Much of the contemporary way of looking at the relationship between science and religion has been an attempt to procure the legitimacy of religion by making it look more scientific. I have labeled this view "religious scientism" because it attempts to utilize the concepts and methods of science to clarify certain religious concepts. However, I argue that when religious scientism is put into practice, what results is not a clearer (more intellectually compelling) form of religion, but a confused version of either scientific practice or religious belief. Specifically, my focus is on the confusion that results when one attempts (as Ian Barbour does) to see religious models on sharing some sort of parity with scientific models, when one attempts (as William Dembski does) to make intelligent design a part of the research aspirations of the natural sciences, and, finally, when one attempts (as Philip Clayton does) to make sense of divine action by making its reasonability (or possibility) parasitic on the sense that can be given to mental causation. In the end, I argue that it is more profitable to find a form of religious language that does not rely on science rather than attempt to merge scientific practice with religious belief in the way that those practicing religious scientism advocate.