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Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
     

Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies

by Michael Laver (Editor), Kenneth A. Shepsle (Editor)
 
Offering a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works, the authors formulate a model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them.

Overview

Offering a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works, the authors formulate a model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them.

Editorial Reviews

From the Publisher
"Laver and Shepsle have produced an expertly executed manuscript that will have a profound effect on the study of government coalitions for years to come....their focus on agenda powers is seminal, provocative, and profound." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly

"...at once eminently testable and refreshingly simple and elegant." American Political Science Review

"Laver and Shepsle creatively combine the components of political theory with vigorous multivirate statistical analysis, case studies of Germany and Ireland, and simulation experiments to differentiate between cabinet and legislative governing responsibilities." Craig A. Williams, LSS Newsletter

"...clear and persuasive.... ...a well-articulated conception of parliamentary government and one that is likely to stimulate much further research. ...Making and Breaking Governments...will powerfully stimulate and enhance future research on democratic political institutions." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly

"The authors have achieved a brilliant juxtaposition of theoretical rigor with practical application. Theorists, as well as commentators on political elections, can profitably use this book. It is well worth an analyst's time and effort to learn this model for applications to their respective parliaments." Douglas Wills, Public Choice

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521432450
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
08/28/2014
Series:
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series
Pages:
320
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.91(d)

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