Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions by H. Peyton Young | 9780691086873 | Paperback | Barnes & Noble
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions

Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions

by H. Peyton Young
     
 

ISBN-10: 0691086877

ISBN-13: 9780691086873

Pub. Date: 01/03/2001

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse

Overview

Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties.

The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780691086873
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
Publication date:
01/03/2001
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
208
Product dimensions:
6.12(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.51(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

Preface
Acknowledgments
Ch. 1Overview3
Ch. 2Learning25
Ch. 3Dynamic and Stochastic Stability44
Ch. 4Adaptive Learning in Small Games66
Ch. 5Variations on the Learning Process77
Ch. 6Local Interaction91
Ch. 7Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Selection in General Games103
Ch. 8Bargaining113
Ch. 9Contracts131
Ch. 10Conclusion144
AppendixProofs of Selected Theorems151
Notes173
Bibliography177
Index185

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