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Overview
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780198796831 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| Publication date: | 11/11/2021 |
| Pages: | 352 |
| Product dimensions: | 9.33(w) x 6.38(h) x 1.05(d) |
About the Author
Robert Alexy was Professor of Public Law and Legal Philosophy at Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, from 1986 until his retirement in 2015. He was President of the German Section of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) from 1994-1998.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Part I The Nature of Law
1 The Nature of Legal Philosophy 7
I The Nature of Philosophy 7
II Pre-Understanding and Arguments 9
III Three Problems 10
IV Four Theses 11
V Entities and Concepts 12
VI Necessary Properties 13
VII Law and Morality 15
2 On the Concept and the Nature of Law 18
I The Practical and Theoretical Significance of the Debate 18
A Statutory Injustice and the Radbruch Formula 18
B Law's Open Texture and the Self-Understanding of Jurists 19
C The Concept of Law as a Concept of a Non-Natural Kind 20
II Positivism and Non-Positivism 21
A Separation Thesis and Connection Thesis 21
B Exclusive and Inclusive Positivism 22
C Exclusive, Inclusive, and Super-Inclusive Non-Positivism 23
III Concept and Nature 27
A Nature 27
B Concept 28
IV The Dual Nature of Law 29
A Coercion 30
B Correctness 31
V What the Law Is and What It Ought to Be 33
3 The Dual Nature of Law 36
I The Ideal 36
A The Claim to Correctness 36
B Discourse Theory 40
II The Real 42
III The Reconciliation of the Ideal and the Real 43
A Outermost Border 44
B Democratic Constitutionalism 47
4 Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights 51
I Positivism, Non-Positivism, and the Existence Problem 51
A Three Elements and Two Dimensions 52
B Two Forms of Positivism 52
C Three Forms of Non-Positivism 53
D Inclusive Non-Positivism and the Existence Problem 56
II The Existence of Human Rights 57
A Human Rights as Moral Elements 58
B The Concept of Human Rights 59
C The Justifiability of Human Rights 60
5 An Answer to Joseph Raz 64
I Separation Thesis 64
A Kelsen's Statement 66
B The Idea of a Definition of Law 68
C Necessary Connections 69
II Participants and Observers 72
III The Argument from Correctness 75
IV The Argument from Injustice 77
V The Argument from Principles 80
6 The Ideal Dimension of Law 83
I The Claim to Correctness 83
II Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Necessities 86
A The Argument from Fruitlessness 86
B The Argument from Deficiency 88
III The Necessity of the Real Dimension of Law 90
IV A Conceptual Framework 91
A First-Order and Second-Order Correctness 91
B Observer and Participant 92
C Perspectives and Dimensions 94
D Classifying and Qualifying Connections 94
V The Relation between the Real and the Ideal Dimension 97
A The Radbruch Formula 98
B The Special Case Thesis 103
C Human Rights 104
D Democracy 105
E Principles Theory 106
7 Gustav Radbruch's Concept of Law 107
I Gustav Radbruch's System 108
A The Law Triad 108
B The Idea Triad 111
C The Triad of Purpose 113
II The Radbruch Formula 115
Part II Constitutional Rights, Human Rights, and Proportionality
8 The Construction of Constitutional Rights 121
I The Rule Construction 121
A Rules and Principles 121
B The Postulate to Avoid Balancing 122
C Problems of the Rule Construction 123
II Principles Construction and Proportionality Analysis 124
III Objections to the Principles Construction 124
IV The Rationality of Balancing 126
A The Central Role of the Rationality Problem 126
B The Irrationality Objection 127
C Pareto-Optimality 127
D The Law of Balancing 128
E The Weight Formula 128
9 Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation 133
I Balancing 133
A Two Objections 134
B The Structure of Balancing 135
II Constitutional Review 138
III Representation 139
A Argumentative Representation 139
B Conditions of True Argumentative Representation 140
10 The Existence of Human Rights 142
I The Theoretical and Practical Significance of the Existence Question 142
II The Concept of Human Rights 143
III The Justification of Human Rights 145
A The Principles Structure of Human Rights 145
B Scepticism and Non-Scepticism 146
C Justification and Thesis 147
D Eight Justifications 147
11 The Weight Formula 154
I The Norm-Theoretic Basis: Rules and Principles 154
II The Principle of Proportionality in the Narrower Sense 155
III The Triadic Scale 159
IV The Formula 165
V The Extended Formula 173
12 Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics 175
I The Problem 175
II Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory 176
A Rules and Principles 176
B Proportionality 176
C Weight Formula 177
III The Concept of Formal Principle 179
IV Principles and Balancing in General 180
V The Wrong Way 182
VI Two Kinds of Discretion 184
VII Second-Order Epistemic Optimization 184
VIII Formal Principles and Discretion 188
13 Ideal 'Ought' and Optimization 190
I The Index Model of the Ideal 'Ought' 191
II The Law of Competing Principles 193
III The Weight Formula 196
IV Law of Competing Principles and Law of Balancing 197
V A Fundamental Equivalence 198
VI Poscher's Argument from Identity 199
VII Sieckmann's Reiterated Validity Obligations 200
14 Human Dignity and Proportionality 205
I Absolute and Relative Conceptions of Human Dignity 205
II Practical Significance 205
III Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory 207
A Rules and Principles 207
B Proportionality 208
C Weight Formula 209
IV The Concept of Human Dignity 211
A Descriptive and Normative Elements 211
B The 'Double-Triadic' Concept of Person 212
C Human Dignity as a Bridge Concept 213
V Human Dignity as Principle and as Rule 214
A Human Dignity as Principle 214
B Human Dignity as a Rule 215
VI Devaluation of Human Dignity? 216
A Clear Cases 216
B Object Formula 217
C Abstract Weight and Epistemic Reliability 217
D Rationality 218
15 Proportionality and Rationality 220
I Empirical and Analytical Approaches 220
II Proportionality and Principles Theory 220
A Rules and Principles 220
B Proportionality 221
III Balancing and Argumentation 226
A The Formal and the Substantive Dimension of Rationality 226
B Numbers, Classification Propositions, and their Justification 228
C Disagreement, Discourse, and Rationality 229
IV Balancing, Universalizability, and Legal Certainty 231
A The ad hoc Problem 231
B The Law of Competing Principles 232
C Rules and Conditions 234
16 The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights 235
I The Absolute and the Relative 235
II Constitutional Rights 236
A Constitutional and Human Rights 236
B The Degree of the Absolute Dimension of Constitutional Rights 238
III Proportionality 240
A The Absoluteness of the Principle of Proportionality 240
B The Relativity and Absoluteness of the Application of the Principle of Proportionality 247
Part III Argumentation, Correctness, and Law
17 A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason 255
I Introduction 255
II In Defence of the Concept of Practical Reason 256
III A Kantian Conception of Practical Rationality: Discourse Theory 258
A The Basic Idea of Discourse Theory 259
B The Status of Discourse Theory as a Theory of Practical Correctness and Rationality 261
C Towards the Justification of the Rules of Discourse 263
D The Application of Discourse Theory 269
18 Problems of Discourse Theory 275
I Discourse Theory as a Procedural Theory 275
II Rules of Discourse 277
III The Ideal Discourse 278
A The Problem of Construction 278
B The Problem of Consensus 279
C The Problem of the Criterion 280
D The Problem of Correctness 281
IV The Real Discourse 285
A The Discursive Modalities 285
B The Relative Concept of Correctness 286
19 Legal Argumentation as Rational Discourse 288
I Models 288
A The Model of Deduction 288
B The Model of Decision 289
C The Hermeneutic Model 290
D The Model of Coherence 291
II A Discourse Theory of the Law 292
A General Practical Discourse 293
B Institutionalization 295
III Legal Argumentation 296
A The Different Kinds of Legal Arguments 296
B The Strength of the Arguments 297
20 Jürgen Habermas's Theory of the Indeterminacy of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication 299
I The Problem of Rationality in Adjudication 299
II Three Insufficient Answers 300
III Ronald Dworkins's Theory of Rights 301
IV Law as an Ideally Coherent System of Norms 304
V Theory of Legal Argumentation 306
VI The Special Case Thesis 307
A Moral, General Practical, and Legal Discourse 307
B The Rules and Forms of Legal Discourse 309
C Unjust Law 310
D Specific Legal Nature? 311
21 Law and Correctness 312
I The Concept of the Claim to Correctness 312
A The Subjects 312
B The Addressees 313
C Raising a Claim 314
II The Necessity of Connecting Law and Correctness 315
A An Absurd Constitutional Article 316
B An Absurd Judgment 318
C The Alternative 319
III Legal and Moral Correctness 320
A Law's Open Texture 320
B The Autonomy Objection 321
C The Objection of Impossibility 322
D Reality and Ideal 323
Index of Names 327
Index of Subjects 329