Independent Central Banks and Economic Performance

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Editorial Reviews

A collection of 23 previously published articles, written between 1977 and 1995, on independent central banks and economic performance, organized in section on theoretical foundations measures, empirical evidence, and determinants of central bank independence. Subjects include politics and business cycles in industrial democracies, the statistical association between central bank independence and inflation, and political influence on the central bank. A new introduction discusses major developments in the field. Of interest to academics, lecturers, researchers, central bankers, and other policy makers concerned with central bank autonomy. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.
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Product Details

Table of Contents

Introduction by the editor
1 Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 3
2 Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy 22
3 The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target 43
4 Precommitment by Central Bank Independence 64
5 Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility 82
6 Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers 96
7 Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies 117
8 Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries 161
9 Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and its Effect on Policy Outcomes 213
10 Central Bank Independence in Twelve Industrial Countries 259
11 Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey of Recent Developments 281
12 Central Bank Independence in Another Eleven Countries 302
13 The Case for Central Bank Independence 349
14 Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence 372
15 Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence 384
16 Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment, and Real Rates 416
17 How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? 462
18 The Statistical Association Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation 489
19 Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There Is No Institutional Fix for Politics 505
20 Commitment Through Delegation, Political Influence and Central Bank Independence 530
21 Variation in Central Bank Independence Across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence 550
22 Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence 567
23 Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy: Credibility vs Flexibility 594
Name Index 639
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