Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy

Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy

by Russell Hardin
     
 

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ISBN-10: 0199261687

ISBN-13: 9780199261680

Pub. Date: 08/14/2003

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

In his ground-breaking book, the leading political philosopher Russell Hardin develops a new theory of liberal constitutional democracy. Arguing against the standard consensus theories, the author shows how social co-ordination on limited, sociological mutual advantage lies at the heart of liberal constitutionalism when it works to produce stable government. The book

Overview

In his ground-breaking book, the leading political philosopher Russell Hardin develops a new theory of liberal constitutional democracy. Arguing against the standard consensus theories, the author shows how social co-ordination on limited, sociological mutual advantage lies at the heart of liberal constitutionalism when it works to produce stable government. The book argues that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy are co-ordination theories. They work only in societies in which co-ordination of the important power groups for mutual advantage is feasible. It then goes on to examine and interpret the US constitution as motivated centrally by the concern with creating a government to enable commerce. In addition, the book addresses the nature of the problems that the newly democratic, newly market-oriented states face. The analysis of constitutionalism is based on its workability, not on its intrinsic, normative, or universal appeals. Hardin argues, similarly, there are harsh limits on the possibilities of democracy. In general, democracy works only on the margins of great issues. Indeed, it is inherently a device for regulating marginal political conflicts.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780199261680
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date:
08/14/2003
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
400
Product dimensions:
8.40(w) x 5.40(h) x 0.90(d)

Related Subjects

Table of Contents

1Mutual Advantage1
Three Mutual-Advantage Theories1
Social Order9
Coordination12
Political Obligation18
Unintended Consequences23
The Governors25
The Argument of the Book27
The Normative Status of Sociological Mutual Advantage31
A Summary of the Chapters34
The Central Controversies38
2Liberalism: Political and Economic41
Two Liberalisms41
The Grounds of Liberalism45
The Welfarist Core47
Deontological Additions49
Strategic Structures53
Hobbes54
Locke58
Smith59
Madison60
Mill61
The Complex View63
Collective Resolution65
Causal and Conceptual Links68
One Unified Liberalism?73
Religious Toleration Again74
Historical Changes76
Centralized Intelligence78
Concluding Remarks80
3Constitutionalism: Contract or Coordination?82
Institutions and Choice82
Contract or Coordination?85
The Strategic Structure of a Constitution90
Coordination on and under a Constitution103
Agreement and a Constitution107
Incentives to Abide by a Constitution113
Contracts Not Like Contracts Either114
Bargains in Philadelphia119
Large versus Small States120
Anti-Federalists versus Federalists122
Slavery127
Plantation Agrarian versus Commercial Interests129
Ex Ante Justification129
Why a Written Constitution?133
4Democracy: Agreement or Acquiescence?141
Consent141
Contractarianism145
Popular Sovereignty152
Constitutionalism and Democracy157
Justice as Order and Democracy159
Government as Grown161
The Logic of Democracy165
Limits on Citizen Responsibility166
Individual Autonomy170
The Right Result172
Alternative Visions175
Virtual Representation178
Concluding Remarks181
5Liberalization and its Discontents184
Transition to the Two Liberalisms184
Constitutional Liberalism187
Ethnic Conflicts190
Economic Conflicts195
Egalitarianism202
Equality versus Efficiency204
Egalitarianism in One Society210
Egalitarianism Without Socialism212
The Dual Task of 1989215
Irreversibility of Liberalization?219
Political Liberalization220
Economic Liberalization222
Concluding Remarks223
6Constitutional Economic Transition228
A Neutral Constitution228
Expectations and Constitutional Stability233
Economic and Political Visions in the Early United States236
The Commerce Clause241
Economic Growth, Economic Transition248
Hammer and Sickle255
Economic Transition in a Constitutional Democracy257
Economic Transition and Demographic Growth264
American and Eastern Comparisons269
Concluding Remarks274
7Democracy on the Margin276
Divided Society276
Democracy as Group Census277
Interests and Democracy280
Constitutional Pre-commitment283
American Extremes285
Democracy and Economic Development291
Communal Good294
Group Justice and Democracy300
Unequal Coordination305
Concluding Remarks309
Afterword: Whether Agreed to or Not311
Justifying the Whole311
Collective and Individual Values314
Acquiescence and Mutual Advantage316
Concluding Remarks319
AppendixOther Liberalisms322
Social Liberalism323
Institutional Liberalism324
Welfare Liberalism325
Group Liberalism326
The Civil Rights Movement328
Strategic Differences329
References333
Index349

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