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Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction
     

Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction

by Philip P. Frickey, Daniel A. Farber
 

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ISBN-10: 0226238032

ISBN-13: 9780226238036

Pub. Date: 01/28/1991

Publisher: University of Chicago Press


In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group

Overview


In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making.

Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law
School

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780226238036
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
Publication date:
01/28/1991
Edition description:
1
Pages:
169
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.70(d)

Table of Contents


Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Interest Groups and the Political Process
I. The Impact of Interest Group Theory
II. Interest Groups and Political Science
III. The Economic Theory of Legislation
IV. Normative Implications
2. Arrow's Theorem and the Democratic Process
I. Arrow's Theorem and Its Implications
II. Republicanism
III. Chaos and Coherence in Legislatures
IV. Public Choice and Legislative Deliberation
3. Economic Regulation and the Constitution
I. Economic Rights and the Constitution
II. Federalism
III. The Delegation Doctrine
4. Statutory Interpretation
I. Legislative Intent
II. Legislative History
III. Ambiguous Language and Rational Choice
IV. Statutory Evolution
5. Integrating Public Choice and Public Law
I. Existing Strands of "Due Process of Lawmaking"
II. Expanding the Influence of Public Choice in Public Law
Epilogue: Beyond the Economic Sphere
Index

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