Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment / Edition 1 by Thomas Gilovich | 9780521796798 | Paperback | Barnes & Noble
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment / Edition 1

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment / Edition 1

by Thomas Gilovich
     
 

ISBN-10: 0521796792

ISBN-13: 9780521796798

Pub. Date: 07/28/2002

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Judgment pervades human experience. Do I have a strong enough case to go to trial? Will the Fed change interest rates? Can I trust this person? This book examines how people answer such questions. How do people cope with the complexities of the world economy, the uncertain behavior of friends and adversaries, or their own changing tastes and personalities? When are

Overview

Judgment pervades human experience. Do I have a strong enough case to go to trial? Will the Fed change interest rates? Can I trust this person? This book examines how people answer such questions. How do people cope with the complexities of the world economy, the uncertain behavior of friends and adversaries, or their own changing tastes and personalities? When are people's judgments prone to bias, and what is responsible for their biases? This book compiles psychologists' best attempts to answer these important questions.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521796798
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
07/28/2002
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
874
Sales rank:
303,360
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.34(d)

Table of Contents

Introduction: heuristics and biases then and now; Part I. Theoretical and Empirical Extensions: 1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 2. Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgment; 3. How alike is it versus how likely it is: a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments; 4. Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: the mediating effect of ease of imagery; 5. The availability heuristic revisited: ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information; 6. Incorporating the irrelevant: anchors in judgments of belief and value; 7. Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generate and experimenter-provided anchors; 8. Self anchoring in conversation: why language users don't do what they 'should'; 9. Inferential correction; 10. Mental contamination and the debiasing problem; 11. Sympathetic magical thinking: the contagion and similarity 'heuristics'; 12. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice; 13. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence; 14. Inside the planning fallacy: the causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions; 15. Probability judgment across cultures; 16. Durability bias in affective forecasting; 17. Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions; 18. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability; 19. When predictions fail: the dilemma of unrealistic optimism; 20. Norm theory: comparing reality to its alternatives; 21. Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition: how to avoid kicking yourself; Part II. New Theoretical Directions: 22. Two systems of reasoning; 23. The affect heuristic; 24. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate?; 25. Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability; 26. Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: advances in support theory; 27. Remarks on support theory: recent advances and future directions; 28. The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning; 29. Feelings as information: moods influence judgments and processing strategies; 30. Automated choice heuristics; 31. How good are fast and frugal heuristics?; 32. Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors: exploring the empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors; Part III. Real World Applications: 33. The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences; 34. Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs; 35. When less is more: counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists; 36. Understanding misunderstanding: social psychological perspectives; 37. Assessing uncertainty in physical constants; 38. Do analysts overreact?; 39. The calibration of expert judgment: Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory; 40. Clinical versus actuarial judgment; 41. Heuristics and biases in application; 42. Theory driven reasoning about plausible pasts and probable futures in world politics.

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