3.4.Interdependence of the Requirements106
3.5.The Effects of Size108
3.6.Information and the Choice of Strategies111
3.7.Empirical Examples116
3.8.Summary and Conclusion121
4.Vote-Trading Games125
4.1.Introduction125
4.2.What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes126
4.3.Judgments about Vote Trading129
4.4.Definitions and Assumptions131
4.5.Sincere and Insincere Voting133
4.6.Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading137
4.7.Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading140
4.8.The Consequences of Refusing to Trade142
4.9.The Consequences of Forming Coalitions144
4.10.Conditions Limiting Vote Trading148
4.11.Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading151
4.12.Summary and Conclusion154
5.Voting Power157
5.1.Introduction157
5.2.The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power158
5.3.The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power164
5.4.Coalition Models of the Two Power Indices167
5.5.Calculation of the Power Indices171
5.6.Three Paradoxes of Voting Power176
5.7.Empirical Applications of the Power Indices182
5.8.Summary and Conclusion195
6.Coalition Games199
6.1.Introduction199
6.2.Power and Coalitions200
6.3.Restrictions on Coalition Alignments202
6.4.The Stability of Alignments204
6.5.Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model209
6.6.The Concept of Winning213
6.7.The Size Principle216
6.8.The Information Effect220
6.9.Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle222
6.10.Criticisms of the Size Principle226
6.11.An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils232
6.12.Summary and Conclusion240
7.Election Games243
7.1.Introduction243
7.2.The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform244
7.3.Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior247
7.4.The Goals of Candidates249
7.5.The Popular-Vote Model251
7.6.The Electoral-Vote Model255
7.7.The 3/2's Allocation Rule257
7.8.Why the Large States Are Favored260
7.9.Testing the Models263
7.10.Campaign Allocations and Biases through 1980266
7.11.Limitations and Extensions of the Models272
7.12.Summary and Conclusion275
Glossary279
Annotated Bibliography291
Index295

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