Hobbes's Critique of Religion and Related Writings

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Hobbes's Critique of Religion

The University of Chicago Press

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

§1. Occasion and Purpose of the Study

If the struggle between belief and unbelief is "the proper, sole, and deepest theme of all world and human history," Hobbes's critique of religion merits the greatest attention. Of the numerous challenges to religion, revealed as well as natural, brought forth by the classical age of the critique of religion—the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—there are not many that can match Hobbes's Leviathan in historical effectiveness, few that can match it in decisiveness of denial, and none that can match it in radicalism of justification [Begründung]. Spinoza's theologico-political treatise is indeed, as Hobbes himself acknowledged, "bolder" than Leviathan, i.e., more reckless in drawing out and stating its consequences; but this boldness is purchased at the price of renouncing the proper foundation of the critique, which is found much more in Leviathan than in the theologico-political treatise.

Despite its very great significance, Hobbes's critique of religion has not previously been subjected to a systematic analysis. The reason for this neglect has to do with the conviction, common to supporters and opponents, that this critique was a necessary byproduct of Hobbes's natural philosophy. This conviction had a certain legitimacy as long as the older view that Hobbes's natural philosophy was a materialistic metaphysics held undisputed sway. But after the investigations, above all, of F. Tönnies established [befestigt] the view that Hobbes's natural philosophy is not so much a materialistic metaphysics as a foundation of modern natural science, the relation of this natural philosophy to the critique of religion had to become problematic. For even if one is also, like Tönnies, of the opinion that there is a necessary connection between modern natural science and the critique of religion, one still cannot pass over the fact that this connection is in any case not evident: precisely those men who deserve the greatest credit for founding [Begründung] modern natural science—Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz—were anything but enemies of belief. If, therefore, Hobbes's natural philosophy is to be characterized not immediately as materialistic metaphysics but rather initially as the foundation of modern natural science, and since, on the other hand, the connection between natural science and the critique of religion is in no way self-evident, an independent investigation of Hobbes's critique of religion is, in view of the latter's preeminent significance, a sensible undertaking.

Hobbes's critique of religion is thus often regarded, with initially dubious justice, as a merely secondary result of his natural philosophy. It remains to ask whether this critique should not be understood as more immediately part of his political science. It is ultimately no accident that his statements belonging to the critique of religion are to be found less in his natural scientific than in his political writings. No less than the explicitly entitled work of Spinoza, these latter are theologico-political treatises: more than a third of De cive and approximately one half of Leviathan are devoted to theological questions. If therefore there are compelling reasons for making an engagement with Hobbes's political science into a desired goal, his critique of religion requires an extensive analysis. A brief statement of these reasons is indispensable for the justification [Rechtfertigung] of our project.

Hobbes is the founder of modern politics. He himself made the claim on his own behalf that he was the first to raise politics to the rank of a science; and his contemporaries, whether in complete admiration or complete consternation, at least conceded to him that his politics constituted an unheardof innovation. This view has been corrected by more recent developments in a few, but not essential, points. Admittedly, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the prevailing Hobbes research could show more and more that important elements of the Hobbesian teaching are attested to in the earlier literature; but on the basis of this evidence, through which Hobbes's work seemed temporarily to represent a self-realized fusion of traditional elements, the original impression is conclusively restored: even if this or that feature of Hobbesian politics was already to be found in the earlier literature, Hobbes gave them a unity that they did not have by themselves but that they could gain solely on the basis of an analysis undertaken from an altogether original point of view. There are indeed considerable features of Hobbesian politics that were seen as unsuitable by later thinkers and that were hence eliminated; but even today his harshest critics themselves admit that he was the first to develop the concept of sovereignty with full clarity; and since this concept is not just one concept among others but the foundation [Fundament] of modern politics, Hobbes is the founder of modern politics. An understanding of Hobbes's political science, then, is the elementary precondition for any radical understanding of modern politics.

The doctrine of sovereignty in Hobbes's philosophy is connected, not only with his absolutist conception of the state, but also with his "pessimistic" view of human nature and his "materialistic" metaphysics. The [later] moderns in general retained the doctrine of sovereignty and abandoned the context in which that doctrine was originally developed. The presupposition of this procedure was the conviction that this connection was not necessary but merely conditioned by the historical situation of the seventeenth century, or rather, by Hobbes's prejudices. We shall not venture to decide whether this conviction is warranted. The presupposition for such a decision would be an impartial analysis of Hobbes's political science, which would not be possible without elaborate preparations. Belonging to these preparations in particular is the understanding of Hobbes's critique of religion, which, as we have already indicated, is an integral feature of his political science.

According to the reigning opinion, Hobbes's critique of religion is also an accidental epiphenomenon of the rise of modern politics. This judgment also requires reexamination. If indeed one may speak in general of a specifically modern concept of the state, which, as it seems, is permissible, that reexamination must be guided by the insight that there must also be a specifically modern metaphysics or theology, on the basis of which this concept of the state gains its evidence; for every view of man and the state implies a view of the world and God, whether theistic or atheistic. Whether Hobbes's theology, therefore, which one characterizes at the outset more appropriately as a critique of religion, is the presupposition of modern politics is a question that absolutely requires an investigation. In order for this investigation to be possible, it is first necessary to establish what Hobbes's teaching on the critique of religion actually says and means. The aim of the present treatment is to establish precisely that.

§2. Hobbes's Politics and the Critique of Revelation

Hobbes founded his political science in opposition to two frequently but not always allied traditions: the tradition of philosophic politics, whose originator was for him Socrates, and the tradition of theological politics, which appeals to revelation. Since revelation in his time was by far a greater authority than classical politics, his attack is directed principally against the tradition of theological politics, more exactly, against the dualism of temporal and spiritual power that was asserted or certainly not radically excluded by it. But in this confrontation the original and fundamental theme of politics does not enter the discussion; for every confrontation over the dualistic or monistic character of "power" has as its presupposition the explanation of the meaning of "power," the answer to the question of the meaning and purpose of the state; and on this question, Hobbes has only the tradition of philosophic politics to confront. Hence, Hobbes's genuine teaching comes together only in his critique of the philosophic politics of classical antiquity. But this critique would not have been possible without revelation and its denial; revelation or the polemic against revelation is what makes the acceptance of classical politics impossible for Hobbes.

Whatever else may turn out to be true in general about the relationship between the critique of religion and modern politics, Hobbes's politics is at any rate indissolubly connected with his critique of religion: religion is the enemy of this politics. For this politics is based on the axiom that violent death is the greatest evil; religion, by contrast, teaches that there is a greater evil even than violent death, namely, eternal punishment after death in hell; religion therefore denies the foundation of Hobbesian politics. Hence, this politics remains questionable as long as the teaching of religion is not refuted: it is dependent on the critique of religion.

The foundation of Hobbesian politics is admittedly called into question not only by religion: the philosophic tradition also denies that death is the greatest evil. But the objection of the philosophers is of significance for Hobbes only if it implies that death is not the greatest evil because there is a life after death; and according to his explicit view, it is precisely this presupposition that cannot be vouched for by reason, but only by revelation. Hence, according to Hobbes's own view, revelation is the only danger to his politics. This politics, therefore, is dependent not on a critique of religion in general so much as on a critique of revealed religion. Accordingly, it is no accident that of the eighteen chapters of Leviathan devoted to the critique of religion, only two chapters treat natural religion, by contrast with sixteen chapters that treat revealed religion. And not only this: Hobbes insists on the complete separation between philosophy, natural reason, on the one hand, and religion, on the other; the sole source of religion is revelation. Hobbes confines the natural knowledge of God and divine things within such narrow limits that he can ultimately even expel them root and branch from the realm of philosophy. Hence, by elucidating Hobbes's position on revelation, one accomplishes everything, or almost everything, that one generally requires in order to understand his position on religion.

In order to assess the entire significance that the critique of revelation has for Hobbes's politics, one must recall the situation in which this science originated. Owing to the consequences of the Reformation, theological politics had become more questionable than ever before: theological politics seemed to lead by necessity, not to order and peace, but to the horrors of the wars of religion. If order and peace were finally to come about, what was required, as it seemed, was a politics resting solely on the self-sufficient reflection of man. Such a politics had been elaborated by classical philosophy. But the philosophic politics that rested on the foundations conceived by Socrates had not only not refused an association with theology; it had also not been able to refuse this; in any case it had provided theological politics with some of its most dangerous weapons. Hence, a new politics was required that would not merely be independent of theology but also make any relapse into theological politics impossible for all future time. In other words, what was required was not a politics that, like classical politics, preceded revelation and hence, as it seemed, had not risen to meet the claim of revelation, but rather one that contended with this claim from the outset, and therefore succeeded revelation. Hence, the critique of revelation is not merely a subsequent, though necessary, supplement to Hobbesian politics but its presupposition, indeed the presupposition of Hobbes's philosophy in general.

This claim, as must be conceded and emphasized immediately, stands in manifest contradiction with the appearance given by Hobbes's critique of revelation, and especially with his critique of theological politics: a glance at Leviathan shows that the critique of theological politics, which appears in the guise of a teaching resting on revelation about the Christian state, follows the purely rational teaching about man and state, that therefore Hobbes's critique of revelation rests on his elaborated philosophic teaching. This procedure seems to be fully unobjectionable. It is in fact not exposed to any considerable objection as long as philosophy, particularly philosophic politics, is held to be self-evident. But if this presupposition becomes doubtful, the question arises as to whether the structure of Leviathan does not conceal the real foundational relation between philosophic politics, indeed of philosophy in general, on the one hand, and the critique of revelation, on the other.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from Hobbes's Critique of Religion by LEO STRAUSS Copyright © 2011 by The University of Chicago. Excerpted by permission of The University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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