An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Volume 3: Thinking / Edition 2

An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Volume 3: Thinking / Edition 2

by Edward E. Smith

An Invitation to Cognitive Science provides a point of entry into the vast realm of cognitive science, offering selected examples of issues and theories from many of its subfields. All of the volumes in the second edition contain substantially revised and as well as entirely new chapters.See more details below


An Invitation to Cognitive Science provides a point of entry into the vast realm of cognitive science, offering selected examples of issues and theories from many of its subfields. All of the volumes in the second edition contain substantially revised and as well as entirely new chapters.

Product Details

MIT Press
Publication date:
Edition description:
second edition
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

List Of Contributors
Thinking: Introduction
Chapter 1 Concepts and Categorization. Edward E. Smith.
1.1 Functions of Categorization
1.1.1 Coding of Experience
1.1.2 Inductive Inferences
1.2 Similarity
1.2.1 Similarity of Category Members
1.2.2 Measurement of Similarity Geometric Approach Featural Approach
1.3 Similarity and Verbal Categorization
1.3.1 Typicality Effects
1.3.2 Typicality as Similarity
1.4 Similarity and Visual Categorization
1.4.1 Importance of Shape
1.4.2 Typicality as Shape Similarity
1.5 Breakdowns of Verbal and Visual Categorization
1.5.1 Category-Specific Deficits
1.5.2 Two Hypotheses about Category-Specific Deficits
1.6 Beyond Similarity
1.7 Summary and Other Issues
1.7.1 Summary
1.7.2 Other Issues
Suggestions for Further Reading
Chapter 2 Probability Judgment. Daniel N. Osherson.
2.1 Degrees of Conviction
2.2 Wagers
2.2.1 Probability Function
2.2.2 Fair Bets
2.2.3 Dutch Books
2.3 How to Avoid Dutch Books
2.3.1 Logical Truth, Exclusion, and Equivalence
2.3.2 Coherent Probability Functions
2.3.3 The Dutch Book Theorem
2.4 Incoherence or Momentary Illusion?
2.4.1 Illusions in Other Domains
2.4.2 Coherent Competence versus Incoherent Performance?
2.5 Representativeness and Judged Probability
2.6 The Thesis Applied
2.6.1 The Conjunction Fallacy Basic Finding Explanation via Representativeness A Sharper Test of the Representativeness Thesis
2.6.2 The Inclusion Fallacy
2.6.3 Nonuse of Prior Probability BasicFinding Explanation via Representativeness
2.7 The Coexistence Thesis
2.7.1 The Case Against Coherent Competence
2.7.2 The Multiplicity of Reasoning Principles
2.7.3 Glimmers of Coherent Thinking Conjunctions Prior Odds Sample Size
2.7.4 What Factors Encourage Coherent Reasoning?
2.8 On the Difficulty of Maintaining Coherence
2.9 Concluding Remarks
Suggestions for Further Reading
Questions for Further Thought
Chapter 3 Decision Making. Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky.
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Risk and Value
3.3 Framing Effects
3.4 Loss Aversion
3.5 Eliciting Preference
3.5.1 Compatibility Effects
3.5.2 Relative Prominence
3.5.3 Weighing Pros and Cons
3.6 Choice under Conflict
3.7 Discussion
Suggestions for Further Reading
Questions for Further Thought
Chapter 4 Continuity and Discontinuity in Cognitive Development. Susan Carey.
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Case 1: Natural-Language Counting Words. The Gelman/Gallistel Continuity Hypothesis and Empiric...
4.2.1 Background: Prelinguistic Representations of Number
4.2.2 The Gelman/Gallistel Continuity Hypothesis
4.2.3 Evidence for the Numeron List Hypothesis
4.2.4 Problems for the Numeron List Hypothesis
4.2.5 What Kind of Representational Change Might Be Required for Children to Learn the Natural-Lan...
4.3 Case 2: Sortal Concepts
.3.1 The Toddler's Mastery of CountMass Syntax
4.3.2 Composition of the Toddler Lexicon
4.3.3 Toddler Sensitivity to Noun Syntax
4.3.4 Words for Novel Objects and Words for Nonsolid Substances
4.3.5 Toddler's Understanding of "A, Some NOUN_"
4.3.6 Younger Infants
4.3.7 Principles of Individuation: Younger Infants
4.3.8 Principles of Numerical Identity: Younger Infants
4.4 Case 3. A Possible Discontinuity Between Infant and Adult Representations of Sortals
4.5 A Few Concluding Remarks
Chapter 5 Classifying Nature Across Cultures. Scott Afram.
Introduction: An Anthropological Perspective
5.1 Folk Biology
5.1.1 The Concept of Folk Species Conceptually Perceiving Living Kinds: The Role of Teleology The Presumption of an Underlying Nature The Folk Species Concept: Its Bearing on Cognitive Evolution
5.1.2 Folk Taxonomy (Folk) Biological Ranks A False Bottom Line: Terminal Contrast The Significance of Rank The Rank of Folk Species vs. the Basic Level Taxonomic Essentialism
5.1.3 Section Summary
5.2 A Comparison with Itza Maya Folk Biology
5.2.1 Cross-Cultural Constraints on Theory Formation
5.2.2 American and Maya Mammal Taxonomy To What Extent Are Different Folk-Biological Taxonomies Correlated with One Another and with... To What Extent Do the Culturally Specific Theoriesand Belief Systems, Such as Science, Shape... To What Extent Does Folk-Biological Taxonomy Guide Inferences about the Distribution of Unkn...
5.2.3 Section Summary
5.3 Conclusion: Science and Common Sense
Suggestions for Further Reading
Appendix: The Logical Structure of Folk-Biological Taxonomy
Chapter 6 Rationality. Gilbert Harman.
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Some Examples
6.1.2 Rationality and Cognitive Science
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Theoretical and Practical Rationality Practical Reasons for Belief Epistemic versus nonepistemic reasons for belief
6.2.2 Inference and Reasoning versus Implication and Consistency
6.2.3 The Relevance of Goals and Interests
6.2.4 Ideal Reasoners?
6.3 Conservatism
6.3.1 Special Foundations: Rejection of General Conservatism
6.3.2 Objections to Special Foundationalism as a Theory of Rationality
6.3.3 The Burden of Proof
6.4 Induction and Deduction
6.4.1 Induction and Deduction as Two Kinds of Reasoning
6.4.2 Implication and Consistency: Deduction
6.4.3 Kinds of Induction
6.4.4 Problem of Induction
6.4.5 Nonmonotonic Reasoning
6.5 Coherence
6.5.1 Negative Coherence
6.5.2 Positive Coherence
6.6 Simplicity
6.6.1 Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction"
6.6.2 Using Simplicity to Decide Among Hypotheses That Are Taken Seriously
6.6.3 Speculation: Basic Simplicity Has to Do with How Easy It Is to Use Hypotheses
6.6.4 Parasitic Theories
6.7 Practical Rationality and Reasonableness
6.7.1 Decision Theory
6.7.2 Derivative Goals
6.7.3 Nonultimate, Noninstrumental Desires
6.7.4 Intentions
6.7.5 Strength of Will
6.7.6 Reasonable Cooperation
6.8 Theoretical Rationality and Philosophical Pragmatism
6.9 Concluding Remarks
Suggestions for Further Reading
Questions for Further Thought
Chapter 7 Working Memory and Thinking. John Jonides.
7.1 Thinking and Memory
7.1.1 Raven Progressive Matrices
7.1.2 Thinking About Spatial Relations
7.1.3 Mental Arithmetic
7.2 Working Memory and Long-Term Memory
7.2.1 Neurobiological Evidence About Long-Term and Working Memory
7.2.2 Behavioral Evidence About Long-Term and Working Memory
7.3 Working Memory in Thinking
7.4 Working Memory in Language Comprehension
7.5 A Working-Memory Theory
7.5.1 The Phonological Loop Phonological Coding Storage Capacity Rehearsal Distinguishing the Buffer and Rehearsal
7.5.2 The Visuospatial Buffer Visuospatial vs. Phonological Buffers: Behavioral Evidence Visuospatial vs. Phonological Buffers: Biological Evidence Neurophysiological Studies of the Visuospatial Buffer
7.5.3 The Visual Buffer
7.5.4 The Conceptual Buffer
7.5.5 Central Executive Processes Goal Management Scheduling
7.6 Summary
Suggestions for Further Reading
Chapter 8 Problem Solving. Keith J. Holyoak.
8.1 The Nature of Problem Solving
8.1.1 Problem Solving as Search
8.1.2 Heuristic Search
8.1.3 Means-Ends Analysis
8.1.4 Planning and Problem Decomposition
8.1.5 Production-System Models of Problem Solving
8.1.6 The Brain and Problem Solving
8.2 Development of Expertise
8.2.1 Expertise in Chess
8.2.2 Expertise in Physics
8.2.3 How Does Expertise Develop?
8.3 Restructuring and Parallelism in Problem Solving
8.3.1 Ill-Defined Problems
8.3.2 Restructuring, Insight, and Analogies
8.3.3 Parallel Constraint Satisfaction
Suggestions for Further Reading
Questions for Further Thought
Chapter 9 Deduction and Cognition. Lance J. Rips.
9.1 Deduction Basics
9.1.1 Proof and Deducibility
9.1.2 Truth and Semantic Entailment
9.1.3 Gricean Pragmatics
9.2 What Role, If Any, Does Deduction Play in Cognition?
9.2.1 Deduction as Heuristics
9.2.2 Deduction as a Limiting Case of Other Inference Forms
9.2.3 Deduction as a Special-Purpose Cognitive Component
9.3 Deduction by Mental Models
9.4 A Case Study: Deduction as a Psychological Operating System
9.4.1 Representations
9.4.2 Inference Processes Rules for Connectives Matching Rules
9.5 An Illustration of Problem Solving by Deduction
9.6 Applications to Experimental Findings
9.6.1 An Empirical Brief for the Deduction System Argument Evaluation Inferences in Understanding Text Protocol Results
9.6.2 Belief Bias, Probabilistic Effects, and "Errors" in Reasoning
9.7 Summary
Suggestions for Further Reading
Chapter 10 Social Cognition: Information Accessibility and Use in Social Judgment. Norbert Schwarz.
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Information Accessibility: Some Basic Assumptions
10.3 Information Accessibility and the Interpretation of Ambiguous Information: Making Sense of the ...
10.3.1 Interpreting Ambiguous Information in Terms of Accessible Concepts: Assimilation Effects
10.3.2 Beyond Assimilation: Concept Priming and the Emergence of Contrast Effects
Section Summary
10.4 Information Accessibility and Context Effects in Memory-Based Judgment: Evaluating One's Enviro...
10.4.1 Constructing a Representation of the Target: Assimilation Effects
10.4.2 Constructing a Representation of a Standard: Contrast Effects Does the Information Belong to the Target Category? Am I Supposed to Use the Information? The Impact of Conversational Norms
10.4.3 Summary
10.5 Accessibility Experiences
10.5.1 Ease of Recall and Judgments of Frequency
10.5.2 Qualifying the Implications of Recalled Content
10.5.3 Summary
10.6 Concluding Remarks
Suggestions for Further Reading
Chapter 11 The Mind as the Software of the Brain. Ned Block.
11.1 Machine Intelligence
11.1.1 The Turing Test
11.1.2 Two Kinds of Definitions of Intelligence
11.1.3 Functional Analysis
11.1.4 Primitive Processors
11.1.5 The Mental and the Biological
11.2 Intelligence and Intentionality
11.2.1 The Brain as a Syntactic Engine Driving a Semantic Engine
11.2.2 Is a Wall a Computer?
11.3 Functionalism and the Language of Thought
11.3.1 Objections to the Language-of-Thought Theory
11.4 Arguments for the Language of Thought
11.5 Explanatory Levels and the Syntactic Theory of the Mind
11.6 Searle's Chinese Room Argument
Suggestions for Further Reading

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