Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide. Although the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination—including both strategic voting and strategic entry—worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws.
1111442947
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide. Although the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination—including both strategic voting and strategic entry—worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws.
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Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

by Gary W. Cox
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

by Gary W. Cox

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Overview

This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide. Although the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination—including both strategic voting and strategic entry—worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521585279
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 03/28/1997
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 360
Product dimensions: 5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.91(d)

Table of Contents

List of tables and figures; Series editor's preface; Preface; PART I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Introduction; 2. Duverger's propositions; PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING: 3. On electoral systems; 4. Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems; 5. Strategic voting in multimember districts; 6. Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems; 7. Some concluding comments on strategic voting, PART III. STRATEGIC ENTRY: 8. Strategic voting, party labels and entry; 9. Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan; PART IV. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THe SYSTEM LEVEL: 10. Putting the constituencies together; 11. Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties; PART V. COORDINATION FAILURES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: 12. Coordination failures and representation; 13. Coordination failures and dominant parties; 14. Coordination failures and realignments; PART VI. CONCLUSION; 15. Conclusion; Appendices; References; Subject index; Author index.
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