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In 2002 Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), the first major revision of federal campaign finance law in a generation. In March 2001, after a fiercely contested and highly divisive seven-year partisan legislative battle, the Senate passed S. 27, known as the McCain-Feingold legislation. The House responded by passing H.R. 2356, companion legislation known as Shays-Meehan, in February 2002. The Senate then approved the House-passed version, and President George W. Bush signed BCRA into law on March 27, 2002, stating that the bill had "flaws" but overall "improves the current system of financing for federal campaigns."
The Reform Act was taken to court within hours of the President's signature. Dozens of interest groups and lawmakers who had opposed passage of the Act in Congress lodged complaints that challenged the constitutionality of virtually every aspect of the new law. Following review by a special three-judge panel, the case is expected to reach the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003.
This litigation constitutes the most important campaign finance case since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Buckley v. Valeo more than twenty-five years ago. The testimony, submitted by some of the country's most knowledgeable political scientists and most experienced politicians, constitutes an invaluable body of knowledge about the complexities of campaign finance and the role of money in our political system. Unfortunately, only the lawyers, political scientists, and practitioners actually involved in the litigation have seen most of this writing —until now.
Ins ide the Campaign Finance Battle makes key testimony in this historic case available to a general readership, in the process shedding new light on campaign finance practices central to the congressional debate on the reform act and to the landmark litigation challenging its constitutionality.
| Editors' Note | ||
| Introduction | 1 | |
| Pt. I | Political Parties | |
| The Rise of Soft Money | 17 | |
| Parties versus Interest Groups | 40 | |
| Why Soft Money Has Not Strengthened Parties | 49 | |
| Why Soft Money Has Strengthened Parties | 69 | |
| The Need for Federal Regulation of State Party Activity | 97 | |
| A Senate Democrat's Perspective | 116 | |
| A Senate Republican's Perspective | 119 | |
| Mobilizing Voters: The Coordinated Campaign | 122 | |
| State Party Activity and the BCRA | 125 | |
| State Party Activity under the Levin Amendment | 137 | |
| Role of Federal Officials in State Party Fund-Raising | 143 | |
| Pt. II | Issue Advocacy | |
| Party and Interest Group Electioneering in Federal Elections | 147 | |
| Electioneering Communications in Recent Elections: The Case for a New Standard | 175 | |
| Issue Advocacy and the Integrity of the Political Process | 189 | |
| Rebuttal to the Expert Reports of Kenneth M. Goldstein and Jonathan S. Krasno and Frank J. Sorauf | 201 | |
| Rebuttal to Gibson | 221 | |
| The National Association of Manufacturers' Advertising Helps Lobby Congress | 237 | |
| Why the Chamber of Commerce Runs Issue Ads | 242 | |
| How the Reform Act Adversely Affects the Associated Builders and Contractors | 246 | |
| A Practitioner Looks at How Issue Groups Select and Target Federal Candidates | 250 | |
| How Issue Ads Are Designed to Target Federal Candidates without "Express Advocacy" | 252 | |
| A Consultant's View on How Issue Ads Shaped a Congressional Election | 254 | |
| Pt. III | Public Opinion and Corruption | |
| Public Attitudes toward Campaign Finance Practice and Reform | 259 | |
| Public Views of Party Soft Money | 266 | |
| The Reform Act Will Not Reduce the Appearance of Corruption in American Politics | 270 | |
| Rebuttal to Ayres | 278 | |
| Campaign Contributions, the Appearance of Corruption, and Trust in Government | 285 | |
| Large Contributions Provide Unequal Access | 297 | |
| Corporate America Contributes Soft Money under Pressure | 300 | |
| Large Contributions Are Given to Influence Legislation | 302 | |
| Elected Officials Often Used to Obtain Large Donations for the Parties | 305 | |
| Why I Participate in a Corrupt System | 308 | |
| How My Soft-Money Contributions Have Helped Elect Good Federal Candidates | 315 | |
| How the Senate Was Corrupted by Soft Money | 317 | |
| Consequences of Members Soliciting Soft Money | 319 | |
| A Cosponsor's Perspective: Why I Don't Raise Soft Money for the Party | 322 | |
| Congress Is Mired in Corrupt Soft Money | 324 | |
| Parties Support Members Who Fund-Raise | 328 | |
| Corruption Is Not an Issue in American Politics | 329 | |
| Parties Undermined by Soft Money | 330 | |
| Parties Weakened by Appearance of Corruption | 332 |
Overview
In 2002 Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), the first major revision of federal campaign finance law in a generation. In March 2001, after a fiercely contested and highly divisive seven-year partisan legislative battle, the Senate passed S. 27, known as the McCain-Feingold legislation. The House responded by passing H.R. 2356, companion legislation known as Shays-Meehan, in February 2002. The Senate then approved the House-passed version, and President George W. Bush signed BCRA into law ...