Game Theory and the Law / Edition 1 by Douglas G. Baird, Robert Gertner, Randal Picker | | 9780674341111 | Paperback | Barnes & Noble
Game Theory and the Law / Edition 1

Game Theory and the Law / Edition 1

by Douglas G. Baird, Robert Gertner, Randal Picker
     
 

ISBN-10: 0674341112

ISBN-13: 9780674341111

Pub. Date: 09/28/1998

Publisher: Harvard

This book promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues.

Overview

This book promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780674341111
Publisher:
Harvard
Publication date:
09/28/1998
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
344
Product dimensions:
6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

  • Preface
  • Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior

    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game

    • The Normal Form Game
    • Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
    • The Nash Equilibrium
    • Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
    • Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
    • Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
    • The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game

    • The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
    • A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
    • Subgame Perfection
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation

    • Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
    • The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
    • Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
    • Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
    • Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation
    • Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
    • Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information

    • Signaling and Screening
    • Modeling Nonverifiable Information
    • Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
    • Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
    • Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Reputation and Repeated Games

    • Backwards Induction and Its Limits
    • Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
    • Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models

    • Collective Action and the Role of Law
    • Embedded Games
    • Understanding the Structure of Large Games
    • Collective Action and Private Information
    • Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
    • Herd Behavior
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Noncooperative Bargaining

    • Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
    • Legal Rules as Exit Options
    • Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
    • Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Bargaining and Information

    • Basic Models of the Litigation Process
    • Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
    • Information and Selection Bias
    • Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes


  • Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
  • Notes
  • References
  • Glossary
  • Index

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >