Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory / Edition 4

Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory / Edition 4

by Eric Rasmusen
     
 

What may be the most successful introductory game theory textbook ever written is now available in its fourth edition. Since it first published in 1989, successive editions have made its presentation ever more elegant, with incisive problem sets and applications.

Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information, 4e uses simple modeling

See more details below

Overview

What may be the most successful introductory game theory textbook ever written is now available in its fourth edition. Since it first published in 1989, successive editions have made its presentation ever more elegant, with incisive problem sets and applications.

Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information, 4e uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The fourth edition brings this material completely up-to-date, adds new end-of-chapter problems and classroom games, and is accompanied by a comprehensive website, featuring problem solutions and teaching notes: www.rasmusen.org/GI.

With its emphasis on applications of game theory and information economics to a vast array of disciplines, Games and Information, 4e provides an accessible first course for students in backgrounds as diverse as economics, business, mathematics, and political science.

Read More

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781405136662
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication date:
11/28/2006
Edition description:
Revised
Pages:
558
Sales rank:
680,553
Product dimensions:
7.70(w) x 10.00(h) x 1.20(d)

Meet the Author

Eric Rasmusen is the Dan R. and Catherine M. Dalton Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at Indiana University in Bloomington. In addition to Games and Information, he has edited Readings in Games and Information (Blackwell, 2001) and co-authored Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (2003).

Table of Contents

List of Figures.

List of Tables.

List of Games.

Preface.

Contents and Purpose.

Changes in the Second Edition (1994).

Changes in the Third Edition (2001).

Changes in the Fourth Edition (2006).

Using the Book.

The Level of Mathematics.

Other Books.

Contact Information.

Acknowledgements.

Introduction.

History.

Game Theory’s Method.

Exemplifying Theory.

This Book’s Style.

Notes.

PART 1: GAME THEORY.

1. The Rules of the Game.

Definitions.

Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner’sDilemma.

Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes and RankedCoordination.

Focal Points.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

2. Information.

The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game.

Information Sets.

Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information.

The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games.

Example: The Png Settlement Game.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

3. Mixed and Continuous Strategies.

Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game.

The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing.

Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: TheCivic Duty Game.

Randomizing is not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game.

Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game.

Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements,and Strategic.

Substitutes.

Existence of Equilibrium.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

4. Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information.

Subgame Perfectness.

An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I.

Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in theGame of Nuisance Suits.

Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: ParetoPerfection.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

5. Reputation and Repeated Games with SymmetricInformation.

Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox.

Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the FolkTheorem.

Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game.

Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: CustomerSwitching Costs.

Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

6. Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information.

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III.

Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrenceand PhD Admissions Games.

The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV andV.

Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma:The Gang of Four Model.

The Axelrod Tournament.

Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

PART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION.

7. Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions.

Categories of Asymmetric Information Models.

A Principal-agent Model: The Production Game.

The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints.

Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

8. Further Topics in Moral Hazard.

Efficiency Wages.

Tournaments.

Institutions and Agency Problems.

Renegotiation: The Repossession Game.

State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II.

Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model.

The Multitask Agency Problem.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

9. Adverse Selection.

Introduction: Production Game VI.

Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II.

Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV.

Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III.

Market Microstructure.

A Variety of Applications.

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production GameVII.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

10. Mechanism Design and Postcontractual HiddenKnowledge.

Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the RevelationPrinciple.

Myerson Mechanism Design.

An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The SalesmanGame.

The Groves Mechanism.

Price Discrimination.

Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

11. Signalling.

The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling.

Variants on the Signalling Model of Education.

General Comments on Signalling in Education.

The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening.

Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues.

Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing.

Countersignalling.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

PART 3: APPLICATIONS.

12. Bargaining.

The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie.

The Nash Bargaining Solution.

Alternating Offers over Finite Time.

Alternating Offers over Infinite Time.

Incomplete Information.

Setting Up a Way to Bargain: The Myerson–SatterthwaiteMechanism.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

13. Auctions.

Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete.

Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-valueAuctions.

Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty.

Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach.

Common-value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse.

Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The WalletGame.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

14. Pricing.

Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited.

Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox.

Location Models.

Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games.

Vertical Differentiation.

Durable Monopoly.

Notes.

Problems.

Classroom Game.

Mathematical Appendix.

Notation.

The Greek Alphabet.

Glossary.

Formulas and Functions.

Probability Distributions.

Supermodularity.

Fixed Point Theorems.

Genericity.

Discounting.

Risk.

References and Name Index.

Subject Index

Read More

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >