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Games, Threats and Treaties: Understanding Commitments in International Relations
     

Games, Threats and Treaties: Understanding Commitments in International Relations

by Jon Hovi
 
What are the conditions for a threat to be effective? In what ways can a threat issued by one state another be made credible? What is the role of commitments in international bargaining? How ca compliance with international treaties be explained? Can treaties be designed to ensure compliance?

Organised in three parts, and using modern game theory as an analytical

Overview

What are the conditions for a threat to be effective? In what ways can a threat issued by one state another be made credible? What is the role of commitments in international bargaining? How ca compliance with international treaties be explained? Can treaties be designed to ensure compliance?

Organised in three parts, and using modern game theory as an analytical tool, this book analyses the difficult art of commitment in international relations. Part I considers interstate threats; Part II considers commitments in international bargaining; and Part III focuses on compliance with international treaties. Throughout the book, rigorous theoretical exposition is combined with empirical examples stemming from topical current events.

Game-theoretic concepts are introduced by the author in a simple and intuitive way, requiring no prior knowledge of game theory.

Editorial Reviews

Booknews
A study of the international relations problem of commitment<-->the incentive to back out from a threat, an assurance, or a promise when the time comes to put words into action. Although the most commonly cited commitment problem was nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, the author argues that many examples remain important to present day international affairs. Even though the book is based heavily on recent developments in game theory, previous knowledge of the theory is not required to understand this book's argument that the international system is in a state of anarchy in which, as a last resort, states must rely on themselves to promote security and welfare. The book is organized into four parts that examine: the theoretical conditions for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of threats; the domestic and international role of commitments in international bargaining; an explanation of why nations comply with treaties under anarchy; and the way game theory can be applied to two recent controversies called the agency-structure and the neo-neo debates. Distributed by Continuum. Paper edition (488-2), $24.95. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781855674882
Publisher:
Continuum International Publishing Group
Publication date:
04/01/1998
Pages:
158
Product dimensions:
6.08(w) x 9.22(h) x 0.50(d)

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