A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games / Edition 1

Paperback (Print)
Buy New
Buy New from BN.com
$39.33
Used and New from Other Sellers
Used and New from Other Sellers
from $47.04
Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Other sellers (Paperback)
  • All (4) from $47.04   
  • New (3) from $47.04   
  • Used (1) from $47.13   

Overview

The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior

• for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood ResearchProfessor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.

Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University ofBonn, Federal Republic of Germany.

Read More Show Less

Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780262582384
  • Publisher: MIT Press
  • Publication date: 6/29/1988
  • Edition description: Fourth Edition
  • Edition number: 1
  • Pages: 365
  • Product dimensions: 6.00 (w) x 9.00 (h) x 1.00 (d)

Meet the Author

Reinhard Selten is Professor at the University of Bonn. He is a cowinner of the 1994 NobelPrize in Economics.

Read More Show Less

Table of Contents

Foreword p.xiRobert J. Aumann
1. The Need for a New Solution Concept p.1
2. Games in Standard Form p.29
3. Consequences of Desirable Properties p.67
4. The Tracing Procedure p.131
5. The Solution Concept p.195
6. A Bargaining Problem with Transaction Costs on One Side p.243
7. Trade Involving One Seller and More than One Seller p.273
8. Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information on One Side p.285
9. Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides p.311
10. Postscript p.341
Notes p.365
Bibliography p.369
Index p.373
Read More Show Less

Customer Reviews

Be the first to write a review
( 0 )
Rating Distribution

5 Star

(0)

4 Star

(0)

3 Star

(0)

2 Star

(0)

1 Star

(0)

Your Rating:

Your Name: Create a Pen Name or

Barnes & Noble.com Review Rules

Our reader reviews allow you to share your comments on titles you liked, or didn't, with others. By submitting an online review, you are representing to Barnes & Noble.com that all information contained in your review is original and accurate in all respects, and that the submission of such content by you and the posting of such content by Barnes & Noble.com does not and will not violate the rights of any third party. Please follow the rules below to help ensure that your review can be posted.

Reviews by Our Customers Under the Age of 13

We highly value and respect everyone's opinion concerning the titles we offer. However, we cannot allow persons under the age of 13 to have accounts at BN.com or to post customer reviews. Please see our Terms of Use for more details.

What to exclude from your review:

Please do not write about reviews, commentary, or information posted on the product page. If you see any errors in the information on the product page, please send us an email.

Reviews should not contain any of the following:

  • - HTML tags, profanity, obscenities, vulgarities, or comments that defame anyone
  • - Time-sensitive information such as tour dates, signings, lectures, etc.
  • - Single-word reviews. Other people will read your review to discover why you liked or didn't like the title. Be descriptive.
  • - Comments focusing on the author or that may ruin the ending for others
  • - Phone numbers, addresses, URLs
  • - Pricing and availability information or alternative ordering information
  • - Advertisements or commercial solicitation

Reminder:

  • - By submitting a review, you grant to Barnes & Noble.com and its sublicensees the royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable right and license to use the review in accordance with the Barnes & Noble.com Terms of Use.
  • - Barnes & Noble.com reserves the right not to post any review -- particularly those that do not follow the terms and conditions of these Rules. Barnes & Noble.com also reserves the right to remove any review at any time without notice.
  • - See Terms of Use for other conditions and disclaimers.
Search for Products You'd Like to Recommend

Recommend other products that relate to your review. Just search for them below and share!

Create a Pen Name

Your Pen Name is your unique identity on BN.com. It will appear on the reviews you write and other website activities. Your Pen Name cannot be edited, changed or deleted once submitted.

 
Your Pen Name can be any combination of alphanumeric characters (plus - and _), and must be at least two characters long.

Continue Anonymously

    If you find inappropriate content, please report it to Barnes & Noble
    Why is this product inappropriate?
    Comments (optional)