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International AffairsSerious work on this subject has begun to emerge with Audrey Kurth Cronin's splendid recent study, How Terrorism Ends, providing a strong example.
— Richard English
"A truly superb book that addresses the actual resolution of terrorist movements. It has a clarity and definitiveness that is rare in the literature and, moreover, will be of special interest to any official or analyst endeavoring to cope with this threatening and sinister problem. Its careful and rigorous message is one of hope."—Philip Bobbitt, author of Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-first Century
"Thoughtful books on terrorism are sadly a rarity. How Terrorism Ends not only meets that test but also tackles a neglected aspect of the subject. I cannot think of another book that addresses the ending of terrorist campaigns in the systematic way or with the depth that Audrey Cronin does."—Adrian Guelke, author of Terrorism and Global Disorder
"This is a thoughtful, sensible, and well-researched analysis of an important but understudied subject with immense policy relevance. It presents a systematic comparative framework that places al-Qaeda in historical perspective."—Martha Crenshaw, author of Terrorism in Context
"This is a superb book dealing with an important and timely topic. It is impressive in its research, very well written, and full of insights. A must-read."—Brian Michael Jenkins, author of Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?
"For all the scholarly work that has been done during the decade on terrorism and counter-terrorism, remarkably little has been done to compare the ways in which terrorist campaigns come to a conclusion. Audrey Kurth Cronin fills this gap admirably in her book How Terrorism Ends [by] using intelligent analysis and a wide array of historical examples."—Colin Dueck, Claremont Review of Books
"This is an impeccable text, offering some hope to those who fear a terrorist cataclysm, ways to ameliorate situations that foster or encourage terrorist activity, and a clear strategy for governments to pursue."—Rabbi Dr Charles H Middleburgh, Charles Middleburgh Blog
CATCHING OR KILLING THE LEADER
[T]he cardinal responsibility of leadership is to identify the dominant contradiction at each point of the historical process and to work out a central line to resolve it. -Mao Tse-tung
Leaders of terrorist groups are often captured or killed in the final months of terrorist campaigns, dealing a death blow to the group and precipitating the demise of the movement. But the specific techniques of targeting vary, and the long-term effects of decapitation are inconsistent. While many campaigns end as a result, others barely falter and may even gain strength.
The immediate effects of removing a leader vary, depending on the structure of the organization, the degree to which it fosters a cult of personality, the availability of a viable successor, the nature of its ideology, the political context, and whether the leader was killed or imprisoned. This chapter employs comparative case studies of the arrest or assassination of top leaders so as to probe the complex relationship between their removal and the ending of terrorist campaigns. A clear finding in what follows is that arresting a leader damages a campaign more than killing him does, especially when the jailed leader can be cut off from communicating with his subordinates yet also paraded in humiliation before the public. More surprising, however, a crucial consideration in determining whether the removal of a leader will succeed in ending a campaign is not the type of action a state uses against him or even his operational effectiveness, as we might logically expect, but rather the effects of his removal on potential supporters of both the terrorist campaign and the counterterrorist operation. Killing the leader of a group that has widespread popular support either has no measurable effect or is counterproductive. In this case, as in many others, the reaction of terrorism's multiple audiences proves crucial.
The "propagandist in chief" who explains the rationale for terrorism is important, even if he or she is not directing the group's operations. Because organizations that rely on terrorist attacks typically lack the strength to employ more legitimate forms of violence, leaders must formulate a narrative that mobilizes followers and has consistent elements. First, whatever the political motivation, terrorist attacks demand a rationale that overshadows moral qualms about targeting civilians. Perception is at the core of terrorism. Without an articulated sense of political purpose, the violence is nothing more than murder and redounds against a group or its cause. Second, supporters must believe that there is no alternative to killing. This requires a carefully crafted story, infused with a sense of urgency. Grievances are a necessary but not sufficient ingredient: potential supporters must also accept that the best, in fact the only, way to remedy the injustice is by killing noncombatants. Third, followers must be convinced that civilians who are killed as a result of terrorist attacks are not really innocent, but represent "the Enemy." Finally, a compelling personality thrusts followers beyond the threshold of personal doubt. The leader convinces them that they are not only right in their actions and convictions, but innocent of the harm that they do.
All of these aspects of terrorism rely upon a carefully crafted argument. Though painful for potential victims to ponder, elements of both attraction and repulsion are essential for terrorist acts to resonate politically and to potentially be "effective." At the core of the apparent moral ambiguities, exploiting the confusing fusion between motivation and method, lies the narrative, which simplifies the complexities of life and presents terrorist attacks as a shortcut nudging history forward toward a new, more desirable reality.
Of course, not all leaders are magnetic ideologues, and not all groups require the creation of a narrative. Some pick up long-standing grievances with a built-in pedigree. Groups that pursue ethnonationalist causes have a ready means of mobilization over territory or identity, and leadership of these groups may be diffuse and discontinuous. Examples include the Basque separatist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) and the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), whose campaign of violence helped to drive the French from Algeria. Others champion causes that are well-established, such as Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islammiyya) and the PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Charismatic leadership is not important to all groups at all stages and at all times. However, when a leader is identifiable, states find it hard to resist targeting him.
Decapitation is an expected impulse for the military or police, but not necessarily for the right reasons. Counterterrorism policy often involves mirror-imaging: police or military organizations tend to view the enemy in their own terms, as a hierarchically structured group that is directed by a leader. Sometimes this is true, but not always. More to the point, in the aftermath of an attack, those responsible for protecting the public naturally find it difficult to take a phlegmatic approach, not least because the people demand a response. Terrorism is emblematic violence that regularly employs a human mouthpiece: it makes sense to attack the head, if only to shut him up, exact vengeance, and demonstrate resolve.
The history of terrorism yields inconsistent outcomes for this approach. Depending on the structure of the group and its evolution, the leader may exercise variable degrees of political and operational control: some are merely figureheads, others carry out attacks themselves. And the role can change: Even leaders who exercise an operational role in the early years of a group may not continue to do so as an organization and its campaign of violence (and response to violence) unfold and evolve. To silence propaganda, to deliver a form of "justice," to remove the operational role of the leader, to undercut the group, to mollify a domestic population, to raise the morale of counterterrorist forces (and the population that supports them), to disrupt impending attacks-all of these are understandable, logical motives for the use of this technique. But when has it worked? When has decapitation been a catalyst for the demise of terrorist groups and their violent campaigns?
What Decapitation Means
To answer these questions, we must first clarify what we mean by "decapitation." For the purposes of this study, decapitation refers to the removal by arrest or assassination of the top leaders or operational leaders of a group. States that decide to target the leadership of a terrorist campaign must first determine whether the goal is to take the leader alive or not. Decisions about whether to capture or to kill the chief may depend on local conditions; but in their effects on a campaign they embody the classic dichotomy between the so-called law enforcement paradigm and the so-called war paradigm in counterterrorism. Capturing the leader reflects the view that he is a criminal, lawfully entitled to a trial; killing him is treating him as a combatant, fair game for attack. Thus, decisions about whether and how to target leaders reflect philosophies in a state's counterterrorism approach, and historical case studies indicate that these tactical choices have significant strategic implications for the outcomes of campaigns. While this chapter does not attempt a comprehensive statistical analysis of the effects of decapitation on the endings of all groups analyzed in this book, it uses comparative case studies to uncover significant findings about the conditions under which decapitation ends terrorism.
The Arrest of Top Leaders
Capturing a leader, putting him or her on trial and then presumably behind bars, emphasizes the rule of law, profiles leaders as criminals, and demonstrates the appropriate application of justice. All else being equal, it is much better to arrest and jail a terrorist leader so that his fate will be demonstrated to the public. There is nothing glamorous about languishing in jail. When terrorism is primarily treated as a criminal offense, either by the state or the international system, the existing legal mechanisms for responding to it are reinforced. If there is a fair trial, terrorist violence carried out in the name of a political cause is labeled strictly according to the illegality and immorality of the act. The cause for which the attacks were carried out may or may not have legitimacy, but the violent acts performed in its name definitely do not, as the use of legal mechanisms clearly demonstrates. Treating terrorist leaders as "bandits" also removes the pretext that they are combatants engaged in a war, a claim that can be very useful in perpetuating a cause and establishing a degree of equivalence between states and nonstate groups. Arrest can result in a succession struggle that paralyzes a group, stymied by the fact that the leader is still alive. Most important, interrogating leaders often provides valuable intelligence on the rest of the group. In an ideal world, arresting and prosecuting terrorist operatives is the optimal solution.
Unfortunately this is not an ideal world. As many commentators have pointed out, there are numerous practical disadvantages to arresting and incarcerating terrorist leaders. Sometimes the legal system frees them on technicalities; sometimes they continue to communicate with their followers from prison; sometimes, after serving short sentences, they are released to do more damage. Sometimes they become more radicalized: in May 1970, Ulrike Meinhof helped to free Andreas Baader, who was imprisoned for an act of political arson, and the two then engaged in a campaign of bloody violence. Jailed leaders can also be a huge liability for the citizens of the state holding them. There are scores of recent examples of hostage-taking and blackmail designed to force the release of jailed leaders.
The gloomy anecdotes abound. For example, in 1973, Black September attacked the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum and took 10 hostages, among them the Saudi Arabian ambassador and chargés d'affaires from the United States, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The gunmen demanded the release of an ambitious list of prisoners, including 60 Palestinian guerrillas held in Jordan, all Arab women jailed in Israel, Sirhan Sirhan, killer of U.S. senator Bobby Kennedy, and members of the Red Army Faction. When U.S. president Richard Nixon refused to negotiate, they shot and killed the Americans and the Belgian. Terrorist kidnappings and blackmailing continued into the 1980s and 1990s. British tourists were killed in Greece and Americans were taken hostage in Beirut because leaders were jailed in their home countries. Ten French citizens died in bombings in Paris because their government was unwilling to release Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1982 murder of Lt. Col. Charles Ray, an assistant U.S. military attaché in Paris. In 1994 Maulana Masood Azhar, head of a radical Pakistani group called Harkat-ul-Ansar (later renamed Harkut-ul-Mujahideen, or HuM), was captured. Five years later, he was released in exchange for 155 hostages on a hijacked Indian Airlines plane. Ansar promptly started another group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (linked to al-Qaeda), which carried out attacks in Kashmir.
Major cases of campaigns that were either destroyed or deeply wounded by the incarceration of a charismatic leader include the Peruvian group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo (Aum). These four cases have been selected for analysis because they represent disparate regions of the world, different motivations, have been thoroughly documented, and yield reliable data about the campaigns before and after their leaders' arrest.
Abimael Guzmán and Sendero Luminoso
Sendero Luminoso's leader Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, known as "Guzmán," a highly charismatic philosophy professor, built a powerful Marxist movement through a brutal campaign of executions of peasant leaders. The Shining Path may have been the bloodiest terrorist organization of the twentieth century; its 20-year campaign of violence resulted in the deaths of some 69,000 people. Ironically, Sendero Luminoso began to engage in violence just after extensive land reform and the restoration of democracy in Peru. The earliest attacks involved burning ballot boxes in the 1980 presidential election, the first balloting to occur in Peru in 17 years and the first ever in which there was genuine universal suffrage. At just the time when Peru was emerging from a long and turbulent tradition of military government, Guzmán and Shining Path launched revolutionary operations.
Beginning in the early 1960s, Guzmán had carefully built the movement from his position as a faculty member of the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, a remote and isolated part of Peru. Although it was an extremely poor, underdeveloped region, public access to university education had increased, enabling Guzmán, whose students were often the first members of their families to attend college, to radicalize a growing cadre of eager young supporters. He capitalized on the opportunity to gather followers among the poor, many of whom had made a precipitous leap from illiteracy to studying philosophy under his guidance. Within the group, Guzmán consolidated his power partly through expelling or executing dissenters, resulting in unquestioned obedience but also a highly individualistic leadership. His goal was to institute a kind of semipermanent, quasi-Maoist Cultural Revolution in Peru. He was good at it: by the early 1990s, Sendero Luminoso had brought Peru to the brink of anarchy.
Guzmán, whose supporters also called him President Gonzalo, was a brilliant strategist and excelled at organization. His elaborate philosophy for violence, developed during 17 years of organizational planning, was known as Gonzalo Thought, a form of Marxist-Leninist theory applied to a Peruvian context, characterized by clear moral codes, rote memorization, and oversimplified ideological explanations for every act. After initiating the movement, Guzmán went underground and was not seen in public. The group used tricks such as symbolically timed blackouts in the capital, Lima, and a huge light-display of a hammer and sickle on Guzmán's birthday to build up the cult of his omnipotence.
During the campaign against Sendero Luminoso, some experts predicted that the organization was so well structured, with such depth of leadership, that capturing or killing Guzmán would not result in its demise. Over the course of the campaign, the Peruvian government repeatedly claimed that Guzmán's key lieutenants had been captured and the organization crippled, only for them to be replaced by new militants. The organization had an elaborate, tiered membership structure, wherein members served first as sympathizers, then activists, then militants, then commanders, and finally members of the central committee. But the leadership also remained highly personalized: new militants were required to write a letter of subjugation, in which they pledged their lives, not only to the cause, but to Guzmán personally. Guzmán's role as the cultish, even deified intellectual leader was never in doubt; nonetheless Sendero Luminoso's organizational agility and depth seemed impenetrable and impersonal.
Guzmán's capture on September 12, 1992, dealt the group a coup de grâce. Guzmán was displayed in a cage, in a striped uniform, recanting and asking his followers to lay down their arms. Much of the top leadership was caught with Guzmán, along with computer disks that reportedly held records of the membership and financing of the movement. In the year following his capture, levels of violence fell by 50 percent and continued to decline thereafter. Guzmán's successor, Oscar Ramirez Duran, known as Feliciano, tried to carry on; but without Guzmán, the group factionalized and the number of active members and passive supporters sharply plummeted, further facilitated by the Peruvian government's offer of an amnesty to remaining fighters. Guzmán was tried in camera by a military court and sentenced to life in prison; although many called for his execution and President Alberto Fujimori urged a constitutional amendment to allow this (the Peruvian Constitution allowed the death penalty only in cases of treason during wartime), Guzmán survived. In subsequent years, Sendero has failed to revive itself as an ideological organization, although a blossoming connection to cocaine trafficking has some Peruvian officials worried that the group could become a resurgent threat, particularly if Guzmán (now 73) is allowed to reconnect with followers from his jail cell. (See figure 1.1.)
Excerpted from How Terrorism Ends by Audrey Kurth Cronin Copyright © 2009 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.
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The Evolution of Terrorism as a Strategic Threat 3
A Word about Scope and Terms 6
The Conceptual Framework 7
Case Selection 8
Overview of Chapters 9
Chapter One: Decapitation: Catching or Killing the Leader 14
What Decapitation Means 16
The Arrest of Top Leaders 17
Abimael Guzmán and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 18
Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 20
Mickey McKevitt and the Real Irish Republican Army 22
Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo 23
Assassination or "Targeted Killing" 24
The Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf 27
Russia and Chechen Leaders 28
Israel's "Targeted Killings" 29
How Decapitation Ends Terrorism 31
Chapter Two: Negotiations: Transition toward a Legitimate Political Process 35
Why Governments Negotiate 36
Why Groups Negotiate 39
Case Studies of Negotiations 42
The Northern Ireland Peace Process 42
Analysis of the Agreement 47
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 48
Terrorism and the Talks 55
The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers) 57
Analysis of the Failure 61
Promising and Unpromising Circumstances for Negotiations 62
Strong Leadership 64
Suicide Campaigns 66
Setting and Story 70
How Negotiations End Terrorism 71
Chapter Three: Success: Achieving the Objective 73
What Does "Success" Mean? 74
Achievement of Objectives 77
Perpetuating Terrorism: Tactical or "Process" Goals 77
Ending Terrorism: Strategic or "Outcome" Goals 80
Cases of Success 82
Irgun Zvai Le'umi (Irgun or IZL) 82
The African National Congress and Umkhonto 85
Other Notable Cases 89
How Success Ends Terrorism 91
Chapter Four: Failure: Imploding, Provoking a Backlash, or Becoming Marginalized 94
Implosion: Mistakes, Burnout, and Collapse 95
Failure to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation 95
Generational Patterns: Left-Wing Groups in the 1970s 97
Generational Patterns: Right-Wing Groups in the 1990s 98
Infighting and Fractionalization 100
Loss of Operational Control 102
Accepting an Exit 103
Marginalization: Diminishing Popular Support 104
The Ideology Becomes Irrelevant 105
Loss of Contact with "the People" 107
Targeting Errors and Backlash 108
How Failure Ends Terrorism 110
Chapter Five: Repression: Crushing Terrorism with Force 115
Analyzing the Strategies of Terrorism 117
Case Studies of Repression 122
Russia and Narodnaya Volya 123
Peru and Sendero Luminoso 125
Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 128
Uruguay and the Tupamaros 129
Russia and Chechnya 131
Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1966 137
How Repression Ends Terrorism 141
Chapter Six: Reorientation: Transitioning to Another Modus Operandi 146
Criminality and Terrorism 148
Colombia and the FARC 149
The Philippines and Abu Sayyaf 152
Insurgency and Terrorism 153
Algeria and the GIA 155
Terrorism as a Catalyst for Major War 157
India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Separatist Groups 159
Outdated Paradigms, Practical Implications 162
How War Ends Terrorism 166
Chapter Seven: How Al-Qaeda Ends: The Relevance and Irrelevance of History 167
Is Al-Qaeda Unique? 168
Resilient Structure 169
Methods of Radicalization and Recruitment 171
Means of Support 174
Means of Communication 175
The Relevance and Irrelevance of History for Al-Qaeda:
Applying the Framework 177
Decapitation: Capturing or Killing the Leaders 177
Negotiations: Talking to Al-Qaeda or Its Associates 179
Success: Achieving Al-Qaeda's Objectives 182
Failure through Implosion 183
Failure through Diminishment of Popular Support 187
Repression: Crushing Al-Qaeda with Force 190
Reorientation: Transitioning to Other Means 191
Al-Qaeda's Decline and Demise 193
Understanding How Terrorism Ends 201
Appendix: Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns 207
Selected Bibliography 283