Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach
Ideal for social science courses in game theory and research methods, Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach explains basic game theory concepts—up to and including Bayesian Nash equilibrium—using results from laboratory experiments that examine how real people behave in standard modeled games. Working from the premise that the crux of game theory lies in thinking logically about a problem and formulating research questions based on theory, author Kenneth C. Williams takes a nontechnical, behavioral approach that is accessible to students with minimal math skills.

Incorporating a wide range of experiments with diverse designs, Introduction to Game Theory is also enhanced by numerous pedagogical features:

* Extensive problem sets, in-class experiments, and sample exams

* Numerical examples for all of the exercises

* Key terms and concepts for behavioral game theory—which differ from those for standard game theory—and a glossary

* Supplemental lecture material and Internet resources—online games, videos, lectures, problems sets, exams, and experiments that students can participate in
1117355242
Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach
Ideal for social science courses in game theory and research methods, Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach explains basic game theory concepts—up to and including Bayesian Nash equilibrium—using results from laboratory experiments that examine how real people behave in standard modeled games. Working from the premise that the crux of game theory lies in thinking logically about a problem and formulating research questions based on theory, author Kenneth C. Williams takes a nontechnical, behavioral approach that is accessible to students with minimal math skills.

Incorporating a wide range of experiments with diverse designs, Introduction to Game Theory is also enhanced by numerous pedagogical features:

* Extensive problem sets, in-class experiments, and sample exams

* Numerical examples for all of the exercises

* Key terms and concepts for behavioral game theory—which differ from those for standard game theory—and a glossary

* Supplemental lecture material and Internet resources—online games, videos, lectures, problems sets, exams, and experiments that students can participate in
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Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach

Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach

by Kenneth C. Williams
Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach

Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach

by Kenneth C. Williams

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Overview

Ideal for social science courses in game theory and research methods, Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach explains basic game theory concepts—up to and including Bayesian Nash equilibrium—using results from laboratory experiments that examine how real people behave in standard modeled games. Working from the premise that the crux of game theory lies in thinking logically about a problem and formulating research questions based on theory, author Kenneth C. Williams takes a nontechnical, behavioral approach that is accessible to students with minimal math skills.

Incorporating a wide range of experiments with diverse designs, Introduction to Game Theory is also enhanced by numerous pedagogical features:

* Extensive problem sets, in-class experiments, and sample exams

* Numerical examples for all of the exercises

* Key terms and concepts for behavioral game theory—which differ from those for standard game theory—and a glossary

* Supplemental lecture material and Internet resources—online games, videos, lectures, problems sets, exams, and experiments that students can participate in

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780199837397
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 06/14/2012
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 304
Product dimensions: 9.20(w) x 7.40(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

, PrefaceCHAPTER 1. WHAT IS GAME THEORY?A. The Goal of this Book1. Baseball stadium model example2. Applied models vs. pure theory3. Applied models and empirical testing using experiments4. A simple and not very good experiment5. Behavioral game theory and ultimatum bargaining6. New technology used to disprove and improve old theoriesB. What Is a Game?1. Game theory as an interdisciplinary method2. Game theory and equilibrium3. A game in von Neumann's sense4. Game theory and the importance of assumptions5. Rationality and self-interest in a curved exam exampleC. Behavioral Assumptions1. What is rationality? 2. Why is rationality needed?D. Behavioral Game Theory1. Research methods of behavioral game theory2. Historical developments in behavioral game theoryE. Different Types of Games1. Cooperative vs. noncooperative games2. Competitive vs. noncompetitive games3. Normal form vs. extensive form games4. Pure vs. mixed strategy games5. Single-shot vs. repeated games6. Complete and perfect information vs. incomplete and imperfect informationF. SummaryCHAPTER 2. WHAT ARE LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS?A. Why Experiments?1. Ben Franklin's clothes experiment2. The need for experiments and the growth of experimentsB. Defining a Laboratory Experiment1. What is a laboratory and how does it differ from the field? 2. What is the definition of an experiment?C. Establishing Causality1. Randomization of subjects to treatments and experimental controls2. Example of the importance of randomization of subjects to treatments3. Experimental controls and confounding factors4. Baseline comparisons and controlling confounding factorsD. Experimental Validity1. Differences among between external, internal, and ecological validities2. Artificial vs. natural environments3. Problems with external validity4. Problems with internal validity5. Benefits of an artificial environmentE. Experimental Methods1. Subject motivations2. Deception3. Experimental environment4. Number of trials5. Between-subject vs. within-subject design6. Anonymity7. How do you design a good experiment?F. SummaryCHAPTER 3. ORDINAL UTILITY THEORYA. Too Many Choices?B. Strict RationalityC. Utility Theory1. Utility2. Graphical utility functionsD. Ordering Alternatives1. Restrictions on choice2. May's intransitive preferences experiment3. Choice and time4. Nonperverse selection rule and exhaustive set of alternatives5. Ariely's iEconomist/i experimentE. Ordinal Utility FunctionsF. Spatial Preferences in One Dimension1. Modeling ideology2. Single-peakedness and transitivityG. How Utility Functions for Money Are Induced in Political Economy Experiments1. Payoff charts2. Spatial payoffsH. Rationality, Emotions, and Social Preferences1. Rationality and emotions2. Rationality used to study other types of behavior via deviations3. Social preferences defined4. Example of a social utility functionI. SummaryCHAPTER 4. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORYA. Expected Utility1. Expected value and slot machines2. The St. Petersburg paradoxB. Expected Utility Theory1. Using cardinal values in a utility function2. Preferences over lotteries vs. preferences over outcomes3. Further restrictions on choice4. Calculating expected utilityC. Modeling Risk1. What is risk? 2. Modeling risk-averse vs. risk-acceptance behaviorD. Framing Effects and Alternative Theories of Risk1. Framing2. Prospect theory3. Regret theoryE. Anomalies to Expected Utility Theory1. The Ellsberg paradox2. Framing and reference points3. Time inconsistencyF. Alternative Theories to Expected Utility Theory1. Bounded rationality2. The BPC modelG. Binary Lottery ExperimentsH. SummaryCHAPTER 5. SOLVING FOR A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN NORMAL FORM GAMESA. iIn Cold Blood/iB. Beliefs and the Common Knowledge AssumptionC. Nash Equilibrium1. Defining a Nash equilibrium2. Nash equilibrium behavior in other examples3. He-think-I-think regress4. Pareto principle5. Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum gameD. Prisoner's DilemmaE. Elimination of Dominated Strategies and a Dominant Solvable EquilibriumF. Three-Player Normal Form GamesG. Eliminating Dominated Strategies in an Election GameH. Finding Dominate Strategies in a Spatial Election ExperimentI. Other Experimental Tests of Dominant Strategies1. Tversky and Kahneman's dominant strategy experiment2. Beauty contestJ. SummaryCHAPTER 6. CLASSIC NORMAL FORM GAMES AND EXPERIMENTSA. Classic Normal Form GamesB. Revisiting the Prisoner's Dilemma1. Repeated prisoner's dilemma game2. Example of finite repeated game with reciprocity strategies3. Axelrod's Tournament4. Prisoner's dilemma as a route-choice gameC. Social Dilemmas1. Collective goods problem2. Collective goods experiment3. Volunteer dilemmaD. Chicken Games and Brinkmanship1. Chicken run2. Brinkmanship and the Cuban missile crisis3. Hawk-dove game4. Acme-Bolt truck experimentE. Battle of the Sexes Game and Coordination Games1. Classic story of the battle of the sexes2. Coordination in a matching pennies game3. Focal point equilibriumF. Stag Hunt or Assurance Games1. The Rousseau game and risk-dominant equilibrium2. Quorum-busting3. Experiment on stag hunt game: Communication and trust4. Coordination and elitesG. SummaryCHAPTER 7. SOLVING FOR MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUMA. Rock, Paper, ScissorsB. Calculating Mixed Strategies1. Spades-hearts game2. Mixed strategy equilibrium for spades-hearts game3. Why would a player use a mixed strategy? 4. Mixed strategy equilibrium for the battle of the sexes gameC. Experimental Tests of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium1. O'Neill's experiment2. Ochs' experimentD. Probabilistic Choice ModelsE. Testing Mixed Strategies Using Observational Data1. Soccer players and mixed strategies2. Tennis players and mixed strategiesF. SummaryCHAPTER 8. EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTIONA. The Twenty-One Coin GameB. Defining an extensive form game1. Follow-the-leader game redux2. Formal definition of extensive form game3. iTwilight/i example4. Three Stooges gameC. Backward InductionD. The Importance of the Order in which Players Move1. First mover's advantage and the chicken game2. First mover's advantage and a collective good game3. Second mover's advantage and RPS gameE. Backward Induction and the Need for RefinementF. Experiments on Backward induction Reasoning1. Race game2. Race game and chess playersG. SummaryCHAPTER 9. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUMA. Credible vs. Noncredible ThreatsB. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium1. Subgames2. Threat game3. Strategy mappings and Rasmussen's computer disk game4. Player 1 moves twice game5. Kreps and Wilson's up-down gameC. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and the Need for RefinementD. Centipede Game1. How the centipede game is played2. Centipede, reputations, and quantal response equilibrium3. Centipede and chess playersE. Ultimatum Bargaining Games1. Ultimatum bargaining and problems with subgame perfect equilibrium2. Ultimatum bargaining and communication3. Bargaining with social preferences turned off4. Ultimatum bargaining and cultural effects5. Physical attraction and ultimatum bargainingF. Trust GamesG. NeuroeconomicsH. Wait a Minute, Are These Really Social Preferences?1. Manufactured social preferences2. Strategic ignoranceI. SummaryCHAPTER 10. IMPERFECT AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMESA. The Structure of Imperfect and Incomplete Information1. Infatuation and fickle games2. Disney movies and incomplete and imperfect informationB. The Structure of Incomplete Information in Game Trees1. Matching pennies and information sets2. Varied information sets in a guessing game3. Restrictions placed on information setsC. Incomplete Information over Player TypesD. Sequential Rationality1. Establishment of beliefs and restrictions placed on beliefs2. Deriving a sequential equilibriumE. Signaling Games1. Truth-lying game2. Truth-lying and games of conflict and common interest3. Calculating a sequential equilibrium for the truth-lying gameF. Sender-Receiver Framework Lying ExperimentG. Persuasion ExperimentH. SummaryCHAPTER 11. BAYESIAN LEARNINGA. iThe people of the state of California v. Collins/i (1968)B. Conditional probabilitiesC. Conditional probabilities and the beliefs of video game charactersD. Bayesian learning1. What is learning? 2. Updating beliefs3. Calculating Bayes' TheoremE. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium1. Weak consistency of beliefs2. Solving for a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium3. Refinements to perfect Bayesian EquilibriumF. Information cascade experimentsG. Alternative learning modelsH. Equilibrium and learningI. SummaryChapter Problem SetsAppendix 1. Solving Linear EquationsAppendix 2. A Short History of Game Theory and Political Economy ExperimentsAppendix 3. Sincere vs. Strategic Voting in Agenda Games, References, Glossary, Index
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