Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

by Kenneth J. Arrow, A. Sen, Kotaro Suzumura

Overview

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780444508942
Publisher:	Elsevier Science
Publication date:	09/10/2010
Series:	Handbooks in Economics , #2
Pages:	992
Product dimensions:	7.30(w) x 10.20(h) x 2.30(d)

About the Author

Kenneth Arrow is the Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research, emeritus; a CHP/PCOR fellow; and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is the joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks in 1972. To date, he is the youngest person to have received this award, at 51. In economics, he is a figure in post-World War II neo-classical economic theory. Many of his former graduate students have gone on to win the Nobel Memorial Prize themselves. His most significant works are his contributions to social choice theory, notably "Arrow's impossibility theorem", and his work on general equilibrium analysis. He has also provided foundational work in many other areas of economics, including endogenous growth theory and the economics of information. He has been co-editor of the Handbooks in Economics series since the mid-1980s.

Table of Contents

Preface to Volume 2

Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow) 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond) 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva)

Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark) 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent) 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb)

Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett) 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet) 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura) 24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster)

Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness 25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera) 26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin). 27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

Detailed surveys by leaders in the field examine major contributions to social choice scholarship

Editorial Reviews

"This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice.  It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates." —Steven Brams, New York University

"This much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area." —Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside

"Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field." —Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics

From the Publisher