Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction

Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction

by Cristina Bicchieri
     
 

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ISBN-10: 0521416744

ISBN-13: 9780521416740

Pub. Date: 04/28/2004

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective

Overview

In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521416740
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
04/28/2004
Series:
Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Design Theory Series
Pages:
413
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.14(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; 1. Feasibility Isaac Levi; 2. Elicitation for games Joseph B. Kadane, Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld; 3. Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions Joseph B. Kadane and Teddy Seidenfeld; 4. Rational choice in the context of ideal games Edward F. McClennen; 5. Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions Jordan Howard Sobel; 6. Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Brian Skyrms; 7. Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz; 8. On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation Stefano Vannucci; 9. Algorithmic knowledge and game theory Ken Binmore and Hyun Song Shin; 10. Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara; 11. Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic Giovanna Corsi and Silvio Ghilardi; 12. Epistemic logic and game theory Bernard Walliser; 13. Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses Vittorioemanuele Ferrante; 14. Representing facts Krister Segerberg; 15. Introduction to metamoral Roberto Magari; 16. The logic of Ulam's games with lies Daniele Mundici; 17. The acquisition of common knowledge Michael Bacharach; 18. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge' Ariel Rubinstein; 19. Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction Cristina Bicchieri; 20. Common knowledge and games with perfect information Philip J. Reny; 21. Game solutions and the normal form John C. Harsanyi; 22. The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories Peter Gärdenfors; 23. Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games Hyun Song Shin.

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